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ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the urban development of the city
of Athens since its foundation as the capital of the newborn
Greek State (1833), until our days. The study focuses on
two particular characteristics that dominate the form of the
city: laissez-faire development and adhocist shaping, as
they rise out of coinciding intentions and aspirations
among the people involved in city making and individuals.
Under the above assumption, we traced specific inter-
actions or counteractions among social classes and groups,
planning services, land speculation, building sector, and
professionals--as they have affected the legislative frame-
work, master plans' proposals or planning guidelines, and
the specific physical structure, of the city (main street
layouts and lines, areas of the city, patterns of land sub-
division, housing typologies), during the different historical
stages of urban growth.
We further try to analyze the present status of the
above social and spatial relationships as a product of the
historical process, and we use the outcome of this analysis
to criticize the on going discussion "Athens 2000", thereby
connecting the thesis to the present-day problems of urban
development.
We approach the historical development of Athens by
focussing on specific cases, that are characteristic of four
major time spans, which marked the course of city shaping.
These four periods refer to: the foundation of Athens as
capital of the new-born Greek state and its first Master
Plan, (1833); the prevalence of land speculation and un-
Planned growth (1880); the refugees' settlement and the
resulting urban agglomeration (1920s); and the formation
of the contemporary metropolitan area.
In the light of the above historical examination we
analyze the present situation, which, we believe, is
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representing a new potential threshold to the development
of the city. After a long time of inaction, planning comes
to challenge the laissez-faire status quo of city making.
Our conclusions are concerned with the dynamics of the new
developing trends, calling for a control over the city en-
vironment, versus the moment of resistance or inertias of
the inherited practices.
Thesis Supervisor: Julian Beinart
Title: Professor of Architecture
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Overview
The urban space of Athens is not a historical
space. By this, I do not mean that is was not
created by history... I mean that this space,
these volumes continually and everywhere are
being transformed, destroyed and rebuilt. What
is of greater significance than the dates, are
the generating powers, the alternations of
mechanisms from the political to the economic,
from the economic to the demographical, that
assured the growth of Athens. In the same way,
they shaped the specific form of the city...
Inside this heaving of architecture and space,
no order is brought out; only the violent game
of the economic and social forces...order is
defined by its lack of definition. In fact
it is urban anarchy.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 401 & 403)
History has nevertheless always been a presence in
Athens, hanging over the space of the city. Monuments
from the ancient past, isolated from other structures,
today stare out from Acropolis rock toward the development
of the modern metropolis. This rock, unlike other ancient
sites, had never been deserted by human settlement. This
natural and ancient landscape has been the only string
connecting the various stages of Athens.
The course of the settlement up to the present is
not characterized by a smooth, continuous evolution, rather
it represents a curve with violent risings and declines,
corresponding to periods of vitality, destruction or
lethargy. Each of these periods brought together its own
philosophy, each radically different from the preceding
philosophy, and each changing the Athenian environment.
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Six such major phases marked the history of the city:
Prehistoric times, when the first people settled on Acropolis
as well as in other places around Attica (3,000 B.C.).
During this period Theseus, a legendary hero, united these
small scattered municipalities of Attica into a state, with
Athens as its capital (Early 13th Century B.C.). From then
onwards the city is divided into two different parts --The
Acropolis, dedicated to the gods, and the lower city, con-
sisting of the administrative and civic center (Agora), and
the residential area. During this period Athens developed
smoothly, spreading from the sacred rock, down towards its
southern slope.
Classical Historic Era: The period of "Ancient Glory."
Athens became an organized "polis." The'union of munici-
palities was finally completed (6th Century B.C.) and an
elaborate democratic system of administration was created.
Following the successful outcome of the Persian wars and
the victory of Salamis in 480 B.C. the power of Athens was
established and its glory overshadowed the other cities or
Greece. The Acropolis aquired new, elaborate temples, the
city spread and new walls were built, widening the city.
The Agora is remodelled: an open space is formed, surrounded
by public buildings . Piraeus's ports also began developing,
being fortified so as to secure the growing naval power of
the city, while the "Long Walls" were constructed to guaran-
tee safe communication between Athens and the harbors. An
Athenian Confederation was created with member cities
all over Greecein which Athens played the leading role.
Commerce, arts, sciences, and philosophy developed.
Opening of relations with, and dominance of the city over
the outside world, brought into it a significant wealth
distributed fairly among its citizens and the municipal
body. This wealth, together with the slaves' labor,
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motivated the admirable activities of Athens. More and
more public buildings and temples were being built. In
contrast to the glorious monumental environment, the every-
day one, as described by Dicaiarchos at the end of 4th
century B.C., was "poor and modest," a valid description
according to Demosthenes, even for the houses of the most
honorable men. Streets were irregular and narrow (3 meters
in width), and only a few roads, leading from the heart of
the city to its gates, were 4 to 5 meters wide. In contrast,
Pireaus was laid out according to a Hyppidamian system.
Euphoria did not last for long. After defeat by Sparta,
Athens began to decline, remaining only as the cultural
center of Greece.
The Roman Period began with the destruction of Athens by
Syllas (86 B.C.). The fortification of the city, the
"long walls," and the fortification of Piraeus were demo-
lished. The port declined rapidly, to the point where--
according to Stravon--there were a few houses around the
harbour and a temple. However, Athens kept a certain
autonomy, surviving as the cultural center of the Roman
Empire. Thus it became enriched by new public buildings
and works of infrastructure, thanks to contributions by
Roman and other emperors, or wealthy men. In addition,
the city was growing in all directions with emphasis to
the east (122-135 A.D.).
The Byzantine Period began when the city was burned by Eruli
in 267 A.D.,with the ensuing 'dominance of Christianity.
The ancient center further declined, becoming a small,
provincial city with a few churches, and without commercial
or transportation significance. Its population diminished.
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The Frankish Period (1204-1456) marked a time when all
walls were abandoned and the city was reduced to a narrow
territory surrounding the Acropolis.
The Ottoman Period (1456-1821) was a time when the city,
taking advantage of the privileges provided by Turks began
to expand again as a commercial center. Many churchs and
Turkish public buildings were built. The Bazaar, being
located over the Roman Agora became the heart of the city.
Houses were built upon the old road traces. A new wall
surrounded the city, characterized by almost the same gates
as the ancient one, since the system of rural roads had not
changed. The city was inhabited in its major part by Greeks
as well as by Turks and Albanians. The Greek Revolution
(1821) against the Ottomans came to sweep away social
structure. This movement followed the French Revolution
slogans and belonged to the broader category of Mediterranean
liberal movements of the period. The movement was initiated
by Greek bourgeois, who lived mainly in the wealthy Greek
communities of Europebut was materialized by bold, local
outlaw heroes who extended it beyond the narrow borders of
the small city. Athens, following the examples of the other
Greek cities of the Balkan peninsula, participated in the
struggle. The city was destroyed, again by the Turks. Its
inhabitants abanconed it, to return after recognition was
given to the independent Greek state by the London Treaty
of 1830.
The modern history of Athens begins in 1833, when it
was decided that the medieval village of four or five thou-
sand people should become the capital of the newly founded
state. Urban development in Athens began with a neoclassical
master plan and a number of western ideas that foreigner
newcomers--Bavarians, international Greek bourgeois--tried
to impose on the Medieval city. Ever since, Athens has
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developed more rapidly than ever before. Its dynamic
growth siezed the minds of modern planners who considered
Athens a New City:
We must however resign ourselves to the fact
that our capital, i.e., Athens, the Piraeus
and the surrounding area, is a new city, newer
than corresponding cities on the American con-
tinent or even in Australia.. .A hundred years
ago, the population of Athens barely numbered
50,000, while at the beginning of its modern
history, when the country won its freedom, it
was just a village with no more than 4,000
inhabitants. Even in the new continents there
were cities of much greater size at that time.
(R. Doxiadis, 1961, p. 281)
Certainly modern Athens did not carry any long urban
tradition, as did other European or Asian cities, nor was
it the 'Brasilia' of the 19th century. Actually its first
neoclassical master plan ended in a series of compromises
until new forms of urban fabric sprang up and multiplied.
Starting as a purely administrative city, it soon became
enriched by educational, financial, commercial, and, fin-
ally, industrial activities, and developed complex mechanisms
that extended beyond the national boundaries. Since 1833,
its space has experienced a great range of models, schemes,
building types, priorities: from the irregular streets and
the traditional houses of the medieval nucleus, to the
generous open spaces and the monumental buildings of its
first ambitious architects and planners; from the gridiron
modesty of middle-class neighborhoods to the exotic land-
scape and the prestigious mansions of its upper-class
suburbs; from the organized building of its first refugees'
settlements, to the ad hoc, overnight appearance of illegal
areas. It was seized by import business firms, and by large
metallurgy and chemical industrial plants run by Greek
capital; by numerous state administrative services, and by
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numerous private ones. It passed into the hands of every
kind of political government, from absolute monarchy and
dictatorships, to socialist and even communist (for a few
days) parties. Always having been a space for receiving
money from abroad, it was at the same time channeling its
products to the whole country or out of it. Having many
faces and including many variables, modern Athens has been
given by geographers and planners many contradictory labels:
colonial and neocolonial third world capital, or the modern
western metropolis; consumption and parasitic center or a
modern industrial capital; an international node or a
Balkan peripheral city:
Athens, linked politically to the world's strategic
interest, connected by its businessmen to the
great economic streams and following through its
port the rhythm of overseas departures, remains
for the majority of its population a city of
peasants, nationalistic and closed to itself.
Nowhere in the Mediterranean basin is the interna-
tional infiltration (of capital, products, tourism)
more intensive; at the same time, no other city of
this dimension is less cosmopolitan. One cannot
conceive of this contradiction if one does not
take into account the young age of the city, the
rural origin of its inhabitants, and its success
as an artificial capital...
... Indicative and contradictory, Athens set under
all these terms, the problem of development.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 14)
Burgel puts Athens in the category of Great
Mediterranean cities (Rome, Madrid) considering its rate
of population growth (3 percent for Athens, 2.8 and 3.3
percent for Rome and Madrid).* But Burgel also takes into
account the fact that Athens is third in rank among the
cities that develop in all directions, after Buenos Aires
and Santiago, while he attributes to it a prototypical
position, comparing its rapidity of growth to the limited
dimensions of the country. In addition, M. de Sola-Morales,
*G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 21, 23.
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noting the similar funcions ("city as business venture"),
common social characteristics (such as extent of and signif-
icance of middle class), and similar development of tools
for expansion (master plans), places the 19th Century Athens
inside the bag of the other Mediterranean cities: - Madrid,
Bari, Algiers, Barcelona. However, Athens abandoned very
early these tools (1880), and followed the pattern of what
might be called no-plan growth." Furthermore, its current
ad hoc urban typology is very close to that of some middle
east centers such as Beirut and Jerusalem.
Athens is finally an exotic city, congested
around the Acropolis. It is also a city in
full growth, that develops incidentally, accor-
ding to the circumstances,without great order,
but with an astonishina inventiveness.
(M. Deon, op. cit., p. 400)
Athens owes this inventiveness to the broad inter-
action with the outside world, and also to the parallel
development of its own specific tools to cope with the urban
space. Unplanned growth in an historic city that began its
modern phase with a well-defined master plan can only mean
that land and building speculation were so successfully
bound to the facilitation of this urban growth, that they became
the dominant element in the city structure. On the other
hand, unplanned growth also points to the inadequacy of
public authorities who are unable to undertake active
initiatives. Perhaps this sounds strange when one considers
the volume and extent of public administration and services
in Greece, as well as state practices regarding control
over other sectors (cultural, educational, political).
But when one reviews this newer history of the city, one
discovers that no urban crisis occurred in Athens except
the one concerned with the implementation of the first
master plan; this contrasts sharply with the successive
political crises.
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Such a characteristic can only be explained by a
silent consensus among the social strata living in the
city, a consensus. that secured for each individual certain
benefits or at least covered some essential needs. Land
and building speculation became both the protagonist and
the means for the distribution of these benefits. The
ad hocist building on the other hand connotes that the social
and.economic basis for this unplanned development consisted
of small private units. Our historical analysis is structured
on the grounds of the above assumptions.
In the following chapters we will examine these two
characteristics of modern Athens--unplanned growth, and
ad-hocism, since its foundation as the capital--as rising
out of coinciding intentions among the social groups living
in the city, public organizations and private institutions
acting on the city level, as well as from coinciding
aspirations among individuals. Thus, we trace specific
interactions or counteractions among social classes and
groups, planning services, land speculation, building
sector, and professionals--such as planners, architects,
civil engineers--as they have affected the legislative
framework, master plans' proposals or planning guidelines,
and the specific physical structure of the city (main
street layouts and lines, main areas of the city, patterns
of land subdivision, housing typologies). Throughout the
study, we consider urban space itself as an indispensable
part of the mechanisms moving the city; it is both influenced
and influential, a dynamic participant, and not simply a
reflection of the city's social structure.
We further try to analyze the present status of the
above social and spatial relationships as a product of the
historical process, and we use the outcome of this analysis
to criticize the on-going discussion "Athens 2000", thereby
connecting the thesis to the present-day problems of urban
development.
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In the examination of the development of the city we
attempt four "cuts" in history, focusing on short time-
spans rather than on whole periods. The four cases are
representative of the periods and correspond to the thresh-
holds of the development of the city, during which signifi-
cant transformations occured. They refer to: the founda-
tion of Athens as Capital of the new-born Greek state and
its first Master Plan (1833); the prevalence of land
speculation and unplanned growth (1880); the refugees'
settlement and the resulting urban agglomeration (1920s); and
the formation of the contemporary urban area.
Initially, we place each case inside its larger
national social context, to the extent it interfaces the
principal aspects of the Athenian development. Then we are
concerned with the internal social and cultural interactions
or contradictions focusing on specific examples of city making.
Finally, we attempt to resynthesize city form, pointing out
the successive prevailing trends, as well as their contin-
uities with former or following periods.
The specific analysis of each period conforms to
the following outlines:
The Foundation of Athens as the Capital of the New Greek
State is considered as the point of convergence between the
nationalistic aspirations of broader Hellenism, and the
Romantic expectations of the Bavarian government to, restore
the ancient civilization. The important aspects here are:
Kleanthes's and Schaumbert's ambitious Master Plan Proposal
versus Athenians' reaction to its implementation, which
resulted in successive compromises and elimination of
large-scale intervention inside the existing settlement.
and the development of a new neoclassical urban fabric,
and the transformation of the traditional everyday environ-
ment so as to approach neoclassical standards. Part One
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ends with an analysis of city form character, which is
marked by two components: a new, growing administrative
and educational mechanism (occupying the planned expansion
of the city); and an alive, traditional,merchandise pre-
capitalist community (inside the old settlement nucleus).
The Unplanned City Expansion and the Prevalence of Land
Speculation at the end of the 19th century are considered
as expressions of two main trends: the liberalization of
the constitution after the explusion of the Bavarian king
and the decision of a part of the international Greek bour-
geoisie to transfer its center of activity to Athens,
establishing banks and investing together with foreign
capitalists on transportation works and industries--in
Pireaus and the new industrial city of Lavrion. This
second part focuses on the following aspects: th.e weakening
role of city planning as a means to control the urban
development, and the fast-growing opposition of land
proprietors to any intervention; the laying out of railways
and tramways and their impact on the laissez-faire devel-
opment of the city; the land ownership system and the
increasing role of real estate property for middle-class
housing and investing. City form during this period is
marked by the development of Athens-Pireaus as a bi-polar
system (administrative-financial and industrial center,
respectively), and the encirclement of the neoclassical
center by railway lines and a new residential periphery.
The Period Between the Wars represents a dramatic change
in the history of the nation: it is marked by the influx
of refugies from Asia Minor's Greek centers and by indus-
trialization. In this, the third part, we concentrate on
three main cases: the scattered establishment of refugees'
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settlements around Athens, undertaken by public and inter-
national organizations, and their catalytic impact on the
industrial development of Athens; the political situation
and the ad-hoc composition of the Athenian agglomeration;
the failure of any planning attempt to cope with the city
expansion; and the appearance of the condominium apartment
building in the central lots, and its impact on the housing
commercialization and on the development of the private
building sector. During this period, Athens and Piraeus
represent one urban whole divided into numerous munici-
palities. This whole is characterized by two centers with
intensified density (the municipality of Athens and the
municipality of Piraeus) and a loose periphery comprised
of the refugees' settlements and scattered speculative and
industrial developments.
The Post-War Urban Area has been defined inside a conser-
vative political context. Social services programming is
eliminated, while the development of the country is managed
exclusively by Greek and international capitalists, under
the protectionist policy of the national government. Athens
plays a dominant role in this development, concentrating
the major portion of Greece's economic activities and
population inside its territory, which is growing in every
direction. Three cases are essential here: the departure
of planning from any concrete reality and its degeneration
into "talk" among architects and planners; the proliferation
of illegal settlements, and their gradual "legalization";
and the condominium apartment building boom, and the
decisive role of the private building sector in the economy
of the city. At the end of this fourth part we attempt to
define the present problems and conflicts by analyzing
the structure and the trends in the post-war urban sprawl.
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In light of the historical examination outlined
above, we attempt a fifth "cut" in the situation, which,
we believe, represents a potential threshhold to the develop-
ment of the city. On the one hand, previous modes of
development seem to have come to a deadlock. Inflation
and staleness threatens the euphoria created by the con-
tinuous growth of the city. National government enters
onto the scene for the first time, to propose a program
framework intending to control the Athenian urban area
("Athens 2000"). New alliances are created among the
concerned groups. A long debate has started among people
involved in the private building sector, municipalities
and national government. In our fifth part we concentrate
on two main aspects: decentralization policy; and the new
planning framework for Athens, as proposed by the governmnet.
Through the conflicts and conventions arising from the on-
going debate about the above proposal we attempt, finally,
to approach the character of the current situation. Here
our historical analysis is used as an underlying framework
for consideration of new conditions, and projection of trends
into the future. In fact, we face a situation diametrically
opposite to the urban planning (or non-planning) situation
of the past. Planning comes suddenly to dispute the reign
of laissez-faire. The outcomes of this conflict are inde-
pendent of specific tactics. No matter what particular
political or economic guidelines were employed, ad hoc
development always walked hand in hand with the growth of
the city. Our conclusions are concerned with the adapt-
abilities and inertias of this inherited situation, as well
as with the social dimensions of the new challenges.
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AN IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CHOICE
ATHENS BECOMES THE CAPITAL OF THE NEWBORN GREEK STATE
When Athens was established as the capital of Greece,
by the decree of June 29 (or July 11) 1833, there were few,
if any, indications that the city would become the dominant
and unchallenged focal point of the whole Helladic space it
is today.
However, the present status of the city along with its
glorious past, during the Classical and early Byzantine
times, usually leads to conscious thoughts or unconscious
correlations about the physical and geographical advantages
of its site. Under such an approach, the location of the
capital by the Bavarians is considered to be "natural" and
"rational". Nevertheless one can dispute the advantages
of the location as such, as well as its organic role within
the national and international networks of productive and
commercial activities at the time.
During the last years of the War of Independence (1826-
1829), Athens became the theater of operation for important
battles between the revolutionaries and the Turks. The
Acropolis was constantly changing hands--the Greeks and
Turks often seiged one another--and this situation resulted
in a heavy battle and the defeat of the revolutionary army
(1827). In fear of reprisals, the whole Greek population
of the city, which represented over 90% of the total,
escaped to Salamis, a nearby island, the traditional shel-
ter for Athenians since antiquity.
It was not until the ratification of the London Treaty
(1831) that the people began to re-establish themselves in
the city. The physical inventory that they found was "1500
destroyed houses. . . 125 churches and very few public
buildings." Maurer gives a vivid, terrifying account of
the situation:
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Wherever you looked, you could see bare rocks and
drought, uncultivated land; nowhere streets, nowhere
bridges. The people were living either in caves or
in hovels, earthern or made with stones simply put
one on top of the other. Athens, which before the War
of Independence had three thousand houses, now has not
even three hundred. The rest turned into shapeless
piles of building materials. Most of them still
remain like this. (Maurer, Pg. 410-411)
Athens, of course, was not the only settlement ravaged
by the War of Independence. The 'capital' of West Central
Greece, Messolongi, was also totally destroyed after a
two-year long siege. (Lord Byron was buried under the ruins
of the city along with thousands of its Greek defenders.)
Most of the cities of Peloponese fell victim to an invasion
by the Egyptians. And the few existing island cities enter-
ed into a period of decline, their wealth bled dry to
support the Revolution. Actually only a handful of cities
were still worth their names. Nafplion, the temporary
chair of the Bavarians; Patras, the west entrance of
the country; and Syra, a bustling port in the middle of
the Aegean Sea. So, from this point of view, Athens had
a lot of competition: a destroyed city among many others,
probably the most damaged one.
Athens had other serious disadvantages. During the
previous fifty years the city had lost its regional role
to other cities with more advantageous positions, either in
terms of their contribution to the administrative structure
of the Ottoman Empire, or their proximity to the prevailing
commercial routes of the time, or both. The initial result
was a decline in population in the 19th century; next, all
administrative and educational institutions were removed;
and finally, Athens was cut off from the rest of the country
as roads declined.
It is characteristic, for the role of the city at the
time, that all revolutionary assemblies, all major informal
-24-
meetings and discussions, and finally all the temporary
governments from 1821 to 1831 were held or established
elsewhere, primarily in the Peloponesian cities. It
follows that all the institutions of the revolutionary state
were also established in those cities; and ultimately in
Nafplion, whose region was the only spot of the Helladic
that had avoided captivity during the ten-year revolution.
So it was natural that King Otto and his 'Romantic Caravan'
first disembarked in Nafplion, the only place that had to
offer them a "State House," a barracks, a few schools and
several houses to establish themselves. But Nafplion was
also decayed. It shared some of the worst memories of
the long 'national discord'. Its previous governor had
been assassinated. And, above, all, it was the base for
all plots and political rivalry of the time. From the very
beginning, it was conceived as a temporary station. Discus-
sion about a new capital began immediately and soon became
a hot issue.
Peloponesians, who carried the main load of the war,
suggested their cities: Tripolis, the center of the region,
a commercial hub with acceptable communications, in the
middle of a productive area, and, most important, the home
of the de facto chief of the Revolution--Kolokotronis;
Argos, which presented a similar case; and finally Corinth,
a city with a strong fortress and an advantageous location--
it was at the geographical center of the newborn state, and
was located on a strip of land between two seas, which was
and remains extremely important for international commerce.
Megara, a nearby city in Central Greece, shared, to a certain
extent, the same advantages, along with the support of a
prominent politician, Kolletis, who had influence with the
king. On the Aegean Sea there was Syra, a commercial center
similar to Corinth, and a promising industrial area. Syra
remained important in that respect for the next half century.
Athens, in this framework, did not have any particular
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advantages to offer and so was not initially considered--
due to the city's isolation and lack of political support.
There was one more alternative in the debate over a
capital, a position which expressed the mood of a signifi-
cant part of the population: a call for many mobile and
temporary capitals, with the government moving from one city
to another until the liberation of Constantinople. This
solution, it was argued, would keep the nation alert until
the fulfillment of its Renaissance. Antiquity was the
Byzantine Empire and its symbol was Constantinople, not
Athens. However, the nation was very weak at that time,
and the idea was kept dormant for fity more years.
The debate over a new capital was becoming more and more
of an obstacle to confronting other problems. Therefore,
Otto assumed the responsibility of choosing it himself,
in collaboration with the Vice-royalty who were, by that
time, in charge of the country. L.V. Maurer, a member of
the Vice-royalty, gives us an account of the considerations
the Bavarians brought to bear on their decision. First,
the proposals for just about all the cities were rejected
as being based on "barren localist" considerations: geo-
graphical position, potential for commerce and industry, or
accessibility to the rest of the country were not discussed.
Instead, the decision was based on the ancient performance
of the cities and, by this criterion, only two met the
requirements. First is Corinth:
Built in one of the most magnificent sites of
the world, over the ruins of the ancient city and
facing the Mountains of Parnassos, Kitheron and Elicon.
(Maurer, p. 478)
Not one comment is made about its commercial and geographic
advantages. Nevertheless, Corinth has a very poor record
when compared with the references of Athens:
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But there are all these memories for the Classical
Civilization, the arts, the sciences and the immortal
war--cloaks that favour Athens. Built over the finest
ruins of Classical Antiquity, and near Marathon, it
faces Salamis, Aegina, the three ports, the remnants
of the long walls, the Tomb of Kimon, the Ancient Stoa,
the prison of Sokratis--where as said he had drunk
the Glass of Konium--the still perfectly preserved
Temple of Theseus, the Parthenon and the Propylae. In
the west it faces the Academy, Kolonos, Elefsis and
the Fortress of Acrocorinth. In the east finally it
faces the bricked-in columns of the temples which were
destroyed by the Persians, the Prytaneum, the Monument
of Lycicrates, the Gate of Adrianus, the Theatre of
Dionysos, the high columns of the Temple of Olympius
Zeus, the Fountain of Calliroe, with its eternally
bubbling water, the well preserved Stadium and the
mountains of Parnassos, Hymettus and Penteli. (Maurer,
p. 478).
And he concludes with:
Which king could choose another place for the head-
quarters of its government? At the moment, he had
in his hands the intellectual spring of the world.
(Maurer, pp. 478-479)
What strikes us first in this text is that Maurer is
unfamiliar with the topography of Attica: Acrocorinth
is not visible from Athens as it lies fifty miles away;
it cannot be considered as a physical boundary since two
mountains are in between. Mount Parnassos, again, is not
visible as it lies more than a hundred miles to the west,
and not to the east of the city. Finally, some of the
monuments that Athens "faces" were, at the time, buried
under alluviums supporting neighborhoods of the village.
Maurer's geographical ignorance aside, the quoted
passages are interesting to the extent that they reveal
the preoccupations of the Bavarians during their rule in
Greece. Their "love for Greece had two sides: a plain "sym-
pathy" for the new nation that was seen as a -ield for
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civilizing work (and for imperialistic exploitation as well)
on. the one hand; and a passionate love for ancient Greece
on the other. The latter notion dominated the former.
Ludwig I, King of Bavaria--Otto's father, was the main source
of this attitude. Later, in 1836, when he visited Athens
he expressed sentiments that may have pioneered the "tour-
istic romanticism" approach to Greek antiquities:
Today the King of Bavaria ordered fires set on the hill
to illuminate the Acropolis. He desires to enjoy
the spectacle by himself. (H. Russack, in Constadinides,
p. 56)
Beyond all this.vague Romanticism, the choice of Athens
had two interesting aspects, but we do not know if they were
consciously considered by the Bavarians at the time.
First, by choosing a place with no local interests,
the Bavarians were not only avoiding the quarrel between
the rival cities but they were also setting a field where
they could exercise their political rule without interfer-
ence from the regional establishments of the country. It
seems that in this preoccupation they had the support of
the Greek diaspora, whose aspiration was to increase its
influence over the affairs of the newly born State. As
Mpires notes:
It was in Athens that they could impose themselves,
easily and steadily, from a political and social
point of view; more than in Nafplion, where the socie-
ty was already organized and strong, and in its neigh-
boring cities Argos and Corinth, where the social life
of Nafplion could easily be transported. (Mpires,
1937, p. 1247)
The second aspect and very important for our study,
concerned land-ownership issues. Under the Treaty of
London, which marked the end of the War of Independence,
the Turks had abandoned their land properties without any
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compensation. In this way, almost all the land became
the property of the State, an advantageous situation for
the implementation of a master plan. There were just two
exceptions to the rule; Athens was one of them. The agree-
ment for Athens gave the departing Turks the right to sell
their land either at the time, or later through representa-
tives. Soon the lands of the area came into the hands of
Athenians and Greeks from abroad.
If the absence of strong local interests was creating
an advantageous precondition for the Bavarians to exercise
their rule, the diffusion of landownership played down that
control in terms of the actual spatial regulation of the
city.
Though it is difficult to determine the exact blend of
political and ideological reasons that underlie the decision
to install the capital of the state in Athens, the results
of the installation are much more visible and clear. By
choosing to develop a new city in a milieu of scarce re-
sources the state actually initiated the stagnation of a
number of other cities by depriving them of necessary ser-
vices, absorbed by the new capital. But, at the same time,
the state did not have the means even to transform Athens
into the city the Bavarians had originally imagined.
After an initial influx of new inhabitants, attracted by
public sector jobs created to support the new regime, the
immigration slowed down and actually stopped by 1854 because
of a cholera epidemic. In 1856 the city had 30,963 inhabi-
tants. Its port, Pireaus, which had also been abandoned
during the revolution, had another 5,000 people. Pireaus
had a unique reason for existing: it supplied the capital
with most of its basic supplies, due to Athens' isolation
from the rest of the country.
Nothing better describes the stagnation of the capital
than the notes of a traveller who visited it thirty years
after its "Renaissance":
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This coincidental capital has no roots. Due to the
lack of streets, it does not communicate with the rest
of the country. Due to the lack of industry, it does
not send any products to the mainland. The plain of
Athens remains uncultivated. Even the few villages
that geographically surround it are not aware of its
existence. To describe it with only a few words, if
the government suddenly decided to move, nothing could
keep the population in its place. (Edmond About, in
G. Burgel, p. 243)
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THE FIRST MASTER PLAN OF ATHENS: A NEOCLASSICAL UTOPIA AND
ITS IMPLEMENTATION
The first master plan of Athens envisioned the city as
the capital of the Greek state, although the plan preceded
the actual choice. Naturally, the Master Plan played a role
in the decision to choose Athens, but it also caused Athen-
ians to realize the potential of their city, under the
existing circumstances.
Kleanthes's involvement in the Master Plan represents
the attitude of Greek intellectuals towards Neoclassicism
and Athens, or, in other words, the complement to the passion
of the Bavarians.
Kleanthes, a native of northern Greece, and a member of
Philikae Etairiae, participated in the battle of Iasion
(1820) as a member of the 'Sacred Company'. The Company was
a union of young intellectuals with nationalistic ideas,
who were proud to compare themselves with the ancient Spar-
tans. In the battle, a prelude to the revolution, the
revolutionaries were badly defeated. Kleanthes, however,
managed to escape and fled to Berlin where he studied arch-
itecture under the leading neoclassical figure of the time,
Schinkel. After completing his studies he received an
award that enabled him to visit Italy, and finally he re-
turned to Greece in late 1829. He was always accompanied
by his Berlin classmate and collaborator, E. Schaubert, also
an architect but primarily interested in archeology. The
work they did together is usually attributed to Kleanthes.
*The two friends first visited Athens in 1830 to
"dream the revival of the beauty of the ancient city and of
the glory of Athens as a Capital of the new Greece" (Mpires,
1933), but also to carry out the first systematic measure-
ments of the site. Soon after they visited the governor,
Kapodistrias, suggesting that the capital be moved to Athens,
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they volunteered to work on the master plan. Kapodistrias
turned down the offer, he was assassinated shortly there-
after, and a 'temporary government' was set up. The two
friends repeated their appeal and in 1832 they were assigned
to work on the master plan. They began working under the
arbitrary assumption that Athens was destined to become the
capital--a perspective with little support at the time. In
late 1832, the plan was ready and was sent to the Vice-
royalty who had just previously arrived in Greece. The
master plan was accompanied with an explanatory memo very
characteristic of the authors' ideologies:
We foresee that all the civilized world will
enthusiastically accept this work. . . Following
public opinion and the general wishes of the Greeks,
we considered Athens as the future capital and the
chair of the king, although we were not assigned to do
so. (Mpires, op. cit.)
Public opinion in Greece was little concerned with
Athens, as we have seen. The statement, however, helped
Athenians to realize their chances and in June, 1833, they
sent an appeal to the Vice-royalty asking that the capital
be moved to Athens. They also promised that, for their
part, they would actually donate all the land necessary for
the implementation of the plan and especially for the crea-
tion of the "Archeological Zone" all around the hill of the
Acropolis. This promise, delivered by the Council of the
Elders of Athens, removed any final doubts that the Bavarians
may have had. A month later Athens was proclaimed the capi-
tal. The master plan was approved at the same time. In
this way Kleanthes and Schaubert became decisive factors
in the choice of Athens by anticipating official action.
Mpires indicates that in their work the two architects
were "strongly supported by intellectuals returning to
Greece at the time" (Mpires, op. cit.). This would be an
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interesting matter to look into; however, there is no evi-
dence to support such a claim in our limited documentation.
Neoclassical town-planning is much harder to define
than Neoclassical architecture. The term refers to town
planning practices during the era of neoclassicism and not
to any specific and rigid configurations as in architecture.
There are no examples of a city or large segment of a city
actually built under this practice. Also, the examples we
do have are quite different from each other. Yet there are
certain concerns that are common to them all and that offer
a guide to Neoclassical town planning. According to Rowan
(A. Rowan, 1972) they are: 1. "Streets that divide the
city in segments radiating from a central public space"
2. "An increasing popularity for a variety of open spaces--
crescents, oval, circuses and squares--alternating through
the streets and often related one to another" 3. "The
final essential ingredient is Nature, found increasingly
in the trees and green spaces that surround the public
buildings and monuments."
If we accept the above description, Kleanthes's master-
plan can be considered typical of Neoclassical town planning.
Public spaces in the corners of a triangle are the focal
points of a radiant deployment of the streets. The north
contains the palace which faces, in the south, the Acropolis.
There are boulevards and a variety of open spaces in between.
In this way the symbol of the new authority is in continuous
visual and spatial conversation with the ancient ruins.
The palace is also surrounded by a square of boulevards.
All public buildings are free-standing and much of the space
around the Acropolis was to be turned into a public pro-
menade.
The plan intersected the old village with many new
streets and some of them were basic elements in the street
network. Extended clearance work was suggested. Even the
streets that remained in place were 'regularized' in order
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to fit the general pattern.
In addition, ancient names were given to all streets
to leave little doubt about the intellectual ideas of the
two architects.
Kleanthes's master plan can be considered 'absolute',
because it simply stresses his concepts without any com-
promise with the existing architectural and environmental
situation. This rigid position was later misinterpreted
and Kleanthes was praised as a kind of prophet who had
foreseen the later development of the city, and had pro-
vided the open space and the streets to accommodate it.
In our opinion, Kleanthes, by ignoring the needs of
the inhabitants for the sake of his own 'absolute' values,
actually made the first step for the establishment of a
relation that later became a chronic symptom of planning
shortsightedness.
Kleanthes's motive was rather obvious: to distingush
the dominance of two authorities--the intellectual authority
of antiquity and the political authority of the Bavarian
king. The rest of the city was seen as a support for these
two focal points rather than as an independent entity
worth consideration. Obviously this was not the kind of
revival that the Athenians had imagined.
The inhabitants had promised, as we have seen, to either
offer or provide at a low price the land necessary for the
implementation of the plan. In the document the council of
the elders had sent to the Vice-royalty (15 July 1833),
the promise was that all lands necessary for the construc-
tion of the palace and other buildings of social character
would be donated. Lands for the creation of the archeolo-
gical zone around the Acropolis would be expropriated for
70 lepta (100 lepta=l drachma) per square ell; other lands,
outside of the old city but within the plan, for 20 lepta
per sq. ell. At the same time, the municipality would be
given 75 acres in the new areas to provide housing for those
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people who would be moved from their houses in the Archeolo-
gical Zone, the palace and public buildings areas.
According to an estimate by Kolletis, even at the above
low prices, the expropriations would require 1,364,000
drachmas, an amount clearly beyond the capabilities of the
new state. Meanwhile, the establishment of the capital
in Athens had attracted wealthy provincials, Greeks of
the diaspora, and even foreigners to the city. Due to in-
creasing demand, the price of land escalated to 2 to 3
drachmas per sq. ell, leaving behind the prices agreed for
expropriations. But the Athenians said they would keep
their promise if the width of the streets was reduced. The
government accepted the request, the plan was reviewed and
in October 19,. 1833 the modified plan was officially
approved. Clearances began immediately but new problems
soon arose. Those directly affected by the plan realized
that they would have to make sacrifices. They began dis-
puting the interpretation of the plan and asked that the
roads be shifted at someone else's expense. Big landowners
had the lead and among them were some well-established
foreigners such as the English colonel G. Finley and the
American preacher J. King. As Mpires (1966, p. 34) notes:
"He [King] was seeking the maximum compensation for his
fields with the same devotion that characterized his sermons
requesting the goods of heaven." Finally the rumor spread
in the city that the "General" Kriezotis was coming to
Athens with his troops to protect his property, threatened
by the implementation of the plan. With the confusion, as
well as the inability of the government to compensate even
the small proprietors, the plan was soon revoked (June 23,
1834).
I The 'luxury' solutions that the plan offered didn't
coincide at all with the sacrifices that the Athenians had
promised: to house the king and provide him with the right
vista, everyone else had to be moved from his home. Also,
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after the placement of the capital was secured, it was
enough for the Athenians that the government provide them
with jobs; large streets and spacious squares with glorious
ancient names were obviously superfluous.
It was the famous Bavarian architect Leo Von Klentze
who played the role of compromiser. Sent by King Ludwig,
to whom he was confidant, he modified the plan to the ex-
tent that could guarantee the survival of Otto. The new
plan kept the geometrical guidelines of the previous one,
i.e. the triangular scheme of the city, but it pointed an
absolute departure from its 'spirit'. The old city was
accepted as such with only slight improvements. The width
of the streets was drastically reduced, as were the number
of public open spaces. The palace, finally, was moved to
the west corner of the triangle and so lost its imperative
role in the scheme.
The primary difference, however, was that Von Klentze's
plan had an 'enclosed' or 'static' attitude when compared
with the open or 'expansionist' one that had characterized
the previous plan. While in Kleanthes's plan the public
spaces and the radiating streets in the periphery implied
an imminent expansion of the city, in the revised version
the peripheral public spaces constituted an enclosed prome-
nade, as if the city would never expand. To leave little
doubt regarding the future of the capital, Klentze reduced
the area covered by the plan by almost 200 acres.
With further compromises and modifications by Gartner--
the major one was moving the palace to the more healthy east
side of the city--the plan was finally implemented. There
were still reactions, but this time the number of those ad-
versely affected was too small to cancel the operation.
The revocation of the very first plan of Athens was to
become a standard practice. Since then, dozens of plans
have been elaborated, even officially approved, for the city
and none of them have been implemented any more than that
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of Kleanthes's. In a broader sense we have the first inci-
dent in a long story in which the city is trapped between
the 'European' aspirations of its modern intellectuals and
the 'vulgar' reality of a nation whose integration was
badly delayed during its most critical stages. In the fol-
lowing chapters we will try to trace how the efforts to
overcome this delay have marked the urban landscape.
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ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATION: MONUMENTAL & EVERYDAY EN-
VIRONMENT
Kleanthes and Shaumbert conceived of Athens as a city
full of public services, educational institutions, and com-
mercial facilities. This was also true for the modifications
of the initial plan during the first years. These designa-
tions functioned as guidelines for the actual shaping of
the city. A few years after feverish building, (1833-1845),
Athens was transformed into the administrative and educa-
tional center of Greece; a development that stemmed from
the mere fact that the Bavarian Government desired to reside
in a place destroyed bythewar but full of ancient monuments.
Although quickly developed, Athens had not yet been
integrated into any network or productive relationship with
the rest-of the country. It stood out as an exotic island,
a capital with "no roots" in its surrounding geographical
space, as Edmond About described it (see p.
The wealth of the city did not result from any systema-
tic exploitation of the surrounding agricultural lands, nor
from any capitalistic development. Piraeus did not play
any major role ih the commerce of the Mediterranean Sea.
Greek capitalists--merchants, ship-owners, financiers--
kept on investing in other centers of the country (e.g.
Syras, Patras), or in the communities of the diaspora (Asia
Minor, Egypt).
The wealth of Athens resulted either from the diffusion
of public money--mainly loans from abroad--or from the
continuous contributions of the Greek diaspora. The latter
had not yet begun investing in productive works and their
money was offered to develop educational programs, necessary
for the building up of the new "hellenic" identity. The
above resources were the ones that financed the construction
of the first institutional buildings of the city.
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The First Buildings of Athens
While the traditional agora (bazaar) of the old settle-
ment continued to function as the most active part of the
community, in other undeveloped areas the first new build-
ings began to rise; public buildings and the homes of the
wealthy became the starting point for the development of
an area that did not as yet have any infrastructure (roads
and utilities), but only a plan.
The antiquities of the Acropolis were being restored,
too. The same people were in charge of both--er'ection of
the new buildings and restoration of the antiquities. They
were architects, Greeks or foreigners, who had been trained
in Berlin, Rome, Vienna or Copenhagen, the last European
centers of neo-classicism. Among them were Kleanthes,
Shaumbert, Von Klentze, Gartner and W. Von Weiler in the
beginning (1830-1840); Lys. Kaftanzoglou, Chr. and Theof.
Hansen, D. Zezos, and P. Kalkos came later (1840-1860).
For Kleanthes and Shaumbert, Athens was an artificial
Ithaca. For the others, the city was a field where the most
elaborate rules of civilization were being tested under
their archetypes. Both groups either put aside the existing
settlement or tried to correct its 'irregularities'. All
their efforts were devoted to the materialization of a new
city, considered parallel to the old one.
Schinkel went even further than that. He conceived of
the symbol of the new order, the palace, as dominating the
ancient memory. He imposed it on the Acropolis itself, and
he emphasized its arrangement by laying out its loosely
stretching masses over the greatest part of the ancient
rock. He imagined the man-made and natural surroundings in
a dialogue, in which his creation was the primary orator.
But the Greeks reacted strongly and Otto was not the
man who could attempt such a challenge. He preferred the
restrained and simplified mass of Gartner's proposal; he
even rejected Leo Von Klentze's colorful design for the
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Keramikos site. The shift of the palace to the east part
of the city, and the construction of other prestigious
buildings around it, indicates the first movement in the
east-west segregation of the city. It was not only the
hygienic considerations that attracted the 'higher' activi-
ties to the east but also the existing popular bazaar
that repelled them from the west. The same division was
reinforced in later periods.
Kleanthes and Shaumbert did not repeat the picturesque
compositions of their schoolmaster. Restrained to small
parcels of land--due to the limited public funds available
for land purchase--they built isolated buildings on a less
grandiose scale within as yet shapeless districts. Under
those limitations, they stressed the qualities of the
buildings themselves. Building primarily in the neo-classi-
cal style, but with an eye to the neo-gothic /style, in an
elaborate scenic approach (Kleanthes) or with a civil
engineering orientation (Schaumbert), the two architects
provided the theme for their successors. Elementary forms,
classical proportions, a balance of open and closed compo-
nents, low heights, a light-tiled roof, and a yard in
front were the visual characteristics of their buildings.
As emphasis was placed on the facade, the interiors some-
times seemed irrelevant and inflexible--perhaps due to the
functional organization of the public services which were
inflexible and unformed, too. Constructed by Italian or
Bavarian artisans with Greek marble and stone, these build-
ings are not simple copies of the ancient ones but represent,
through imitation, the different ancient elements in a new
formation created in the natural and cultural climate of
Athens by talented artists.
Out of those first typesi, the successors of Kleanthes
and Shaumbert preferred the neo-classical examples even
though the neo-gothic style dominated over European archi-
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tecture at that time (1840 to 1860). But for the architects
of Athens, neo-classicism was not simply a matter of
fashion, an opinion shared by the Greek intellectuals of
the time living in Athens.
As the educational buildings were going up, a new
group of religious buildings were also constructed, while
the old ones--mostly Byzantine--remained in ruins or were
demolished. Their lots and the building materials were
used for housing purposes, despite the intentions of
.Kleanthes and Shaumbert, whose plan was to preserve the
medieval heritage. The new churches, a combination of
neo-classical proportions and elements with a Byzantine lay-
out, expressed the new force of the relationship between
the Orthodox church and the state; the former, losing its
autonomy, was being incorporated into the latter.
Although in Europe neo-classicism had begun to decline
(with a few exceptions in Vienna and Copenhagen) and in
London and Paris the first expressions of a new industrual
style had appeared, Greece resisted the new trends. Neo-
classicism still remained the formal expression of the
dominant ideology. While, in the country, traditional art
and literature continued its slow pace, intellectuals,
politicians and high officers in Athens adhered to the
principles of the ancient heritage. Although there were
some gifted designers in architecture, there were none in
the other arts or in literature. The new, formal language,
constructed according to the ancient pattern, acted as a
barrier to any growth in these other arts.
the orientation of Greek nationalism towards an
excessive use of its 'resources' inevitably helped the
selection of a language already cultivated and codi-
fied, that flattered feelings for national dignity.
It was absolutely natural for the newborn nationalism
to turn to the beautification of the tool around which
the glory of the past had been centered. . . (Tsoukalas,
1976, p. 538)
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The elders of the Orthodox Church had penetrated key
positions in the state mechanism and constituted a dominant
caste in the city. A formal language--a compromise between
the archaic type used by the Church and the typical one
used by the Greek bourgeois--became the official language
of the state. Through the rapidly established educational
network, this language spread all over the country, re-
placing the various spoken local dialects. This educational
system--public and free, beginning with primary schools and
leading to the University of Athens--established a selection
process from the various social strata of those people
who could fulfill the needs of both the public service and
the communities of the Greek diaspora. In this socializa-
tion process, the integration in the dominant class was
followed by a symbolic breaking off with the language
structures of local origin.
The cultural environment in Athens contributed in this
social transformation. The ancient monuments were the
models for Kleaanthes's architectural forms, and these in
turn became the models for not only the later monuments of
the city but for the everyday environment, too. The neo-
classical elements, not investigated systematically, became
incorporated in the previous typology under rather latent
forms.
Neo-classicism and the Everyday Environment
Together with the reconstruction of the old houses,
even before the master plan's approval, a number of new
houses appeared in the larger parcels of the old settlement
as well as in the proposed center and the periphery of the
city. They belonged to wealthy Greeks, many of whom were
living abroad on a permanent basis, and to Bavarians or
foreign diplomats. Those houses had quite similar forms to
the first public buildings, having been built by the same
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architects in a monumental rather than domestic scale.
Some of them were used, in the beginning, for sheltering
the first public services or for the king's residence (e.g.
those of Vouros, Konstostavlos, G. Stavros, etc.)
But providing housing for the majority of the new resi-
dents--coming to work in the public services, the most
promising job opportunities--was a difficult problem in
the beginning. Due to the housing shortage, speculation
in land and in dwellings and large increases in rent prices
began. Many houses were built too quickly and poorly. The
government published a royal decree "for the execution of
the City Plan of Athens" on April 9, 1836 in order to con-
trol the problem. The established building regulations
called for the new buildings to have their fronts on the
lines of the new streets and an open yard on the side or
in the back of the house; they should also be two to three
stories high. Along these legal lines and according to the
aesthetic patterns of the wealthier residences, the trans-
formation of the old Athenian houses began.
The previous style was a structure built around a court-
yard, with a well or a garden in the middle. The house was
built at the back, in the middle or along one side of the
lot, if the lot was tiny. On the front of the street a
high fence-wall would be built, sometimes together with the
one side of the house to protect domestic privacy. There
were small windows on the second floor. The layout con-
sisted of a sequential placement of rooms around an arcade
on the first floor (used primarily for storage, work space
and livestock) and/or around a glass-enclosed porch on the
second.
But the old, strict and clearly defined family life was
to be transformed. The new middle class residents together
with the change of their social status began to modify their
lifestyle and to adapt it towards the new urban environment.
Housing patterns were being transformed according to the new
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lifestyles.
The new middle class Athenian house did not strictly
follow either the old type or the luxurious examples of the
new mansions. These dwellings were characterized by a
rather hybrid form, with the new aesthetics used to compose
the facade, while, behind it, the old structure was more or
less maintained. In front, a new stone base, an emphasized
entrance, more numerous and larger openings, and balconies
with decorative flanges underscored intentions for a more
open life. Such features also served to demonstrate the
status of the nouveau riche. However, the courtyard con-
tinued to constitute the core of the whole arrangement, and
was only slightly modified'. The use of the first floor for
storage and 'livestock began to disappear and the arcade
followed thd new morphological demands: it featured
columns and roman arches or epistyles. On the second floor,
the glass-enclosed porch continued to serve the row of
rooms, but in combination with a new corridor which led
towards another row of rooms looking out onto the front.
In this way, the new arrangement indicated the first inten-
tions for the more 'compact' type.
These houses, built both by anonymous artisans, who had
been exposed to the Bavarian or Italian artisans working on
the neo-classical buildings, and by practical architects
sometimes, often show an effortless cleverness, especially
when they escape from the basic typology. Most of them are
considered today as representative examples of collective
architectural qualities such as aesthetics, functionality,
environmental control, and adaptability to newly formed
needs. On the other hand, buildings produced by the pro-
fessional architecture of that time, regardless of their
external visual qualities, often exhibited an inorganic
composition characterized by a dark corridor or room in
the middle, with rooms on both sides of it.
Both the compact type and the courtyard type prevailed
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at that time in the city. But at the edges of the middle-
class neighborhoods, or in the smaller lots of the city,
we meet a simpler type that belongs to the lower-income
populace (workers, servants, etc.). This type follows the
middle-class courtyard scheme but it is differentiated from
it in the size of the lot, height, and number of rooms.
Aesthetic forms are also much simpler. What we do not meet
in neo-classical Athens is slums or wooden barracks. Al-
though life was rather poor and the wages were low, there
was no unemployment.
The country is not rich but very few die from hunger.
The majority of the population has a small house and
a piece of land. . . The absence of beggars can be
attributed to the proud character of the nation, but
also the distribution of wealth is quite extensive;
the classes that are dependent totally on their wage
represent a small proportion in relation to the total
population. (Charles Cheston, 1887, in Tsoukalas,
1976, p. 204)
While cities in Europe were facing complex urban prob-
lems, Athens stood out as a calm port for neo-classicists
to work in so as to achieve their static utopia. They
came to implement their idealistic principles in an environ-
ment that was not ideal but simply a step behind the other
industrialized countries. Within this environment, utopic
intentions happened to prevail. Greek nationalism kept
the illusion that Greece would regain its ancient glory.
This aspiration became a consensus among the different
social groups that composed the new population of the
city, as consensus that was spatially expressed by the adap-
tation of an architecture that was considered to follow the
ancient heritage.
Institutional buildings and a few houses still survive
from this era of neo-classicism in Athens; the former to
give the city a little bit of the glory that any city should
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have in order to be a capital, and the latter just to remind
the Athenians of what is lost.
Judged by any standards, the neo-classical city consti-
tutes the prehistory of modern Athens; a prehistory that
predisposed in many ways the city's actual development,
which began later.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last quarter of the 19th century, Greek
society was in a transformative period--like a chrysa-
lis which has ceased to be a caterpillar but had not
become a butterfly--it ceased to be Greek but it had not
yet become European. (Asmodaios, in K. Vergopoulos,
1977, p. 168)
In reality, what was happening in Greece in the late
19th century was the search for a new equilibrium; the old
balance had already disintegrated.
The capitalist system was developing.throughout the new
state, on the one hand destroying the remaining old societal
relationships, while, on the other it was struggling to
survive in the milieu of international competition. The
first manufacturing efforts, based on Greek capital, could
not compete with the products of the already industrialized
European countries. As a result, Greek capital was channel-
ed into the tertiary sector (banks and nagivation), acting
as an intermediate, and dependent on larger and stronger
European capital.
Athens became the field where the conflicts, related to
such stunted capitalistic growth, were expressed in political
terms; the capital city also became the place to absorb
and transform these conflicts into new directions. In a
world where old agriculture and manufacturing centers were
declining and whole villages were removing from the high-
lands to the plains, and where the few cities with promising
economies were struggling to hold onto what they had already
gained, Athens was stimulating a new network of connections
with the rest of the country and abroad.
Although the political arena appeared to be unstable--
there was a continuous interchange of governments--and the
economy was weak enough to be badly affected by internation-
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al crises, new ideological directions, shared by many
Greeks, appeared on the scene.
Chief among these ideologies was the 'Great Idea',
which called for the liberation of Greek areas still remain-
ing under Ottoman rule, and which offered the perspective
of an 'ideological contract' among Greek people.
The integration of an excessively large rural popula-
tion, on the other hand, into the urban petit-bourgeoisie,
through its distribution into the well-developed Greek
communities abroad, worked as a key mechanism--both in
ideological and economic terms--to prevent major class con-
flicts. Here Athens played a crucial role. It became the
control center for various public and private institutions
(e.g. banking, education, taxation), that spread their
capitalist guidelines throughout the country. It also
became the organizing center for a transportation system
that served the movements of products and people: raw
materials, rural products, consumer goods, those people
taking part in the rural exodus, and the army.
Through foreign loans and with the help of the inter-
national Greek bourgeoisie, the capital city of Greece
expanded in all directions, generously offering space to
everyone.
Strangely enough Athens was developing exactly because
there were no Athenians. Therefore, Athenian develop-
ment and Athenian capitalism was of a different type
than that of the French capital city; Athens did not
express the Expansionist intention of a local power
because it was rather a work of foreigners who, through
it, immediately projected the set of their territorial
claims and their expansionist will. (G. Burgel, 1976,
p. 141)
Since imported capital had but few outlets for produc-
tive investment, land speculation and building served as
the major investment channels, and the property market
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became the real 'stock exchange' of the city. As a result,
laissez-faire development would prevail over potential
development patterns prescribed by every previous planning
effort. Paradoxically, while the implementation of laissez-
faire had inflated tremendous contradictions in Europe's
Victorian cities, and had even posed a threat to the capi-
talist system itself, in Athens, a similar formula was
followed in order to disperse and absorb any existing or
imminent conflict. While, in Paris, planning was the
new, 'neutral' and 'pure technical' tool to conduct, under
the service of the new ruling class, the development of
the city and to destroy the evidence of its contradictions,
in Athens planning--being connected to the unpopular Bavarian
autocratic regime--would be replaced by speculative private
development. Thenceforward planning would act in a cor-
rective way, and only to control the network of the main
public spaces of the city.
Neoclassicism, which in its broadest sense referred to
the 'absolute perfectness' of the ancient civilization,
left its place to the alive 'great people' to realize
their 'Great Idea' and national integration. Liberalism,
strongly connected to individualism, began to offer to these
indifferent 'great people' the means to express and deliber-
ate themselves. This new ideological concept, though seem-
ingly romantic, was strongly connected with conformism,
an inherent characteristic of the bourgeoisie in a tertiary
capitalistic society.
Both nationalism and individualism came to prevent any
reaction that would aim at a radical resolution to the con-
flicts of capitalism. Old towns were declining and the few
cooperative manufacturing efforts begun in the first decades
of the 19th century had already disappeared; there were no
suggestions for an alternative direction to the prevailing
type of development. Utopia was something totally unknown,
either as concept or as experiment, in Greece during that
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period.
Thus, laissez-faire occupied every position in the
relationships and the minds of the 'great people', leaving
room only for marginal traditional interpretations, which
were going to expire later in the 20th century.
A house in Athens's speculative settlements increasingly
became the dream of every petit-bourgeois, as well as of
the wealthy. It was also becoming the borrowed model for
the small, rural-origin, working class which mainly manned
the building sector. As a result, social differences
tended to be expressed in the urban space only in quanti-
tative terms. The character of the spatial product was
marked by an insignificant moderation very close to medio-
cracy. 'Freedom to build' in Athens of the late 19th
century was interpreted into conformist terms, both in the
urban structure and the urban fabric.
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LAISSEZ-FAIRE VS. PLANNING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE URBAN
FORM
A closer examination of the Athenian environment, at
the end of the previous neoclassical period reveals the
coexistence of different trends:
As it unfolds itself, the capital is a city of great
contradictions. No picture could express this truth
better than that of the Athenian streets (1850).
Next to a shop with a turkish appearance, where the
shopkeeper is sitting cross-legged and smoking his
chibouk, one can see a Perisian modiste and coffee
shops recalling France. Porters from Malta are
sitting on the street, waiting for work. Over there,
heroes in white kilts and sailors from the Aegean
Sea, in large drawers, are smoking narghile, while
other Greeks, dressed in the most recent French
fashion are drinking beer, smoking cigars from Havana
and reading newspapers. Alongside the finest civil-
ization one can find almost vulgar customs and manners.
Alongside a democratization as instinctive in Greeks
as in Americans, one can see people with a feudal
attitude, based as much on violence and abduction,
as in the medieval barons. (Fr. Lenorman in E.
Stassinopoulos, 1973, pp. 411-12)
This picture of the city, although drawn from a
Western European perspective indicates that, during this
period, striking differences coexisted in the physical and
social environment of Athens. Some of these differences
had existed since the times of the Greek Revolution,
others appeared on the scene with the new capitalistic
directions. As a result, numerous conflicts unfolded.
Westernization vs. traditional patterns represented
one such conflict. German autocratic state vs. "free"
capitalistic model was another. The different intentions
of the Great Powers--Great Britain, France, Austria and
Russia--regarding the Ottoman Empire were also inserted
into the political context, favoring one or the other side.
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Liberalism vs. Absolutism became the axial component
of the contradictions. Otto was expelled in 1862. The
new Constitution approved by the National Assembly in 1864
defined the system of government as a "Republican Kingdom."
George I, a Danish Prince was elected to be the new king of
the country. Political change brought together a more
open, although not yet completely liberal, system of
government. From now on existing conflicts were channeled
through political parties. Parliamentary elections became
the battlefield for the different trends.
Finally, Liberal intentions and laissez-faire practice
prevailed over the political and economic scene. Both
had to confront the already formed bureaucratic state mechan-
ism. In the end capital and state mechanism came to a
convention, where political forces, on the one hand be-
came familiar and conformed to the previous stately atti-
tude while capitalistic forces on the other were
liberated from the old central limitations.
Under the above circumstances, laissez-faire develop-
ment would enter into the Athenian scene, dramatically
influencing the form of urban expansion. From the very
beginning of the period, and side by side with the applica-
tion of the Master Plan, new forms of development appeared
in the outskirts of the narrow city. They were character-
ized by a less careful layout, which imitated gridiron
schemes. These areas were approved by the City Plan Service,
a national institution established by the government, as
'extensions' of the Master Plan or as "suburbs". They were
concentrated around the main exits of the city and addressed
towards different social strata. The process of peripheral
development, that of land speculation, would become the
vehicle for expansion of the capital in the following years.
If one were to attempt to isolate any of the decisive
influences behind the peripheral development phenomenon
inside only the Athenian territory, one factor would
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certainly be the existing ownership patterns in the greater
Attica county. Half of the surrounding land had been bought
by wealthy Greeks from abroad, just before the Turks'
departure. These people had left most of their estates
unexploited, simply waiting to transform them into urban
land as soon as the city expanded. Having the power, they
succeeded in influencing state planning policy so as to
achieve maximization of urban land revenues. The land-
owners' expectations of large profits would not allow for
the neoclassical concept of grandiose vistas and broad
public open spaces. As a result, narrow streets and small
lots became the new pattern for land subdivision, even for
the bourgeois neighborhoods.
In the meantime, the City -Plan Service had already
accepted quite a few modifications of the Master Plan,
which further eliminated the size and number of planned
public spaces. With the growth of the City, new problems
arose regarding planning policy, aside from the immediate
problems of swift expansion. The connection with the
Saronicos ports, (Piraeus and Phaleron) as well as with
the industrial town of Lavrion and the few suburbs in the
basin could not be accommodated by a Master Plan that
had not anticipated the coming of railways.
Introduction of the new transportation means into the
city was initially handled by the City Plan Service, manned
at that time by army engineers, through the remedy of
"clearances".
This would be the last spectacular attempt by govern-
ment planning to achieve overall control of the urban
environment.
Mankind might well be divided into two groups, in
regard. to their surroundings: those who initially
set about their environment and those who are content
to accept the state of things as it exists. In spite
of the pioneering spirit of the first group, there
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always persists a heavy weight of inertia, which
is found almost universally in extreme youth and old
age. (P. Abercombie, 1959, p. 9)
Actually, any existing pioneering spirit in Athens had
been consumed in the debate between neoclassicism and local
pragmatism. In addition, the infant Greek capitalism, was
hesitating about its priorities, being encased between
international competition and traditional structures.
Planning occurs when mankind in the group makes a
definite and conscious attempt to model or mold his
environment; natural human growth takes place when
mankind is unconscious of, or unconcerned with, its
general form. (op. cit., p. 10)
Laissez-faire development would finally prevail over the
initial "conscious attempts" of Bavarians to mold the neo-
hellenic society. Athenian capitalism, after temporarily
going along with the last guards of a conscious city plan,
would gain control of the urban land. There is no doubt
that the productive forces of the country found themselves
in a dilemma--faced with a choice between a rural and an
industrial direction--and therefore could not take decisive
initiatives; but what is also true, is that the birth of
"uncontrolled" growth in Athens was not at all the result
of blind action by "unconscious" operators. It was rather
a silent agreement among the most powerful forces of the
time, which served as a means for the dispersion of the con-
flicts that capitalistic growth implied for the Athenian
space. The preformed, politically strong state could not
permit any loosening of its control without first securing
social stability inside the capital city. The existence of
an overall ideological framework at that period reveals,
also, the grounding of an overall concensus among the main
social forces and not an "unconcerned" or "confused" whole.
In the following pages we will try to trace the laissez-
faire process of development in Athens at the turn of the
-59-
century, focusing on the actions and aspirations of the
participants in the decision-making process, whose aim was
the attainment of social stability. We will particularly
focus on two areas:
1. The conflicts, compromises or inertias among the
social forces of the city milieu: state ruling class,
local aristocracy, Greek international capitalist
class, the new social strata of merchants, manufacturers
and workers, foreign international capitalists and the
large middle-class. Our analysis will be concerned with
those of the above interactions that had an impact on
the city planning institutions and the actual city
making (infrastructures, structural physical elements,
and urban fabric).
2. The prevailing ideological trends, as they were
expressed through spatial concepts in, for example, the
layout patterns, the different zones in the center
and the periphery, the landmarks of the city, and the
everyday environment.
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CONFLICTS AND CONVENTIONS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE URBAN
STRUCTURE
Since this period does not represent any dramatic change
in the history of the country, as does its next one, but
rather a series of gradual transformations of the previous
situation, our examination will follow the transformations
step by step, until the moment when a new institutional
framework was created. This framework, along with up-and-
coming social forces, would generate the industrial "take-
off" of the 1920's.
Consequently, the historical analysis will be divided
into three parts:
1. The conditions before 1870s, when an autocratic
government coexisted with newborn capitalist trends, until
this coexistence proved to be incompatible.
2. The appearance of laissez-faire in the 1870s inside
a slightly transformed institutional framework.
3. The prevalence of "free-development" practice over
the city and the parallel establishment of an infrastructure
and institutional network across the nation, which was con-
trolled from the capital (1880-1907).
Trends Before 1870--Epilogue to Kleanthes's and Shaumbert's
Plan
During the last decades of Otto's reign the efforts of
the public and municipal institutions of the capital were
concentrated on three problems: the completion of the
new center according to Kleanthes's and Shaumbert's Master
Plan; the facilitation of a new consumption market that was
introduced dynamically into the life of the city; and'the
establishment o'f an overall Master Plan, including the
initial one and its modifications, as well as provisions
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for city extension layouts due to ongoing growth.
Since the first years of the establishment of Athens
as capital of Greece things had changed. The dreams for
glorious revivals proved to be unobtainable. The Bavarians
had failed to persuade the Greeks to accept them as patrons.
After the peaceful coup d'etat of 1843, when Otto was
forced by Greek politicians and army leaders to concede to
a constitution that at least allowed Greeks to replace
Bavarians in public positions. In reality, the new Consti-
tution didn't offer any major reform except a change of
guard in public seats. An oligarchy, constituted by Otto
and his favorite cabinet councils, was in power anyway.
As a result, the structure of institutions, as well as
the planning policy, didn't change very much. The state
government was in control of Master Plan implementation,
while the municipality had a secondary role. Ultimately
it was Otto himself, who had the final word in every
critical matter.
The new City Plan Service was comprised of army engin-
eers. These men, who generally remained aloof from the
political intrigues of the day, were expected to play a
"neutral" and "objective" role, placing themselves on the
service of the national interests. As military men, however,
trained by their predecessors and belonging to the king,
according to the law, they behaved towards citizens in an
autocratic manner. Having a utilitarian educational back-
ground, they gave more emphasis to the actual implementa-
tion of the Master Plan, especially with regard to its most
important streets, without caring much about its aesthetic
accomplishments or any finer elaboration. Consequently,
architects' roles were actually eliminated--only occasion-
ally did they participate in the planning decisions. They
were mainly concerned with the architectural scale and land-
scape of prestigious buildings, having as clients the state,
the city and the wealthy bourgeoisie.
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Municipal government's role was also sharply curtailed,
although it had participated actively in the peaceful coup
of 1843. From its very beginning, it consisted of members
of the local aristocracy. Their numbers were later in-
creased by the wealthy Greek bourgeois, who decided to
reside in Athens. However, members of the municipal gov-
ernment, having been connected to the various social ranks
of the Athenian population through the 'clientelle' system,
were originally the only organized voice that could confront
the Bavarians' proposals regarding the broad implementation
of clearances. But, when powerful Greeks began to have
access to the national government, local government lost
most of its previous importance. Its role became that of
opposing or accepting central proposals. Although it was
continuously loosing its broader powers* (the municipal
government's) opposition on the city planning front was
more successful than ever before**, and its collaboration
with the national government was more cohesive. This
mutual support can be explained by the fact that represen-
tatives in both national and local government were express-
ing common interests, the interests of the Athenian upper
class of that time.
The residents of Athens had no other representative
organization, aside from the local government, to care about
environmental conditions. Nevertheless, quantitative pro-
blems had not yet become a major interest. The social
*In 1844 municipality lost the control of the city
police, which fell within the purview of the national gov-
ernment. (See G. Chaidopoulos, 1979, p. 26.)
**In 1845 a proposal from the military service for
street improvements was opposed by the city council with
the excuse of its financial inability for the expropria-
tions. At the same time national bank was also against the
proposal because it affected properties involved in mort-
gage loans. The proposal finally was rejected. (See K.
Mpires, 1966, p. 82.)
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structure consisted of a large number of middle-class
people, occupied mainly in state services* and commerce; a
small percentage of upper-class people (local landlords,
high-ranking state officers, politicians, and several
capitalists); and several lower-rank strata (artisans,
servants, porters, building workers and a few manufacturing
workers). These groups were distributed according to the
patterns of the previous period: local aristocracy and
politicians, (former army leaders) in the eastern part of
the old settlement (Plaka); international Greek aristocracy
and bourgeoisie towards the eastern streets of the New
Center; lower strata towards the western part of the Old
and New settlements, and in Proastion, an "unauthorized"
settlement on the eastern outskirts of the city; while the
middle-class was concentrated mostly in the central areas
or spread throughout the city.
Until 1853, this structure remained rather stable.
Athens was growing slowly and its principal function was
that of an administrative center**. Several other cities
were also developing at the time, while the great majority
of the population was still living in the rural areas***,
and the real Greek economic centers were out of the Greek
borders (in Balkan cities, Thessalonika, Istanbul, Asia
Minor, Russia, and Egypt). As a matter of fact, City Plan
Service concentrated its efforts on the implementation of
the Master Plan by modifying it whenever a serious conflict
occurred. Modifications usually favored strong individual
*See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 210.
**The average annual rate of population increase was
0.5 percent for the years 1848-1853. (See K. Tsoukalas,
1977, p. 178.)
***Greece's population was 1,679,470 in 1853. The urban
population comprised only 8 percent. (See N. Svoronis,
1976, p. 102.)
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interests which were aiming at the expansion of their
properties at the expense of public spaces. Otto reacted
only when these claims were threatening his immediate
environment. This was the case with Syntagma Square
which, since 1838, had been under his architectural control.
Since land values in this area became extremely high,
owners of the surrounding properties wanted to expand over
the public space. Having access to the political govern-
ments, they tried four times to modify the plan, unsuccess-
fully. Their interference became evident in 1847, in the
"Committee for the completion of the plan of Athens". Al-
though this committee proposed an incorporation of the
unauthorized settlement of Proastion inside the city plan,
the topic of discussion was not the intervention in an al-
ready structured neighborhood but Syntagma Square. The
committee, influenced by Prime Minister Kolettis, proposed
an elimination of its public space. Otto refused to
approved the proposal. Ironically Syntagma Square would
become the stage of popular protests for democracy and
would keep this meaning to the present.
From 1853 on, a new sector appeared dynamically in the
Athenian scene. The infusion of money, from the national
government and the Greek diaspora, along with the influx
of numerous white collar workers, stimulated the creation
of a new consumption market, characterized by imported
luxury goods (textile, leathers) as well as new recreational
services (cafes, confectionaires, restaurants). This new
market, totally distinguished from the old bazaar, began
to spread rapidly over the new center and principally, along
the new main streets of Eolou and Ermou. Both the munici-
pal and national governments showed support for these new
activities and tried to facilitate them. They both agreed
on the enlargement of Eolou Street, the private appropria-
tion of a public "people's garden" (in order to offer more
space for commercial activities) and the covering of the
-65-
central streets. The municipal government displayed a
significant efficiency during this period, regarding a
'decent' shaping of the new center: it undertook the cover-
age of 18 central streets, using French engineers;* it also
cared for their illumination, beautification and level-
ing;** it established a new food market in the new west
neighborhood of Neopolis, a new slaughterhouse out of the
city this relieving Athenians from the "terrible spectacle"
of the "butchery of the animals. . . on the sidewalks in
front of the butcher shops or wherever the butchers would
like" (K. Mpires, 1966, p. 88). A cleaning service and a
second cemetery were also organized. Finally the local
authorities undertook medium-scale infrastructure works,
such as repairing and extending the water reservoir, water
supply system and sewage system, funding them through new
taxations.
Related to the establishment of new business in the
central district was the problem of goods transportation
and distribution. Urban tarnsportation as well as connec-
tion with Piraeus became vitally important to the economy
of the city. A contract between the national government
and Feraldi Company--which was also entrusted with the in-
stallation of a gas system--for the construction and exploi-
tation of a railway line connecting Athens to Piraeus,
marked the birth of a new cycle of works critical for the
development of the capital.
Ermou Street, whose extension was reserved for the
building of the station, was expected to become a major
entrance to the city. A series of street improvements, in
*These works were financed by Tossitsas' donation and
by offerings from Athenians. (See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 85)
**While leaving the rest of the streets dirty and dusty
(See E. Stassinopoulos, 1973, p. 377)
-66-
Ermou Street, as well as in 30 other streets, related to
the above connection and to forthcoming tramways, were
approved by modificatory decrees. Most of the "improve-
ments" resulted in destruction to portions of the west
side of the old city, where low-income population was
living.
The management of army engineering service, enforced
the evacuation of buildings, and proceeded with
their demolition, showing the proper effectiveness
[sic] for the execution of the works. (K. Mpires,
1966, p. 84)
But finally, when improvements were to be applied to other
parts of the city, local government objected to them and
stopped any further implementation.
But this internal dynamic development of commerce,
and the related introduction of transportation, and of
new services, brought another pressure to the limited lay-
out of the city: population growth.*
In the rest of the period two proposals for an overall
city plan were worked out, which were intended to cope
with the problem of city expansion.
In 1860, the Stavrides Committee, which consisted of
army engineers, architects, the French civil engineer
Daniel and the mayor, proposed a format for expansion lay-
outs and modifications in the old Master Plan. The latter
included new squares in the perimeter of the central areas
which were intended to accommodate institutional buildings.
A city government that could not afford the suggested ex-
propriations, opposed the plan, which was finally rejected.
*Between 1856 and 1861 the average annual increase of
the Athenian population jumped to 5.9 percent from the 0.4
percent growth rate during 1853-56. (See K. Tsoukalas,
1977, p. 178.)
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In 1864, the management of the army engineers came
up with a new proposal that basically consolidated the
guidelines of the former one. Three quarters of the "new"
plan were finally approved. It provided the city with
layouts for expansion in its northeastern part, above the
Educational Center and northwest around Metaxourgeion the
first textile industry. Although the expansions were fol-
lowing the geometrical lines of Kleanthes's and Shaumbert's
Master Plan, the neoclassical concept had degenerated into
a mechanical repetition of streets and blocks that follow-
ed gridiron patterns. The plan was also modified according
to preexisting ownership boundaries. The resulting plan
would be valid for the next seven decades. Soon, however,
it would be overwhelmed by the actual growth of the city
which occurred in every direction.
With all the above activities, central government tried
to achieve two goals: first, to complete the initial-
attempts for a well-defined center according to the impera-
tives of neoclassicism and, by doing so, to control its
character; and, second, to respond to the developing trends
in the city, regarding growing economy and population.
'Clearances' proved to be a 'successful' means for the
facilitation of the new market, while expansion through a
well-defined overall master plan, would prove from the very
beginning the inadequacy of neoclassical tools and the
administration to cope with the growing population of the
city.
*It divided the city into four parts according to the
cross section of Eolou and Ermou Streets. The fourth
part, which was not approved included archaelogical
space. State government didn't have the required money
for compensation of the houses under expropriation. (See
K. Mpries, 1966, p.I 61)
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Trends During 1870's--The Appearance of Laissez-Faire
During the 1870s the trends related to the economic
and population growth of the city, would be intensified.
Financial activities and transportation works would come
to be added to the already expanded commerce and enrich the
character of the city as a business center. Correspondingly,
city-making would, thenceforward, ignore the outdated Master
Plan and concentrate on three aspects: opening of new
arteries; laying out of railway and transportation lines;
quick and cheap housing for the new residents.
This shift in priorities was connected with the new
role that Athens assumed for itself and for the rest of
the country, due to changing conditions in the political
and economic scene. In 1863 Otto was expelled. He left
the country, carrying in his bags the whole ideological
framework that he had tried to introduce into Greece
during the 40 years of his reign. Constitutional change
opened up the way to the introduction of liberalism but
still kept it bounded to the institution of the monarchy.
Parallel to the political change, three important changes
would mark the economic development: the transfer of
capital by the Greek diaspora*; the increase of internation-
al loans and the involvement of international capital
inside the economy of the country and the appearance of the
first important industrial attempts.
As a result, this period is the beginning of the esta-
blishment of capitalism all over the country. State comes
to play the role of mediator between the various forces
trying both to coordinate and facilitate capitalistic
development. Private initiative was defined as the vehicle
*From the Balkan and Egyptian communities, where rising
of local national bourgeois classes, together with politi-
cal interventions of the great powers, created unstable
conditions.
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for this development and the various governments were esta-
blishing the institutions that would support and protect
it. Thus, Koumoundouros' government proceeded with the
distribution of national lands to peasants (1871), and with
protectionist measures for the protogenic industry.* But
industry and agriculture were pacing their first steps,
while competing against each other for first place in the
protectionist policy of the central government.
As a result, large Greek capital coming from the Greek
communities abroad, reserved for itself the role of finan-
cier of the various enterprises. Also, together with the
international capital, it turned to investments in trans-
portation works and mines. Their center of enterprises
became Athens from where together with the state government
they would establish their various networks all over the
country.
Athens became the financial center of the country as
well as a dynamic competitor for the other economic centers
of the country. In the period between 1868 and 1873, 11
banks were established in the city and began to open branch-
es all over the country. On the other hand, Athens was
developing as a center for capital. First was Piraeus a
fast growing commercial and industrial port and after was
Lavrion, a city with mines and an emerging metallurgy in-
dustry. Piraeus was gaining in importance regarding the
two other ports of the country, Patras and Syras, while
Lavrion was becoming the first mining center of the Balkan
penninsula.
As a result, the matter of connecting Athens with the
developing centers of the surrounding region became the
first priority regarding any planning decisions. National
*See K. Vergopoulos, 1975, p. 333.
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government contributed to transportation development by
opening new streets leading out of the city, while large
capital undertook the construction and exploitation of
railway and tramway lines. At the same time, municipal
government was limited to secondary infrastructure works
only inside the Athenian territory.
The army engineering service was in charge of both the
city plan and new route construction until 1879. Their
first attempts to connect the old rural roads, which had
been overlooked by Kleanthes's Master Plan, to the center
of the city failed because of the required expropriations
and reaction by the residents.* The only old road that
managed to be laid out so as to carry transportation net-
works was Patession Street leading to Patessia suburb
and Kefissias Street, passing through Ampelokepi suburb
and leading to the prestigious suburb of Kefissia. Two
new important roads came to be added to the above network:
Alexandras Street, a peripheral road connecting the two
former streets, and Syggrou Street leading from the center
to the small port of Phaleron. The municipal government
contributed to the development of Alexandras Street by
buying a large estate which became bisected. Syggrou
Street construction was funded by Syggros's donation. Both
were characterized as national roads, according to the Act
of December 5, 1864, which facilitated their opening by
the City Plan Service. But as the national government,
together with the local one, had limited financial resources,
it remained for private initiative to complete the rest
of the transportation works.
In 1869 the completion of the railway line connecting
Athens and Piraeus by a British company and an Athenian
bank, marked the incorporation of the two cities in a bi-
*See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 188-9.
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polar system.* Piraeus grew simultaneously during this
decade, so that, by 1879, it had quadrupled its population
over three decades, while Patras and Syras had stable
populations. It became the most dynamic industrial center
of the country producing textiles, engines, leathers, and
tanning. Together with Lavrion, it concentrated almost all
the industrual activities of the region while Athens re-
mained as the administrative, educational and financial
center.
After the construction of the Athens-Piraeus line, the
French company of Lavrion Mines constructed the Attica
Railway Line, connecting Athens to Lavrion, with a branch
to Kifissia suburb, where most of tis capitalists and
executives were living. The terminal station was initially
in the periphery of the city (Attica Square), but soon it
was moved nearer to the center (Lavrion Square).
A Belgian company undertook the construction of inner-
city horse-tramways as well as facilitation of the nearby
suburbs and, later, connection to Phaleron and Piraeus. Pre-
vious period 'clearances' had supplied the space for the
tramway's central network, while new street openings allowed
for its branches.
Besides transportation lines, the same companies also
undertook development of recreational centers around their
suburban stations in order to attract more passengers and
to gain profit from their exploitation. First, the Athens-
Piraeus railways, after buying a large parcel of state land
in north Phaleron, established there an entertainment center,
including sea baths, restaurants, candy shops, dancing
clubs, summer theater and gardens (1880). This center had
a remarkable impact on its surroundings. Within a few
*See Prevelakis, p. 113.
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years a new high-income summer settlement was developed.
Some years later the competitor, Tramway Company, reached
the area and added its own development--an operetta theater,
a luna park and gardens. In addition, Attica Railways
developed a recreational center in front of the Kifissia
station.
Parallel to the transportation works, new housing
areas were developing in the periphery of the city. Fol-
lowing a different process than before, land speculators
divided land into lots according to gridiron patterns, and
sold them to the large numbers of middle-strata*, who were
coming to work in state and private services. Contrary to
the transportation companies' practice, these developers
aimed at an easy acquisition of profit and not at an inten-
sive capitalistic exploitation of land. As a result, their
"neighborhoods" were lacking any facilities or communal
spaces.
These parcels of residential land were continuously
added to the city plan, as expansions of the city, and,
for the time being, were concentrated to the north of the
city along Patession Street. The same military service
that had showed absolutism during the implementation of
street clearances looked askance at this mode of city ex-
pansion, which they could not control. The abandonment
of neoclassical planning practices, by the same people who
had promoted its application, shows how decisive the socio-
economic changes were. Speculative development came to
respond to the dynamic growth of population, providing it
with cheap land for housing. This mode of city-making was
to be the vehicle for housing commercialization and the
*The average annual increase in population was 4.3 per-
cent for the years 1870-1879. In 1870, Athens's population
of 60,000 was almost double that of 1853 (36,000). (See
K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 178 and p. 167.)
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dominant model for city expansion in the following years.
Trends at the Turn of the Century--Athens and Piraeus,
a Powerful Bipolar System
In the following years the forms that appeared as a
response to the trends of development would prevail over
the city structure. Land speculation would guide the spa-
tial development, while railway networks would be intensi-
fied, achieving the connection of the two centers, Athens
and Piraeus, with the rest of the country.
Simultaneously, two changes in both the economic and
institutional frameworks would mark the further development
of the two cities. First, Athens-Piraeus would come to
function as a dual urban whole. By the turn of the century
they would be the dominant economic center of Greece.
Second, the City Plan Service was transformed from a mili-
tary to a civil one, abandoning, at the same time, any
construction activity.
Changes in the Greek political and economic scene
became critical to the extent of the development in Athens
and Piraeus. Greece had already broadened its physical
borders: besides the annexation of the Ionian Sea islands
(1864), the fertile rural areas of Thessalia and Arta,
came to be added, in 1881, to its narrow territory. The
latter addition inflated, on the one hand, the national
aspirations, but they also raised the issue of the large
estates (Tsiflikia). Wealthy Greek bourgeois from abroad
had bought the major part of the land, as in the case of
Attica County, before the departure of the Turks. Some-
times, they concurred with the great landowners and capital-
ists of the Athenian area (Zographos, Skylitzis).* These
*See K. Vergopoulos, 1975, p. 115-138.
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people, by treating the previous individual cultivators as
a simple labor force and the land as simply a safe invest-
ment, and not as a field for intensive exploitation, and
by continuously pressing the governments to take protection-
ist measures for their rural products, put the brakes on
capitalistic development in agriculture and industry.
Later, the country would pay with a political and economic
crisis, for this superfluous protectionism.
Trikoupis' government (1882, and 1885-1895) followed
a compromising policy between the great farmers' interests
and those of the industrialists. As in the 1870s they
favored mainly investments in infrastructure as the safest
means for capital accumulation. As a result, rural reform
and industrial development were delayed during this period.
Recession of economic development, heavy international loans,
as well as an international economic crisis, brought the
country to bankruptcy in 1893.
Despite this crisis, Athens and Pireaus continued to
develop. Furthermore, while the other urban centers of the
country started declining--the only exception being the
Thessalia cities*--the hierarchical networks, that the
capital city -had already established all over the country,
through public and large capitalist mechanisms, started to
bear fruit. The two cities were continuously receiving the
surplus of production, money and people from the other
centers.
Two of the three railway lines that were built during
this period, (Athens-Peloponese and Athens-Thessalia) had
as their starting points Athens and Piraeus. The third one
(Thessalia Railways) was financed by an Athenian capitalist
(A. Syggros). The Corinth Channel (1893), connecting the
Ionian and Aegean Seas, was responsible for upsetting the
*See G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 176-242.
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hierarchy of the Greek ports: Piraeus became the first
port of the country.
During this period, the two cities would be the first
reception centers for the large rural population, as well
as the filter for the migrants moving to Asia Minor and the
U.S.A. From 1879 to 1889 both cities experienced a 61 per-
cent increase in population (by 1889, 114,000 people lived
in Athens, and 34,000 in Piraeus). This growth had a sig-
nificant impact on the city layout.
State government, since it had secured a well-planned
center along with its connecting routes, left its previous
active role and merely kept the regulatory one, leaving
the housing problem to be solved by the land market quickly
and inexpensively.
In 1879, the military engineering service was replaced
in their city-planning role by a body of civil engineers
attached to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This service
consisted, in the beginning, of graduates from the School
of Surveying of the National Technical University. Later,
it would include graduates from the School of Civil Engin-
eering. Their education was confined to a strictly techni-
cal orientation, while the technocrat role was reserved,
at that time, mostly for the graduates of the European
schools. Infrastructural works were reserved for foreign
engineers, while City Plan Service people didn't have any
decisive intervention. The latter, holding a white collar
attitude and working inside a bureaucratic institution,
could not generate or promote any elaborated concept for
the future of the city. Thus, they were- concentrated ex-
clusively on the occasionally developed pieces, checking
if they conformed to their regulations. But, even in this
case, they could not take any initiative, due to their non-
permanent status. Their position was totally dependent on
the good will of the successive governing politicians, who,
operating in a patronage-oriented 'clientele' system, spent
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most of their time trying to fulfill their voters' wishes.
As a result, the employees of the City Plan Service, con-
tinually fearing for their own jobs, were unable to partici-
pate in any essential interference in the development of
the city, and they were satisfying the land speculators'
interests. In addition, they didn't have any responsibility
for the various site plans involving public or municipal
institutions. These site plans were elaborated by profes-
sional architects.
During this period a significant number of institutional
buildings were built--mainly social welfare buildings (e.g.
asylums, hospitals, prisons). These institutional buildings
were considered less prestigious--their structure and loca-
tion followed the prevailing market practices. Consequently
they were spread throughout the periphery of the city, where
land was cheap enough for the necessary expropriations.
The buildings' plans were added to the city plan as 'expan-
sions'.* Therefore, even the public institutions, followed
the laissez-faire model regarding location of their
buildings.
Land speculative patterns continued to prevail in resi-
dential areas. Now graduates of the school of surveying,
hired by developers or by landowners themselves, were the
'planners'. Their model: land slicing. The forms of the
new areas: a piece without beginning or end, with the only
reference point being a major traffic artery, a station
or a social welfare institution. No expansion of this per-
iod can be considered as a distinctive entity. Surrounding
the city on every side along the railway and tramway lines,
these new residential 'neighborhoods' were totally dependent
upon the center.
*See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 318.
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In the years 1878 to 1907, city layout increased from
800 to 3995 acres,* a fourfold increase in area for a popu-
lation that had only doubled.** The average population
density, which was already low in 1880 (48.8 inhabitants/
acre) became even less in 1907 (38.4 inhabitants/acre)*.
It seems that aside from the pressure created by an expand-
ing population, the power of land speculators was another
decisive factor in shaping the Athenian urban form.
Finally, for the people who could not afford to buy a
piece of land, a small 'squatter' settlement was the only
viable alternative. The settlement started around the time
of Otto's expulsion, and was built by artisans from the
island of Anafi over the old neighborhood of the city and
under Acropolis rock, in a public area (archaeological
space). This traditional neighborhood would be left by
the City Plan Service to survive to the present. Besides
the fact that this process could provide cheap housing to
the poorest migrants, located in the outskirts of the city
and out of any range, in contrast to the unauthorized
settlement of Proastion, which was incorporated into the
city plan two decades ago.
In the rest of the residential areas soon the empty
spaces between the new quarters would be filled in. The
installation of an electrical plant in Phaleron, in 1892,
by Nicholaedis, who represented the French company
'Thomson Houston de Mediterranee'. Electrification of
tramways and railways (1904, 1906) would affect the spread
of the city along their lines.
But another dynamic factor seems to enter onto the
*See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 274.
**In 1907 Athens and Piraeus had a combined population
of 250,000, while in 1879 they had 100,000 (See K. Tsoukalas,
1977, p. 169, p. 177).
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scene to mark the urban development during the next period:
industrial growth.
The black mass of the 'fertilizers' factory that,
since 1909, lay at the entrance of Piraeus and was a
continuing symbol of Greece's first industrial development
would underlie a new stage in the history of the two cities.
........... ... .. .:~*.... . . . . ... .
eNeclassical
'City ... . .
. . . . . . . ...... ...............
.~~~~ ... 
.. . .... 
.
...
... ..... ...
.. ..... .....
........
.. .. .. ....... .... .. .. ....
. . . .... ..
....104
W9k~
.... ... 
... ....
*.... . ....:: :: :~
X 4 ....... ..... . ...
.. .. . ..
.... City Expansions .- .,-..
-80-
URBAN STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY
From 1860 on Athens was beginning to form the nucleus
of its new urban reality;
The whole city consists of two central streets,
Eolou and Ermou. Around them the four quarters
are located, while a little beyond a new city has
been formed, [Neapolis].
(M.A. Proust, 1858 in E. Stassinopoulos, 1973,
p. 417)
The growing city showed, from the very beginning, a devi-
ation from its first plan concept and its medieval precedent.
The real center was neither the large avenues of the central
triangle, that Kieanthes had conceived, nor the colorful
mixture of social, commercial, residential, open and closed
activities of the old bazaar, but the intersection of two
new, but not so wide, streets (Ermou and Eolou).
The intersection represented the appearance of a new
reality; that of a capitalistic market operated by middle-
class merchants, oriented to imported consumption goods and
addressing itself to the new bourgeois population of the
city. Beginning from the intersection of the two streets,
the new commercial activities would expand, occupying the
central and western part of the central triangle.
Although, initially, the four divisions of the city oc-
cupied equal areas, their buildings were not equally distri-
buted. Low-income residents were compressed in the west
side of the old city, due to the increased land values in
the east side, where the Palace and the cultural centers were
located. Apart from the other residencies a new neighbor-
hood was formed towards the northwest, where the first tex-
tile industrial unit (Metaxourgion) was installed. The
upper class was building its mansions in its own area, in
the east side of the new center. In addition to the above
settlements, and in the extension of the central streets,
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scattered houses had appeared and were built for the middle-
income population..
The old neighbourhoods of Plaka, Psyrri, Thesseion
Metaxourgion, and, later, Neapolis were densely
inhabited. A great number of houses were also
built in Vatrachonissi, Makryyanni, Vathes Square,
and in the area around the gas plant, which, along
with the western neighborhoods of Athens, were
the poorest and most miserable quarters of the city.
Today prestigious Kolonaki was scatterly inhabited
till its square. ...There were, however, other
spot islands inhabited too....., as well as some
scattered houses over Lyssiatreion.
(D. Skouzes, 1961, p. 9-10)
If spatial segregation in the capital itself was follow-
ing a step-by-step process, segregation in the new dynamic
bipole, (Athens-Piraeus) was already a fact. The space of
the port was reserved for two, explicitly defined functions:
that of importation of goods and that of supporting the
first industrial installations along with working class
housing. The railway line, was dividing the city into two
distinctive parts: one of a mixed commercial and residential
character, for high and middle incomes', and another mixed in-
dustrial and residential area, for low-income people.
Simultaneously, Athens was developing into an administra-
tive and business center, as well as a reception area for
the new middle class people. Its center was seized by the
two ruling powers: state and financial capital, while retail
was an indespensable part of both. Each one of them would
follow different directions, inside the central triangle:
The first two would reserve the eastern part for both their
enterprises and their housing, while the latter would spread
over the central and western part, along with the municipal
enterprises. Through a "natural" process of development,
without any intervention of zoning regulations, each one of
the central streets would obtain its own character, which
would remain to the present time.*
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Following the labor segregation, the two cities dev-
eloped different cultural characteristics. A new type of
recreational center was found throughout Athens. These
were offering "light" music or a kind of musical performance
that became very popular among the new middle strata. One
could find such centers not only around Concord Square but
also in the outskirts of the city, along Illissos river, and
near the seashore, in Phaleron. The so-called "hovel"
music centers, on the other hand, that were popular among
the lower urban strata, were displaced and sent to the base-
ments of Pireaus's shops. In this way, middle and working
strata were spatially segregating from each other.
But, at the same time, we have the fusion of the old
"traditional" life-style with the new "European" one. The
marriages, for instance, that took place under the protec-
tive gaze of the Palace -- first between the descendants
of the heroes of the revolution and the intellectuals from
Constantinople and, later, between politicians and capital-
ists -- resulted in the creation of the so-called "High
births" of the country and represent a symbolic event through
which cultural conflicts were absorbed. The prestigious
western patterns prevailed also as the model for imitation
by the malleable mass of the petit bourgeoisie.
The "theoretical" grounds for the new ideology were
produced by the highest state educational institutions --
University, Academy and the National library -- all located
on the eastern side of the central triangle. The two uni-
versities were, until the end of the nineteenth century
the only universities, that served the Balkan area, as well
as the Near East. As such they played an important role in
* Ermou Street for female fashion; Stadiou Street for male
clothing; Athenas Street as food market; Eolou Street as
financial, commercial and social center, Panepistimiou and
Academias as cultural centers.
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concentrating the most dynamic cultural part of the Greek
speaking people of these areas in the capital. The univer-
sities also influenced the shape of political behavior. The
specific orientation of Kappodistrian University, for
example, emphasized classical studies -- philosophy, theo-
logy, law -- as well as an arterisclerotic version of
Platonic philosophy, combined with the most absolutist lines
of 19th century Western thought. Its graduates were the
bearers of a conservative ideology, which on a theoretical
level was linked to academia, while in the everyday practice
was translated into the most scholastic, bureaucratic behav-
ior. They were keeping high the banner of archaic, official
language,* and strongly resisting any challenges coming from
the more venturesome parts of the capitalistic class or from
more progressive intellectuals. They were afraid of losing
their status together with their symbols.** Similarly the
envelope of the state cultural institutions kept the neoclas-
sical morphology denoting the immutability of their content.
But besides these prestigious educational buildings,
international Greek capitalists financed an extensive educa-
tion program for all social levels: a large schooling mech-
anism was developed all over the country, including primary,
high and commercial schools. Its purpose was to give the
rural-origin people an opportunity to acquire those skills
necessary for their employment as clerks in public and pri-
vate services, both in Greece and in the Greek communities
abroad.
*See E. Stassinopoulos, 1973, p. 454. The problem of lan-
guage would be the cause of a series of protests undertaken
by the state middle-class which, at the turn of the century
was losing its power in front of a broader application of
an industrial development. These protests gave to others
the opportunity to express their anti-royalist feelings
against a dynasty that was more inclined to support British
interests than Greek ones.
**See K. Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 171.
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The same people also financed the series of health,
pedagogic, and disciplinary institutes that were erected
on the periphery of Athens: night schools for working
children, schools for women and the poor, hospitals, asylums
and prisons. The last two categories were addressed to mar-
ginal and psychopathic people, whose number inevitably in-
creased with the rapid capitalistic growth.
The increase of population, after 1870, revealed
the inadequacy of the hospital care, as well as
the inadequacy of social welfare. The Municipal
Civic Hospital was obliged to accept patients
from all over Greece. It treated only acute
pathologic cases, while those suffering from
chronic or incurable diseases could find asylym
only in the monasteries. The mentally ill,
whose relatives could not secure for them a bed
in the cells of the monastery of Dafni, were
carrying around their misery, in the streets of
the Capital. Together with them, a great number
of unsheltered people of every age, were begging
for one penny or a piece of bread. The gas
village, a mixture of huts and wretched sheds,
between the gas plant and Sacred Street was a real
hell of misery and corruption. The very old and
uninhabitable buildings of Trigeta and Garbola
were used as prisons. A prison term there was
the worst misery, if not death. The working
children, on the other hand, were condemned to
remain totally uneducated and they were subjected
to many dangers.
(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 202)
New social mechanisms began developing in order to handle
the "marginal" phenomena and to spread over the lower social
strata of the city the dominant system of values. In the
wake of two epidemics that Athens suffered in 1854 (chol-
era)* -- and in 1881 (typhus), philanthropic associations
were constituted by members of the royal family, local gov-
ernment, and the Athenian bourgeoisie, and were funded by
Greek capitalists. Their purpose was to care for the victims
of diseases, orphans, and women. These organizations under-
*During an Anglo-French military intervention -- aiming at
the "neutrality" of Greece during the Russian-Turkish Crimean
War.
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took the establishment of social welfare institutions.
Between 1870 and 1890 twelve buildings were erected in the
outskirts of the existing city in order to accommodate such
institutions.* In contrast with the shining educational
buildings of the central district, the plain and austere new
ones constituted the fortresses of the Athenian society.
But both represent the twofold function of the public ideolo-
gical mechanisms: to project the basic directions of the
nation and 'correct' any noncomforming element.
The eastern-central area was reserved to play the first
role. Two new landmarks of the city stood apart from the
bulk of the monumental buildings: Zappeion, a semicircular
neoclassical exhibition hall intended for the display of
agricultural and industrial products of the country, and the
reconstructed stadium. Both were located near the Royal
Garden and were built with funds donated by Zappas, a wealthy
Greek from Rumania.
Providence donated to us so much wealth, we were
able to do both: benevolences and raising
children. As I am older, and because I want to
benefit our fatherland as much as possible with
my wealth, I am asking you to create a family,
so as to conserve our name.
(EV. Zappas to his nephew K. Zappas in "Signature",
1979, p. 47)
K. Zappas would follow in his uncle's footsteps:
Let the name of our family be conserved in the
memory of humanity, through out good acts. It
is impossible for me, not to follow your own
traces, either in this world, or the future one.
(op. cit.)
As Rowe has said, when "active benevolence becomes the
*Houses for the poor, night schools for working children,
hospitals, an infant asylum, workshops for poor women, an
asylum for womens' education, a sanitorium, Syggrou prison,
a madhouse, a juvenille prison, an orphanage, an asylum for
the incurable, and others. In addition, six more buildings
of the same category were built between 1890 and 1909.
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social goal it is probably time to look out."* Great
donators' proposals for the shaping of their 'Ithaca' had
first been addressed to the Royal family members, the most
active promoters of their aspirations.
For most of them Athens was a field to project their
Platonic utopia; neoclassicism appears in most of the monu-
ments they built in the center of the city. But, at the
turn of the century, several "foxes" appeared among them.
A. Syggros, for example -- at the same time he was financing
theaters, and educational and social welfare institutions,
he was also involved in works of infrastructure and trans-
portations, banks, industry, mines and commerce (Korinth
Channel, Thessalia Railways, Bank of Thessalia, Mines of
Lavrion and Serifos, trade in arms).
However Athens of the late 19th and early 20th century
cannot be attributed to the power of only one social group.
It was a field where many new forces were interacting,
trying to establish a new way of life. "Clearances" were
one of the aspects of this new ideology; the expulsion of
traditional open air trade from the center of the city was
another one. For those in power, anything recalling a
"vulgar" tradition had to be eliminated.
Over there to the west, lie the Gypsies-workshops.
I have heard some time ago, that they decided to
remove this whole guild in order to locate it in
Petralona, or I don't know where else. Till to-
day, I haven't heard if they have abandoned this
plan. I never hear anything in time. It would
be sad if they expel these lovely sounds of life
and work, which harden the ears and strengthen the
nerves.
(A. Papadiamantis, 1896, p. 219)
The character of the city center, as a territory for
modern businesses and public institutional buildings, was
established during this period. Athens would keep it until
*C. Rowe, 1975, p. 72.
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today, although inside a different architectural context.
If laissez-faire had finally been subordinated in a pre-
planned core in the central district, its impact was decisive
for the character of the periphery. This mixture of rail-
way arteries, rural and national roads, gridiron schemes,
and scattered housing, approaches more the Victorian model
more than its precedent neoclassical one.
This type of development had appeared in the European
and American cities some decades earlier. Certainly, the
close collaboration of Greek bourgeois with the European
and mainly English capitalists and the deep penetration of
the latter into the Athenian economic life, was also re-
flected in the patterns followed in the city. But Athenian
laissez-faire coincides also with a significant change in-
side the social structure of the city. Its middle-class
became more connected to private capital than to public
organizations.* Land speculation found in these new strata
a new market of potential of buyers.
Nevertheless, inside the urban structure, the previous
trends, regarding class distribution continued, but in an
even more divergent fashion. Lower strata were settled in
the western part of the periphery, upper class in the
eastern one, and middle strate mostly in the north and
south.
Late-19th-century Athens was still a city with a coher-
ent structure, despite the fact that it consisted of differ-
entiated parts. It was a city developed around one center
and along a main axis radiating from it. Through building
regulations and the architecture of private houses it was
*Interval composition of tertiary sector in Greece (K.
Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 192)
1801 1870 1879 1901
-Commerce-Transportation-Exchange 38% 42% 40% 50%
-Private Services 24% 25% 28% 18%
-Public Administration 27% 23% 21% 15%
-Professionals 10% 9% 10% 15%
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consolidating an escalation from the periphery to the
center. It was a white-collar city, that was still hold-
ing its population around the work places.
Besides the common character of their jobs, these
people also shared common ideological grounds. Like their
habitats, gathered around a unique center, their ideologi-
cal directions were all converging on one notion: the
"great idea", the dream of liberating the Greek areas that
were still under the rule of the Ottoman empire.
The 'Great Idea', I am proud of it. My first
surprising ecstasy blew from my infancy when
I heard of it in my home. They used to whisper
it around like a great secret, like an expecta-
tion for a future resurrection. And I believed
in it with a sacred devotion.
(K. Palamas in K. Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 178)
The "Great Idea", by connecting the present reality to
the romantic goals of the Greek revolution, had been the
backbone of the neohellenic ideology during much of the
19th century. Every political government, no matter what
its economic program was, recognized it as the priority
that would lead to the national completion.* Athens,
after gathering the greatest part of the Greek bourgeois
from the Balkan peninsula and Egypt, became the workshop,
where guidelines of national policy were laid out. But
control over the official cultural mechanisms as a means to
diffuse the "Great Idea" was not enough by itself, for the
achievement of national unity. Since neoclassicism failed
to move the Greeks, by raising the "absolute perfection"
of their ancient model, Greek Nationalism had to conform
to everyday reality and the new conditions emerged.
The concept of "Great People" came to unify the indivi-
dual subjects and to be added to the concept of Nation.
It included everyone: capitalists and workers; state
officers and entrepreneurs, bankers and employees, manufac-
*See Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 167-8.
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turers and speculators; bourgeois and peasants. All these
different forces that emerged and walked together with
capitalism could not be satisfied with the static schemes
that neoclassicism professed. Greek intellectuals undertook
to restore the image of contemporary Greeks in history.
Continuity of Greek civilization through the Byzantine Em-
pire and traditional communities was the main aspect of
Paparegopoulos's History of the Greek Nation and N. Politis'
anthropological studies. The actors of this evolution were
the "Great People,"* in other words, contemporary Greeks.
The subject of the "Great Idea" was shifted from the static
principles to the living potential of the country.
Our popular tradition is inside us, like the
traces of our soul; following it ....we will
find our soul, the real source of Neohellenic
life. Popular tradition will lead us to the
source of this life.
(I. Dragoumis in A. Konstantinidis, 1950, p. 57)
In reality Athenian development followed neither the
traces of ancient tradition, nor those of the popular one.
The rare exceptions of Proastion and Anafiotica are nothing
more than the confirmation of the rule. "Liberation" of
the individual subject brought in the light the speculative
soul, which subordinated private will inside his monoton-
ous rules. And the extensive system of the new neighbor-
hoods was dependent on one center where state and capital
reigned. Athenian capitalism, after breaking down the
traditional entity into a number of atoms, succeeded in
keeping them along his grounds, by ensuring a personal piece
of land for each one, inside its territory. Binding, also,
each independent molecule to the main economic, political
*The concept of "People-Nation" was projected, at that time,
in Europe, through Neo-Kantian philosophy, as a moral idea
that combined the justification of History with the per-
sonal elevation and salvation. Neitzschean philosophy was
very influential in the formation of its Greek interpreta-
tion. (See K. Vergopoulos, 1977, p. 173).
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and ideological choices of its center, capitalism succeeded
in establishing a more or less unified continuum in the
Athenian environment. Architecture comes to confirm this
structural entity. From the ends of the city to the center,
the different interpretations of a more or less common
architectural language marked, during that period, an
escalated but unified whole.
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THE SPECULATIVE FABRIC
Ownership Patterns & Building Processes
Although the Athenian expansions had as common denom-
inator the organization around a focal point, each wave of
expansion was ruled by its own type of internal order.
In terms of patterns of land subdivision, the city's peri-
phery was looking closer to a set of differentiated patches
than to a uniform entity. Contrary to the unique expansion
unit, seen in other Mediterranean cities of the time,
Athens displayed four clearly different types of urban
fabric: distorted grid, regular grid, combination between
grid and neoclassical schemes and, finally, traditional
insular village fabric.*
The first three types were addressed to all social
ranges of the Athenian population, while the latter remained
only a habitat for working-class people.
The distorted grid marked the first expansions of the
city and, later, became the most frequent pattern. Such
grids were developing along the old roads that were connect-
ing Athens with the rural areas of the county (Patession
Street, Kiffissias Street, Pireaus Street, etc.). The
irregular course of these roads, as well as the incremental
process of land parceling were the main generators of the
"incidental" form that this kind of grid was finally taking.
The development of these quarters was initially charac-
terized by the concentration around specific poles
*We should point out the different form of the Kifissia
suburb. Isolated from the middle class suburbs, this
prestigious settlement, diverged from both the other
expansions of the city and the European suburban model.
The land looks as if it were divided 'incidentally',
following a distorted grid pattern; but the qualitative
differences lie in the larger size of its blocks, the
extremely low population density and its luxuriant vege-
tation.
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("suburbs"* such as Patessia and Ampelokipi; or railway
stations, as in Attica Square and in Larissa Street) and
by scattered residential structures between the center and
the poles. Continuous parceling was followed by the
gradual incorporation of the new areas into the city plan
as "city expansions".
Due to the unbelievably high prices of the lots
inside the city, ... many are building out of
the boundaries of the Plan. As a result, new
incomplete quarters are added in the Plan and
new roads are continuously established; thus the
area of the city has become almost equal to that
of Smyrna, but including many vacant spaces.
(From an Athenian newspaper, in Mpires, 1966, p. 169)
The new quarters were characterized by the coexistence of
straight and irregular streets intersecting each other at
various angles, and by the lack of public or communal
spaces. The blocks had different sizes, usually larger
along the main street (Patession Street, Kefissias Street)
and smaller in their perpendicular ones.
Looking at land subdivision as it was before urbaniza-
tion, one can make two hypotheses: that the new quarters
either had derived from rural land previously subdivided
to smaller fields, or from a gradual parcelization of the
original estates. The second case was the most frequent
in the areas adjacent to the city. As we have seen in pre-
vious chapters, Greeks from abroad had bought more than
the 50% of the Attica county land before the departure of
the Turks. The rest of the land became National land. A
small part of it was sold, at low prices, to the peasants;
radical distribution of much of the land didn't take place
until 1871, under the Koumoundouros government -- it
constituted the first step of an agricultural policy, that
*In reality they were something between suburban and urban
development, incorporated into the city plan as suburbs.
They represent the first examples of distorted grid pat-
terns.
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had chosen the small or middle ownership of land as the
quicker vehicle for the incorporation of the agricultural
production into the capitalistic system.* A large part
of the national lands had been appropriated by the culti-
vators, who had the right of usufruct, while the rights of
ownership remained with the state.* In order to claim
ownership titles, the prerequisite was not to pay taxes,
as tax payment was proof of a leasing relationship. The
distribution of national lands was nothing more than the
arrangement of a situation which had been equivocal soci-
ally and economically for a long time.** The fact that the
private usufruct of land according to the Ottoman agricul-
tural system, was a common pattern in Greece in the past,
may explain why this trend for small or medium ownership
formation was so strong inside the rural population.***
What one can assume from the above land ownership pat-
terns, regarding the shaping of the Athenian periphery,
is that prior rural land around the city belonged to both,
large and small landowners. The variable sizes of the
City Plan 'expansion' -- from small to large -- corrobor-
ate this assumption. However, the larger expansions appeared
first and more frequently than the smaller ones.
In both areas that followed the distorted type of grid
model, urban land parceling was very similar to that of
agricultural land. This switching of land from rural to
*See K. Vergopoulos, 1975, p. 89.
**According to Tsoukalas, one-third to one-half of the na-
tional lands, 3,000 square km, had been appropriated till
1879, (K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 74).
***See K. Vergopoulos, 1975, pp. 31-39. The land, during
the years of the Ottoman occupation belonged to the Sultan,
but the system was so loose, that the users, mainly small
and medium cultivators, acted as the owners by Roman Law.
The imposed German-Roman Law system in the new state ignored
the traditional patterns in rural land, and created many
misconceptions.
p.I
0I*
4
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urban, which was initiated by large powerful landowners,
and from time to time included some small or medium culti-
vators, resulted in the increase of the number and the
wealth of the Athenian capitalists.
One had better not ask for names among the
local noblemen.... Names of unknown Athenians
started to appear, because of their shining
wealth, gained from the rural land speculation
of the exploitation of Athenian quarries.
These people derived from the class of Albanians
who lived in Plaka and in the villages sur-
rounding Athens...
(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 183)
It seems that something more than a small group of people
gained from the intensification of speculation. It is
also true that, since land prices in the new quarters were
relatively low, a large number of the new population was
accommodated in this way, for it was ensuring them a small
piece of land and a house of their own. In addition, this
process of land parceling led to a quick integration of
the house construction industry into the capitalist system.
Small enterprises were in charge of the construction which
was still in the handicraft stage.
The state, by favoring the quick integration of land
and housing markets into the capitalist system, tried to
satisfy both large and small land owners.* In this way,
a large portion of the newcomers soon became homeowners
themselves.
The second type of expansion layout, the regular grid,
derived from asystematic parcellization of large estates.
It was developed after 1880, along the new streets or the
tramways, (Alexandras, Kallithea), by the landowners them-
selves or speculative enterprises. It had a uniform
*A parallel compromising policy was applied in the rural
areas, where the governments were squeezed in their effort
to satisfy both large and small landowners.
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rectangular grid pattern worked out by hired surveyors.
The developers advertised the new areas by using seductive
names totally unsuited to the dull and monotonous environ-
ments they were actually offering.
The third type, combination of neoclassical and grid-
iron patterns, was an attempt to synthesize the character
of the neighboring neoclassical monuments and their gardens
(Zappeion, Stadium) with the successful speculative model.
Besides the typical patterns already described, there
was also the formation of an "unauthorized" pattern
(Proastion and Anafiotika), which tended to follow the
traditional, island village model. Of the two settlements,
the first one was absorbed inside the city fabric, as soon
as the city started to expand towards its direction, while
the second one still resists to any demolition or regula-
tion. Both were established by artisans from the Aegean
islands. Their layouts were characterized by a main bending
street-agora-surrounded by "irregular" blocks and curved,
secondary roads. They are the only examples of new neigh-
borhoods with structured communal form, and totally dis-
tinguished from the speculative settlements. Proastion
consisted of 60 houses and it was built on land that was
legally acquired but not included in the city plan area.
Anafiotika was built on public land; officially, it was
part of the archaeological space. The process that led to
the development of Anafiotika presents striking similari-
ties with later forms of land occupation:
In the beginning two craftsmen from Anafi Island
taking advantage of the emergency situation
during Otto's expulsion, had built without being
noticed, with subtraction and addition, the
curves of the rock (or Acropolis) created small
houses. This nucleus not only attracted the rest
of the builders, who had already been living in
Athens, but it also served as a safe support for
those, who, during the following years, would
decide to leave their island and come to work in
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the capital. This illegal settlement remained
homogeneous till the two first decades of the
next century. For, the solidarity and the
mutual help for the always-secret-settlement of
new people was given only to relatives and com-
patriots (Mpires, 1966, p. 172).
State government tolerated this illegal process, since
it did not cost anything, on the one hand, while it pro-
vided a shelter to working class people, who were necessary
for the increasing building sector of the capital.
Housing construction gradually became a matter of com-
mercialization for the areas closer to the center of the
city, while, in a large part of the periphery, guilds of
craftsmenwere still keeping personal contact with the house-
owner. The impulse for commercialization took place in
the wake of a new influx of people.
In 1879 a sudden increase in housing demand occurred.
This increase was closely connected to the influx of Greeks
from Egypt.* Several building enterprises appeared at that
time to respond to the demand. They usually constructed
two- to three-story houses. As the land belonged to many
different landowners, these houses appeared in a random
way: one at a time or two adjacent lots at the most, but
never in long rows. "Houses for sale" were their name
(metapratika). As a result, there was an intensification
of urban tissue in the central areas, and the closer peri-
phery. In the center, furthermore, there was an increase
in the demand for prestigious housing and business spaces.
The first bulky buildings appeared, which were character-
ized by an increased floor to area ratio and dimin-
ished or even light wells. Height also increased to three
stories, and sometimes a basement was added. The first
floor was usually reserved for commercial use, while the
upper ones were multi-family dwelling units for rent, to
*Fearing possible revolt of the Arabs against foreigners,
which actually occurred in 1882. (See K. Mpires, 1966, p. 198).
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Greeks and foreign, high-ranking officers or young profes-
sionals. A combination of factors, such as the low effi-
ciency and organization of the building enterprise, the
handicraft character of building materials and elements
production, the high cost of the imported iron beams, the
inadequency of the water supply system to serve the upper
floors, as well as the desirable view of the Acropolis --
the supreme symbol of the city -- prevented the central
ares from a systematic exploitation in the form of high
buildings. Since it could not expand vertically, building
floor-space was stretched to the limit, leaving minimal
open spaces.
In the western side of the old city, intensification of
urban tissue use took the form of adding rooms for rent.
Small house-owners constructed impromptu, small, unhealthy
rooms in the periphery of their yards, which usually shel-
tered poor students coming from the rural areas, or migrants
and people without penrmnent jobs, usually singles, who pre-
ferred to live around the "job" market of the central area.
The other residential units, six to seven low
rooms, all very old and dingy spaces, some
without windows, almost all with rotting walls,
were occupied by various people. There were two
or three bachelors, one family with five or six
children, one young divorced woman,... doing
charring and obviously living alone. The inner
room in the back of the yard was occupied by the
house-owner ... and her daughter. This enclo-
sure with the poor buildings was on a side street,
between Psyrri and Tatsi neighbourhoods.
(A. Papadiamantis, 1900, p. 453)
Speculative Fabric and Individualism
Although the phenomenon of poverty and misery was lim-
ited, the differences between the rooms for rent or the
small houses in Anafiotika, and their extreme opposite,
the mansions of the ruling class people, was strikina.
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But, what did not bring the two opposites face to face and
appeased the differences in a city scale was this extensive
continuum of middle class neighborhoods. From the urban
type of the two-to-three-story commercialized houses; to
the lower, "suburban" townhouses with garden; from the more
elaborate facades of the central streets; to the plain bulks
in the city plan expansion; a broad channel was established,
through which striking contradictions were diffused.*
The ruling class held for itself the absolute means of
the architectural language, by hiring Greek and foreign
architects gathered in the Greek Capital. Interpretation
of the Beaux Art principles in the wealthy mansions became
for the architects the only field, since any chance for
architectural intervention on the city plan level had van-
ished. These mansions did not compose coherent complexes
as in the cases of Paris or London. The Syntagma Square
complex, governed by the architectural regulations of Otto's
era, was the only exception to the rule. The rest of the
eastern-central area was characterized by a variety of
trends, according to the personal tastes of the various
politicians, state officers, natives or foreign-born cap-
italists, landlords and intellectuals. Styles varied from
the pure neoclassical to the most rich interpretation of
the neorennaissance or neobaroque. The permanent setting
of a large part of international Greek bourgeoisie**
brought together the prevalence of Eclecticism over the
Bavarian academism.
*An analogous continuum occurred in the language spoken in
the city, which started from traditional idioms and con-
tinued to a whole range of mixed types in order to end to
the artificial archaic language established as official
by the new Greek State. (See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 565).
**In 1880, of a total of 39 mansions, 23 belonged to
wealthy Greeks who came from abroad, 14 to native Greeks
and 2 to foreigners. See K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 242.
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But this definition of "freedom" of style, still inside
a classical repertoir, without any appearance of Avant-
garde efforts, reveals the limits of the renovative spirits
of Greek capitalists. The latter, preferring stability to
risk, short-term to long profits, and bound to the European
chariot, were repelled by any novelty that would bring
change in a more or less stable society. This conservatism
became more evident at the educational level, where, al-
though they had the power, they did not dare to change an
educational system oriented to the production of clerks, and
as backwards as the dead, "official" language it used. For
them, if it was not the most progressive process for the
capitalistic development it was at least a stable one.
The educational system was actually one of the state
mechanisms, that quickly transformed Greek society.
If there ever existed a country where the myth
that social exclusion of the lower classes from
the goods of civilization could be overcome
through educational and cultural mechanisms,...
that country is Greece.
(K. Tsoukalas, 1977, p. 571)
A large part of the rural population was absorbed by
the broad schooling mechanism, and through it, transformed
to a mass ready to be incorporated inside the urban middle
class. This process of social rising was in conformity
with the type of family programming that existed in the
country.
The small ownership, managed by the family, was for
centuries the basic economic unit. For such a small entity,
the only way to protect itself from a further subdivision
resulting from increasing numbers of its members, was to
provide some of the new members with new horizons, located
out of the borders of the family's own territory. School-
ing system became the channel for this movement. The
family was financing the studies of the sons in exchange
for the exclusion from the agricultural land, and supported
-10.1-
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them till they could make their own living. Politicians
connected to the family through the "clientele" system,
were protecting the graduates and providing them with
clerking jobs in and out of the state mechanism. This
process of "structural mobility" that produced a large part
of Athens' population, was extremely influential in the
system of values that prevailed in both the city and the
country. For it secured strong social ties between the
family unit and it functioned as a suspensive mechanism for
any rising of sharp cultural conflicts between the two op-
posites. In reality the schooling mechanism, being stuck
to a time-consuming program of teaching a complex and alien
official language and an academic version of Greek history,
produced masses of semieducated, antiproductive bureau-
crats. For these people it was very easy to accept the
ruling class ideology and imitate their patrons.
Feeling satisfied inside the "freedom" and "equality"
of the regular or irregular grids in the capital, and
having lost the community structure of their places of ori-
gins, the bureaucrats became the massive dough of the new
urban population of Athens, without being able to structure
their neighborhoods. On the other hand, the few working
class settlements of the same period, show a rich weaving
of social relationships in their environments.
For the individual petit-bourgeois at the end of the
19th century, personal contacts with high-ranking officers
as well as individual ownership, became the means, through
which he was trying to personalize his relationships with
work and habitat. Although his home still denoted his
personal identity, it also denoted his boundaries:
In 1860, personal contributions of the Athenians
for the amelioration of the capital were
stopped because some people were considering
these isolated efforts as opposed to the new
urban civilization. This marks the beginning
of citizens' isolation, regarding their environ-
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ment. Until that period Athenians were obliged
to maintain themselves in the part of the streets
corresponding to their own houses, and also to
participate personally in a variety of other
works or urban amelioration. The emerging
bourgeois society, and specialization, put an
end to personal and communal contribution in
Athens.
(C. Haidopoulos, 1979, p. 36)
The indifferent new street patterns contributed to
this isolation, by prohibiting the type of open communica-
tion that existed in the old city neighborhoods. But,
while the new street patterns could not support the old
form of urban life; they had nothing in common with the
elaborate utility service system that other Mediterranean
cities had.*
...most of the streets were unpaved. But even
those covered with gravel, were overrun by a
thick layer of mud because they were continually
damaged by the wheels of carts and carriages,
as well as by horseshoes. This created many
problems for Athenians, either as dust during
summer or as thick mud during winter.
(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 170)
In addition, the new quarters were lacking in water
supply and disposal systems. Municipal government was in-
capable of dealing with the street under a "rational" per-
spective.
So, if local government, state government and utility
services could not live up to their assumed roles -- as
the bearers of a system of infrastructure ensuring the
hygiene of the streets of the city -- what else could be
this gridiron pattern than the best model for the exploita-
tion of the salary earners by the speculators?
Hence, the new settlements contained nothing else than
accesses and land for sale, the acquisition of this last
good remained the only feasible expectation of the Athenian
inhabitant.
*See M. de Sola- Morales, 1973, p. 30.
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... the desire for individual settlement was widely
spread in Athens. The private house, one story
and simpler for the lower class, and two to three
stories for the upper class, represented a common
interest. Even in the houses built for rent, that
contained two or three dwelling units, each one
of them occupied a whole floor and it had its
independent entrance and staircase. The simple
internal organization included one row of several
rooms in the front and another one at the back --
separated from the first by a middle wall.
(K. Mpires, 1966, p. 199)
An old custom that survived in Athens influenced a lot
this broad spreading of private houses: According to it
the family of the bride was obliged to provide the new
couple with a house to live in. This social characteris-
tic not only became adapted to the capitalistic relation-
ships, but it continues until today to have a remarkable
impact on the housing market.
As acquisition of a house was a family matter, even for
the low incomes, state or city government could free them-
selves from the responsibility of housing provision for the
new residents of the city. On the other hand, this "cus-
tom", still held in the capital, and strengthened the land
market and the building construction sector of the city.
Certainly the 19th century speculative developments
have little in common with the 20th century ad-hoc situa-
tion. But the origins of this phenomenon can be traced to
the popular desire for individual housing, the absence of
any state interferences in the shaping of the neighborhoods,
and the inability of municipal government to respond to
its role. But it was also something more. The dominance
of a powerful land market, which was looking for the easiest
and most profitable way to divide the land, and the ab-
sence of any strong resistance by the future residents to
neighborhood models lacking social facilities. Small retail
business came later to sporadically establish a few places
of interaction in the new quarters. But, during those years
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these places were concentrated in the central area. Among
them cafe's were the most popular ones.
Since there were no structured bonds but only the ties
of common fate, and social communication with the others
was reduced to discussions of state matters, and political
chit-chat. The great number of Athenian newspapers (56
out of a total of 131 in the whole country) with exclu-
sively political content, reveals not only an extremely
"political" society, but also the voracious appetite of the
new "educated" population, professionals and employees, for
public matters and their thirst for information. It shows
also the important role of these "intellectuals" to the new
Athenian society, which became closer to a "political soci-
ety" than to a "society of citizens."
This attitude would become critical in the course of
Athenian development. Inside the extensive grid of the
periphery, lacking any intermediate social communal struc-
ture, the majority of the Athenian population would be acting
simultaneously on two opposite levels: the individual and
the public. The privately owned house would be the ideal
for everyone, while familiarity with the public affairs
would be the illusion, replacing real participation in the
urban community.
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INTRODUCTION
The strong influence of socio-economic and political
changes on the spatial shaping of cities is a truism.
Emergency situations, on the other hand, while not given
much honor in bibliographies, are also accountable for con-
siderable alterations in city form.
In this section we are concerned with an extreme case:
a city adopting a new shape in a milieu of painful trans-
formation and continuous crisis. Under such pressure, change
becomes a force out of control.
This was the case of Athens in the period from 1909 to
1940.
The task of social change was undertaken by the Army
League (1909) which expressed, though in vague terms, the
general desire for broad reforms in social and political
life and, ultimately, for liberation from the royal court,
which was considered to be liable for the country's con-
tinuous bankruptcy, for the failure of national policy, and
for the 1897 defeat. Within this general climate of dis-
satisfaction the ruling Greek bourgeoisie initially ap-
peared decisive in undertaking the organization of a modern
state following the patterns of the liberal West. Reforms
in education, the judicial system, the army and, mainly,
in agriculture were the declared purposes. Unlike similar
reforms in liberal states, those undertaken in Greece were
carried out incompletely, after a long march on twisting
paths. As Svoronos notes "the pre-history of the Greek
Bourgeoisie could not guarantee any radical positions,
especially at the very moment of Imperialism". (Svoronos,
p. 115)
In a broader sense the Greek Bourgeoisie never existed
as a unified class with clear and concrete aspirations:
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the struggle between "political patronage" and the new per-
ception of "social justice" and "public good" was, through-
out the period, present and acute. Greek Liberalism shared
many of the major characteristics of the brand of liberal-
ism expressed in other European nations, but it largely
remained an ideology of intention not action.
Greek events were even further removed from the European
context.
The country entered the first Balkan War in 1912 as a
part of the alliance with other neighboring countries to
dispute the Ottoman authority in the area. The second
Balkan War began in 1913 over the distribution of the former
Turkish lands among the previous allies. After a waiver
period of two years which was marked by a wild conflict
among the pro-Central powers (Royalists) and the pro-Entente
ones (Liberals), Greece entered WW I in 1916 and found her-
self on the winners' side at the war's end. A "last-minute
ally" Greece faced severe problems in the ensuing negoti-
ations, especially as Greek interests interfered with
Italian Imperialism and the Anglo-French conflicts in the
area. Greece finally achieved the annexation of East
Thrace and control of a large part of Asia-Minor that
would become Greek territory after a referendum five years
Later. Antagonism among Liberals and Royalists led the
army far beyond the boarder of the assigned territory, deep
into Turkey and destruction in August 1922. Arson des-
troyed the urban centers of east Hellenism, Smyrna, and
more than a million Greeks returned, as refugees, to their
national cradle. Their arrival marked the definite re-
folding of Hellenism that had already begun during the
Balkan wars. The incident was perhaps even more interest-
ing than the War of Greek Independence. As it is often
noted:
Modern Greece is the child of the compulsory
joining between Hellenisms and Helladism, which
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took place under sorrowful situations. Hellenism
was destroyed. Helladism was the only one to
survive. This was the decisive turnover in
Greek history.
(Markezinis, p. 9)
The same author showed that the situation in Greece
after 1922, as opposed to its previous situation was ana-
logous to the relation between modern Italy and its preced-
ing Papal State. That is true concerning the resolution
of nationalistic problems but not in what followed. After
the disaster and up to World War II, Greece saw 13 govern-
ments, three coup d'etats, the deportation of the king
(1924), his restoration (1936) and a dictatorship in 1936
that concluded the activity.
The existence of conflicts themselves is not the most
important aspect of this period, since conflicts actually
never eluded Greek politics; it is rather the nature of the
conflicts that changed so rapidly. In earlier times we saw
the "Grand Idea" as the common ground for political aspir-
ation; differences would emerge from various interpretations
of it and the tactics proposed to achieve it. Now the com-
mon ground disappeared and left in its place an arena of
conflict with social roots.
Athens had been the place to express grandiose aspir-
ations with prestigious institutional buildings far exceed-
ing its needs. Quite naturally, it now became the battle-
field of the different social groups that were trying to
impose their particular, deeply split, aspirations and wills.
The urban landscape became the victim of a bitter fire
that was raging out of control.
It is important to understand how acute and wild the
political struggle was. Each regime had only a short time
to prove its "good" intentions and to rally peoples' support.
Various governments reacted to the demands in various ways
in order to acheive their own political survival. Every
group or class was treated as a potential political ally,
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and this treatment in turn inflated each group's hopes of
solution.
Planning, a long-time effort to allocate resources as
an explicit compromise between different interest groups,
had no place in a situation where the long-range perspec-
tive was overwhelmed by constant changes in the government
and where compromise could be neither achieved nor imposed.
Ad-hocism became the answer to satisfy quickly and
separately, all needs and demands. Its consequences were
perceived much later, when all the increments of action
inevitably came together into a perceptible whole. It was
then that many realized that the layers of government action,
first to satisfy one group, then to satisfy another, had
become incompatible and that, despite initial impressions,
no single group's problems had ever been solved.
The most vital force of the nation, the administrative
force, was concentrated in Athens; commerce, industry and
infrastructures came later. It was not surprising then that
Athens was the place to absorb most of the shocks and reap
most of the benefits that followed national expansion and
social reform.
The way in which, and the circumstances under which, the
agglomeration of the Athenian basin was formulated are out-
lined in the first chapter. We then present the changes in
power structure and the consequent failures to implement
a plan as a means to illustrate the new power structure,
rather than as a way to interpret city form. In the fourth
chapter we will approach city form, through a detailed
study of the various modes of space occupation that ap-
peared as a response to the needs and aspirations of the
different social groups.
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THE FORMATION OF THE ATHENIAN AGGLOMERATION
PRODUCTIVE TRENDS AND THEIR DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS
Athens and Pireus consisted, as we have seen, of a bi-
polar system of two economically interdependent though
physically separated cities. They were interdependent with
divided functions performed by each but also physically
separated with visible peripheries existing for both. At
the same time their 'suburbs' in the basin were actually
small settlements, functioning as separate villages rather
than as extensions of the two cities. There were five such
villages in between the two cities and two more in the north
of Athens, none of which had populations exceeding 2000.
Much agricultural land still existed in these areas and its
exploitation benefitted farmers who were close to large
consumption centers.
By 1940 this image has been turned upside-down. The
villages, whose total population in 1909 represented 10
percent of Athens and Pireaus combined, now had their popu-
lations increased to such an extent that the total became
almost equal to that of the two major cities (Table 1).
With their enormous growth, they not only took up most
of the space between the two major centers, but they also
established a pattern of diffused development in almost the
entire area of the basin, thus removing its non-urban func-
tions. An agglomeration had replaced the bi-polar system.
Meanwhile its total population had increased by more than
a factor of five, dramatically changing the Athenian basin's
share in the whole Greek population. Above all, the transi-
tion had changed the national role of the capital. Here we
give an account of this shift only to the extent that it
influenced city form. The purpose is not to explain how and
why Athens had gained its role, but rather to explain how
this new role affected the shape of the urban fabric.
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The demographic and spatial development of the capital
in this period was a response to a complex system of factors
related to two developments. First, there was the creation
and redistribution of economic activities in the helladic
region. The second development was the refolding of broader
hellenism which took place from the first Balkan war on-
wards till the late '20s, though at varying rates and for
different reasons in the intermediate, short periods.
The Balkan wars resulted in the doubling of both the
territory and population of Greece. The new areas included
vast cultivatable regions and a network of urban centers as
well. Among them was Thessalonika, a large urban center on
the whole Balkan peninsula, second only to Constantinople.
Thessalonika was the main focus of a railway network of re-
gional importance and international influence, as it was the
only connection between Central Europe and the Ottoman em-
pire. With an evenly advantageous port, the city, just
before its incorporation into Greece, represented 67 percent
of the commerce of the Greek state. (Moskov in Haidopoulos
p. 57).
The annexations enlarged the Greek market. Immediately
after, Greece found itself isolated, with the declaration of
WW I and the related falling off of the international com-
merce. The need for self-sufficiency stimulated industrial
investments: under the umbrella of this imposed.and abso-
lute protectionism, the Greeks of the Diaspora for the first
time seemed to trust industrial investment, instead of
continuing to invest in mines and public works (Tsoukalas
p. 235). Within thirteen years the capital of the industri-
al corporations increased eightfold, surpassing that
invested in public works and approaching the capital in-
vested in mines (Andreadis p. 210-214).
However, industrial development was not evenly distri-
buted in the country. For a number of reasons Athens
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absorbed most of it. The war front in the north and closed
borders made it very risky to invest in that region. At
the same time, shifts in population that followed the re-
distribution of the former Ottoman territory deprived cities
of their natural dynamism.
Athens, having already imposed itself as the administra-
tive and productive center in the previous period, was now
ready to vigorously absorb the victims from the Balkan con-
flicts. We should also remember the trust that investors
from the colonies had always shown for the capital city as
a reference point for their activities. Within such a
framework, primarily set by the international situation and
not from an inherent dynamism, it is not surprising that,
during the period 1912-1922, Athens experineced a substantial
increase of its population, despite immigration to the US
and demographic bleeding of its natives (Haidopoulos p. 54-
58).
Typical victim of this concentration process was
Thessalonika. After the new national borders were formed,
Thessalonika was deprived of a considerable part of its
commercial hinterland. Also, its communications with Europe
stopped with the establishment of the Balkan front during
WW I. Finally Thessalonika lost its Jewish population, who
not only counted for one third of the total but who also
held most of the city's commercial wealth. As a result,
the city lost a vigor that had characterized it in the pre-
vious periods. A number of other towns in Macedonia, south
Epirus and on the east Aegean Sea faced similar problems:
annexation to the national center under such conditions
meant for them separation from the system on which they had
traditionally based their well-being.
However, the rapid growth of Greece, in terms of popu-
lation, still kept a relative balance between the capital
and the rest of the country. The influx of refugees was
the final impulse and established Athens as the dominant
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element in the national urban network (Table 2).
It is a common fallacy to think of the influx of refu-
gees into Greece in relation to the 1922 disaster in Asia
Minor. Within a broader perspective, however, refugees
landed in Greece from 1913 to 1928.
There were two refugee waves from Asia Minor, one in
1914 and another in 1919, 57,000 people came in from Russia
immediately after the 1917 revolution and another 47,000
came from Bulgaria under the Neigy treaty of 1919 (Aggelis
p. 30). This refugee population totaled up to half a mil-
lion. Together with the natives of the newly annexed areas,
they helped to cause the state population to double between
1907 and 1919. At the same time, half a million foreign
nationals left Greece for their respective countries; there-
fore the first refugee waves did not greatly disturb the
demographic equilibrium. Instead many of them managed to
bring capital, thus participating in the industrial develop-
ment we have seen before. Despite these first movements
of Greek populations towards their national center, three
of the five biggest Greek cities still were outside the
national boundaries: Constantinople, Smyrna and Alexandria,
which dominated the broader eastern Mediterranean region,
and which were the mainspring of wealth for mainland Greece.
However, at the end of the disastrous Greek army expe-
dition into Asia Minor, two of these cities were erased from
the map as Greek ones. Their inhabitants along with
hundreds of thousands of others from the regions rushed
back to Greece during a few days in September 1922. They
left behind them almost half a million dead, three hundred
thousand trapped, and the largest parts of their fortunes.
The shock this experience caused to Greek society was so
strong that, to many, the whole refugees' influx was asso-
ciated with this single violent event.
The 1928 census counted a total of 1,222,800 refugees
(the number includes also those trapped in Asia Minor, who
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came later under the Treaty for the Exchange of Populations-
1923). Slightly more than half of that number (643,000)
were established in urban centers; among these, 245,000 in
the capital. Table 3 shows the spectacular impact of the
influx on the total population of the city -- which in-
creased by 30 percent -- and presents some aspects of the
city's spatial development, showing a dramatic increase of
the peripheral areas.
But why did Athens attract so many refugees?
Athens was the place to offer the best opportunity in
either the prevailing industrial sector or in the tradi-
tionally hypertrophic Administration. For the refugees, we
can also hypothesize that they felt a certain attraction
for urban centers and particularly for Athens, as they had
lived originally in more urbanized areas than most of the
people of mainland Greece. Smyrna and Constantinople not
only had a Greek population almost equal to that of the
capital but, also, a cosmopolitan life that was unknown to
Athens.
However, none of the hypotheses outlined above seems
strong enough to explain why the 21 percent of the refugees
was immediately absorbed by the capital. We feel that, in
order to understand the phenomenon, we have to take into
account the politics of the period.
The Asia Minor expedition took place within the milieu
of a bitter fight between the royalists and Venizelos
Liberals, known in history as the 'national discord'.
Though it was Venizelos who obtained Greece's right to por-
tions of Asia Minor, and who landed the army there; it was
the royalists, that meanwhile overthrew him, and who con-
tinued the adventure which led to the disaster. Conse-
quently, the refugees considered the royalists as respon-
sible for their fates, while Venizelos was associated with
the period of nationalistic aspirations and inflated hopes.
Also, by their very nature, the refugees were inclined
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towards progressive political positions; Liberalism became
the vehicle to express their aspirations for integration
into the Greek society.* As the political fight continued,
it is understandable that Venizelos favored the settlement
of these people in the vital control point of the country,
as a means of counterbalancing the conservative forces of
the royal court and the.backward oligarchy. As G. Burgel
put it:
The refugees became the Praetorians of Venizelos'
Liberal Democracy; praetorians to whom he was not
obliged to promise either (agricultural) lands or
jobs and salaries, but just the possibility for
settling themselves.
(G. Burgel p. 379)
For Greece the phenomenon of the direct impact of politics
on urbanization was neither new nor surprising. We have
seen how the reelection of provincial politicians was con-
nected with the fulfillment of their preelection patronage
promises to their constituents. Most of these promises,
giving the required signature for acceptance into higher
education or providing employment in the hypertrophic public
sector, were strongly related to migration to the capital,
a phenomenon that was becoming more and more the symbol
of social success.
Nevertheless, a new element was introduced that over-
shadowed the previous situation. At this point, the gov-
ernment, as a collective mechanism, encouraged the trend,
not individuals. Consequently the capital, previously the
center of provincial antagonism, became the center of the
national consciousness, the symbol of a happy life and
success. Given the promising industrial development of the
basin, residence in the capital was equivalent to having
the best opportunities.
*Sometimes the refugees went even beyond that, by taking
radical positions. Generally, the foundation of the Greek
Communist Party (KKE) is associated with their influx in
Greece.
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Tables
ANNUAL ANUAL ANNUAL
RATE OF RATE OF RATE OF
1907 GROWTH 1920 1928 GROWTH 1940 GROWTH
1907-20 1920-28 1928-40
I.Athens 154,863 4.81 285,966 302,966 0.75 481,225 3.93
2.Pireaus 67,982 4.01 II3,3I5 131,065 1.84 205,404 3.81
3.Athens'suburbs 20,567 3.42 31,844 232,336 28.19 5I3,060 6.82
4.Pireaus'suburbs 6,598 9-90 22,518 135,254 25.12 146,391 0.66
5-Athens & suburbs 175,430 4.66 317,209 535,302 6.76 994,285 5.92
6.Fireaus & suburbs 74,588 4.72 135,833 266,319 8.78 351,795 2.35
TCTAL 250,010 4.68 453,042 801,621 7.4 I,346,080 4.41
(Source: 1920 & 1928 Census, in Prevelakis, p.207-208.)
POPULATION POPULATION POPULATION OF THE
OF GREECE OF THE CAPITAL AS PERCE-
CAPITAL NTAGE OF THE TOTAL
GREEK POPULATION
1907 2,631,952 250,020 9-50 %
1920 5,531,474 453,042 8.20 %
928 6,204,684 802,622 12,92 %
I940 7,318,915 1,346,080 18.3) %
(Source: 1920 & 1928 & 1940 Census, in Prevelakis, p.210.)
REFUGEE POPULATION RATE OF POPULATION
POPULATION WITHOUT THE INCREASE., 1920-28
IN 1928 REFUGEES WITHOUT THE(1928) REFUGEES
I.Athcns 37,242 265,825 -0.88 %
2.Pireaus 18,907 112,158 
-0.13 %
3.Athens'suburbs I08,I64 124,158 18.54 #
4.Pireaus'suburbs 80,850 5 4,L04 11.66 %
5.Athens & suburbs 145,305 389,997 2.62 %
6.Pireaus & suburbs 99,757 I66,562 2.58 5
TOTAL 245,062 556,559 2.61 %
(Source: 1907, 1920, 1928 & 1940 Census, in Prevelakis, p.210.)
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FACTORIES WORKERS WORKERS PER HP HP PERFACTORY FACTCRY
1917 2,213 35,000 15.8 70,000 31.6
1920 2,905 60,000 20.6 110,000 37.9
:')30 4,000 110,000 27.5 230,000 57.5
1938 4,515 140,000 31-0 277,000 61.3
(Source: Svoronos, p. IOI.)
GREECE ATHENS & ATTICA ATHENS & ATTICA AS
PERCENTAGE OF THE
INDUSTRY NUMBER OF NUMBER OF HP No OF No OF HP NATIONAL TOTALFACTORIES WORIKRS FACTOR. WORKERS
FACT. WORKERS HP
Netallur-y &
:achAiery 3,702 14,3I? 6,426 I,013 9,498 4,275 27.4 63.0 66.5
Chemical I,III 8,IO3 7,I35 344 3,820 3,820 3I.0 47.1 5.4
Textile 3,939 23,735 10,065 1,173 9,965 4,345 29.8 41.9 4.2
Food 24,096 96,848 66,836 2,905 I?,I85 9,255 12.1 17.8 19.I
Various 251 3,301 20,655 131 2,626 12,977 52.2 69.2 62.8
TOTAL 33,704 146,331 100,720 5,566 42,732 35,849 - -
(Source: Census of -The industrial enterprises, 1920, in Frevelckis, p.225-7.)
PIREAUS GREECE. PIREAUS AS PERCE-
NTAGE OF THE6 MILLION MILLION NAEO HTONS TONS NATIONAL TCTALDRACHMAS DRACIHIAS VALUE WEIGHT
Imports(I930) 5,432,202 I,355,164 8,682,426 2,568,672 62.5 52.8
Exports.(I930) 687,944 78,546 5,985,677 766,174 11-5 10-3
Total (I930) 6,119,146 1,433,710 14,668,093 3,334,846 41.7 43.o
Implorts(I93 8 ) 8,682,416 1,756,915 14,758,578 2,741,203 58.8 57.5
Exports(I93 8 ) 1,184,817 99,802 10,148,865 1,394,362 11.7 7.2
Total (1938) 9,367,253 I,676,717 24,907,443 4,I35,565 39.6 40.5
(Source:Iliopoulos ,p.265-)
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Changing attitudes were expressed in policy shifts.
The responsibility for employment was left to the prevail-
ing private sector, and the government prefered to accom-
modate the newcomers on other grounds providing them with
the opportunities necessary for urban settlement. The
forms that this provision has taken under the specific
conditions of the time are examined in Chapter 3 (Adhocism
and city expansion). Here we want to point out that the
state itself became a conscious promoter of urbanization,
and thus it strongly influenced the ideologies of the people.
This is a peculiarity when compared with policies in other
European countries of the time. But it is necessary to
understand it in order to explain the overwhelming urbani-
zation of Athens and the related forms of spatial occupation
that were correspondingly developed. The Liberals in
Greece saw urbanization as an opportunity for modernization
and for strengthening their rule, and with good reason.
The arrival of the refugees marked the end of traditional
society and the beginning of unprecedented growth. The
dynamism of modern European society was imposed on tradi-
tional stability. With the boldness of desperation, the
refugees infused the economy with a new vigor, even apart
from the fact that their demographic vitality had balanced
the decline in numbers of the native population. Their
presence, along with the drastic elimination due to immigra-
tion to the US, had brought the state and the people to a
fundamental truth of survival, that, in various ways, had
been avoided until then: Greece had to develop its own
productive forces in the best possible way. Completion of
agricultural reform and industrialization were the most
apparent ways.
1.8 million acres of land were distributed to 270,000
families, from 1922-1929, radically solving the first
problem (Aggelis p. 31-32). Agricultural reform was the
only one that the Greek liberalism managed to carry out in
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a satisfactory way, at least concerning the distribution of
land, and shortly thereafter Greece became food self-
sufficient. However, the mechanisms of the 19th century
that were taking up the surplus value of agricultural pro-
duction did not disappear at all. Mainly through a system
of impositions, urban centers were, once more, the true
beneficiaries of the reform (Prevelakis p. 218).
As for industrial development, the era is characterized
by a take-off that appeared after a long waiting period of
slow investment and development. Table 4 shows the increase
in absolute terms and the positive development in those
factors -- such as number of workers per plant -- that char-
acterize the transition from an artisanal stage to an in-
dustrial one.
The refugees, a cheap labor force striving to survive,
are generally considered to have been the main factor in
the unprecedented industrial development. However, an in-
creased market, the influx of experienced entrepreneurs
and the protectionism of the state also played a major role
(Vergopoulos, 1978). Finally the worsening international
economy put enormous strains on the commercial balance,
therefore encouraging national industry to replace imports
with its own products, especially consumption goods. What-
ever the exact reason, we should note that the annual rate
of industrial growth in Greece between the wars was the
third highest in the world, following only the USSR and
Japan (Vergopoulos, 1978, p. 74).
A more detailed look reveals that the distribution of
industrial growth was, once more, unbalanced -- absorbed
primarily by the capital and especially by Pireaus. So the
division of labor was deepened both on a national scale
and within the agglomeration.
There are two reasons for this new concentration.
First in a consumption-oriented industry, manufacturers
and suppliers tend to move close to the existing markets.
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Athens was the best, if not the only, such market at the
time. Second, all the administrative functions were con-
centrated in Athens; an advantage in an environment of
state protectionist policy, where the industrialists were
forced to be in continuous contact with the backward and
badly organized bureaucracy. In a sense, the fate of the
city was unconsciously decided in the late 19th century,
when all of those necessary preconditions were established.
Table 6 gives us a final insight into the economic
nature of the agglomeration at the time. Pireaus holds the
vast majority of imports (consumer goods and machinery)
but very few exports (agricultural products). It has been
said that the economic strength of the capital rested mainly
on its ability to consume a large part of the nation's
product, rather than in its productive capability
(G. Burgel p. 9). Whatever the truth may be, we should note
that the population growth of Athens was not a direct re-
sult of industrialization, as in other European countries.
It was rather an enforced urbanization caused mainly by a
turbulent international situation and a national crisis
that preceded industrialization and actually helped it to
occur to the extent that it did. The spatial distribution
of industry that followed the patterns of the refugees'
establishment is a good illustration of that process, which
we will examine later in this text.
However, the fact that a productive mechanism was in-
deed built up as a response to the challenges of the time,
demarcates the boundaries of the problem on the opposite
direction and explains the differences between the develop-
ment of the Greek capital city and that of third world
capitals.
Within such a framework it is not surprising that Athens
did not develop slums, either of a miserable working class,
like those found in the advanced industrial societies of
western Europe, or of the desperate migrants, as found in
-123-
the third world metropolises.
The rush towards Athens was not so much the direct re-
sult of an urban pull (industrial development) or a rural
push (decomposition of rural society). Instead it happened
in the milieu of a whole empire's collapse, and was rein-
forced by the active role of governments that saw in it
opportunities to strengthen their individual positions.
This condition determined both the expectations of the
inhabitants and the limited spatial control that was left
to the state; given the limited resources at its disposal,
it had to accept endless compromises simply to be consistent
with its basic policies.
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THE PLAN PROPOSALS: 1908-1924
After the initial effort by the Bavarians to develop
a unified and well-controlled plan for the city, the no-
tion of a Master Plan was virtually abandoned, to be re-
placed by small-scale, free, private developments. In this
situation, the slow rate of population growth and a rela-
tively coherent society prevented distortion of the basic
aspects of the urban fabric. However as population growth
rates accelerated and changed the nature of the capital
during the early 20th century, this laissez-faire approach
proved to be less and less effective in solving the prob-
lems that spatial control and city plans began. A number
of plan proposals appeared during the transitional period
up to the refugees' influx. These plans offered very
little insight into the physical shaping of the city.
Nevertheless the study of their inception and fate is very
useful for understanding the roles and ideologies of the
various forces that were actually shaping the city fabric.
Athens at the time was a conservative place in the sense
that traditional ideas and methods were preserved some-
times against the prevailing general ideological framework.
This was the case with planning during the first steps of
the Liberal regime. Despite declarations for reform in
other fields, urban planning was felt, once more, to be
strictly the affair of the king, the architects and the
municipality, or more precisely of its mayor; the same old
formulas were tried once more, in spite of their proven
inadequacies. The governments may have altered their notions
regarding social organization but, on the eve of the Balkan
wars, had not yet abandoned their aspirations for a Greek
empire of "two continents and five seas", in the words of
the Liberal leader Venizelos. This empire obviously would
have to have a suitable capital, a need strongly felt, with
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the war imminent and, with the disintegration of the
Ottoman empire, promising the realization of the "Great
Idea."
In 1908 the mayor of Athens, Mercouris, and a
Venizelos protdgd, invited the Berlin planner Luwig Hoffman
to lay out a "directory plan" for the city. Hoffman, in
the tradition of his predecessors of the neoclassical era,
found the assignment a "very tempting" one. In his personal
log book he explains the reasons:
I began thinking of my school years when I had
enthusiastically strolled through ancient Greece,
and admired its arts, thanks to the judicious
interpretations of the classics from our respected
teacher. It seemed to me a divine order to visit
the city and have the opportunity to help solve
the remnants of ancient art from disgusting
adjoining.
(Schmidt p. 50)
After a brief visit of nine days to this "disgusting
adjoining" he came back in Berlin and drew up a plan within
the guidelines of the Eclecticist Academic school of
planning, the "Wilhelm style", in accordance with which
the monumental arrangement of the city's open spaces was
an absolute necessity. He was mainly concerned with the
beautification of the existing streets and squares by
applying such devices as colonades, obelisks and small scale
street improvements. Characteristic of his proposal were
the large scale clearances to be made to extend Korais
Street, useless from any practical point of view, but in-
tended to symbolically connect the group of the most pres-
tigious modern educational institutions (National Library,
University and the Academy) with the area of the ancient
Acropolis. With this idealistic attitude and grandiose
proposal, Hoffman's plan was irrelevant to both the real
needs of the city, and its financial capabilities. No dis-
cussion was held about this plan and the declaration of war
gave the city administrators a good opportunity to forget
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it as suddenly as it had appeared. But the Academic
Romanticism aside, Hoffman's plan had some interesting
aspects that were overlooked by the authorities. For
example he suggested, for the first time, the creation of
a peripheral street network as a basis for later develop-
ment of the city and, also, the unification of the two
railway stations: This measure of rationalization of the
infrastructure never disappeared from the ensuing plan
proposals, but also has never been realized.
Five years later the process was repeated; another for-
eigner was invited by the mayor to draw up a plan, but this
time with the personal recommendation of the queen (Mpires
p. 277). Mawson, an English architect and planner, visited
Athens for a short time and then, working with maps, gave
the Athenians a scheme that so much delighted them that they
called it the "miracle plan".
Mawson, as Hoffman and the Bavarians eighty years before,
felt compassion for the ancient city and above all with
"the natural beauty and imperishable youth of the Parthen-
on". He also felt that the contemporary problems were ruled
by the ancient glory: "Necessity must be met in a way that
will conserve all that ancient Athens met". Necessity, for
him, was primarily serving tourists, "for the many who re-
gard the ancient city as the Mecca that must be visited,
therefore there must be a new and well-planned system of
hotels". But beyond this idealism Mawson was interested in
providing the city with those facilities that would make it
a viable alternative to Brindisi on the route to India.
So he once more suggested the unification of the two rail-
way stations as a means of improving the commercial trans-
portation of the British Empire (Mawson, 1914). Apart
from this colonialist attitude, the plan was based on the
ideology of the "Illuminated City": good living conditions
are envisioned for the working class quarters on the peri-
phery. Boulevards and parks were everywhere, "where workman
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and others may rest in comfort during the long midday re-
cess", and these would be complemented by the reforesta-
tion in the outskirts of the city. Air and light stand-
ards were to be improved everywhere in the old city with
even more demolition than suggested by Kleanthes. The new
boulevards were, by following topography, emerging in an
"organic" street pattern. Finally, a rationalization of
functions was suggested and industry, commerce, transpor-
tation, education and administration were located in speci-
fic areas, related to each other with diagonal boulevards.
A lot of wedding-cake architecture was forming the image of
a city destined to become, as it was thought, the capital
of an empire.
Once again the proposal was ignored by the authorities,
a natural response in the middle of WW I and with Greece
split into two separate small states, one pro-Entente
(Venizelos) and one pro-German (Royalists). However, it
inflamed the public imagination and became the center of a
popular controversy: people fought for or against it and
suggested their personal alternatives. "Marbles in the cafe
tables have become planning boards and the Athenians im-
promptu planners, especially in the cafe of Zacharatos"
(Mpires p. 278) which was a kind of Athens' Hyde Park style
free forum. If nothing else, Mawson's plan gave many people
a way out of the piling-up problems of the time.
Mawson's plan was the last in a series of "Grandiose
designs" sailing against a vulgar everyday reality. Actu-
ally in Athens planning never managed to be imposed as one
man's affair.
The fact that a king existed was not enough by itself
to ensure him the force to implement his plans altogether,
as it happened with Popes in Rome before Italy's unifica-
tion or in Paris before the Bourgeois upheaval. It was a
brought King, imposed by outsiders, not emerging from a
physical-social process. His origins demarcated both the
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nature of his role and the limits of his power. Greek
social forces were either resisting him or allied with him
only under the light of their own purposes. This hybrid
situation never permitted the implementation of "Royal
planning".
We believe that this prehistory of Greek planning had
certain repercussions in what followed, in the sense that
the new authority was subject to the same equivocal situa-
tions as its predessessors. The lack of well-formulated
bourgeois class made apparent the need from the micro-
bourgeois classes, a support that could not be gained with
such vague generalities as "public good" or "social jus-
tice" -- promises of a liberal state -- but with visible
and direct concessions. If the 1909 revolt of the bour-
geois class had created any hopes for a bourgeois integra-
tion the continuous shake-up and, finally, the 1922 dis-
aster destroyed it. The refugees with their advanced social
background could not accept a marginal position in Greek
society; instead, they were pushing for a share that would
enable them to live a fully integrated life. The fact that
they offered themselves for an initial capital accumulation
had not at all the desperate perspective of the English
proletariat in the early 19th century; it was seen instead
as a necessary step for the integration process.
In such a framework the notion of "public good" was
different than in the classical Liberal states of the West,
a truth reinforced by the fact that an especially weak state
had never had the means to compensate, on an acceptable
level, the victims of the process of supplying these
"public goods". The same deficits that had been delaying
the first Master Plan were now becoming more and more pro-
hibitive for the new state. The means that public planning
could employ in Greece were also being eliminated:
-- Clearances of densely populated areas in the tradition
of Paris, London and Rome were not merely difficult
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but unthinkable. The fate of Kleanthes's Master Plan
was actually decided on that field. It was not only
that money had always been in scarcity but also that
the Athenian society, with its vast middle classes,
had neither slums to clear nor a public authority will-
ing and able to implement such a policy.
-- The lay-out plans for the new residential areas were,
on the other hand, illogical for an authority that,
from the very beginning, was concerned only with the
central quarters.
Then the only applicable option was that of small-scale
improvements in selected locations, mainly to guarantee a
certain level of coherence in the street network. A final
point that completes the picture is about the political
system of clientele, which always confuses the meaning of
public goods with individual ones -- achievement of the
later ones being the ultimate measure for the reelection of
politicians from the very beginning of modern Greece.
In this atmosphere of compromise, the new regime was
obliged to follow the old paths. Nothing can describe
better the depth of the problem than the denial of a member
of the municipal body to support the hiring of the German
L. Hoffman; he judged it vain "because good wills are
lacking in the country, just as the administration loses
its courage whenever facing the last of its voters (Mpires
p. 276).
With the accretion of the problems it was becoming more
and more apparent that the artistic approach to city
planning no longer had any scope. The plan of the Calligas
Committee that followed proves not the turn to an urbanis-
tic thought, but the official adoption of ad-hocism as a
consequence of an inability to control urban growth. This
can be seen not only in the plan but also in the city
planning legislation that was passed in the period, and
actually regulates building to the present day, and above
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all in the way the state itself acted in the public housing
programs for the refugees. All these were conceived with
a single purpose in mind: to support individual interests
with no regard to the overall consequences.
The making of the new plan was entrusted to the
Calligas Committee -- from the Ministry of Transportation --
that, meanwhile, had substituted the ministry of interior
affairs in its city planning responsibilities. This admin-
istrational change isolated further the already deterior-
ated municipality and established twisting paths for the
bureaucratic processes necessary to coordinate planning.
In 1919 the ministry organized the "supreme technical
board of state" which would be in charge of urban affairs.
In the same year the French Urbanist Ebrar* was appointed
president of the board, and the Greek engineer Calligas
vice-president. The board first met in early 1920, and
Ebrar outlined his own perception for the scope of a master
plan for the city that could be successful:
Instead of providing a new plan for Athens we
should, at the time, leave the city exactly as
it is and work only in its periphery. From the
World War [I] onwards the problem of urban
modifications became extremely difficult because
of a continuous housing crisis. In such a situ-
ation, an ideal and grandiose plan for the rear-
rangement of the existing city is unapplicable.
Overlooking the danger of being considered para-
doxical I have to confess my deep belief that
such a plan is not even needed by the city.
Instead we should study the general traffic
*Ebrar represents a different case than other foreign
planners who had short assignments in Greece. He stayed
in the country for seven whole years (1914-21) and was
involved in the replanning of Thessalonika, which was
extensively destroyed in a great citywide fire (1917);
in teaching at the Athens technical university; and, finally,
in Athen's planning. It is characteristic of the poli-
tical climate in Greece, that he left the country, before
completing his last assignment, dismissed by the Royalists
that meanwhile had overthrown the Liberals (1921) who had
hired him.
-132-
network and lay out the new living quarters the
appearance of which is imminent and unavoidable...
We should focus on the periphery because we
cannot touch any single stone of the existing
city before we regain the housing balance we
had had before the war.
(Ebrar in Mpires, p. 238)
Ebrar's idea was to apply a kind of zoning by dividing
the city in four concentric sectors all of them intersect-
ing in Concord Square. Different regulations would apply
to each sector thus introducing a variety in urban form
that Ebrar was considering to be very uniform and monotone.
Each sector would consolidate its already established major
function, which would be improved in the outskirts of the
existing settlements. A main north-south artery was also
suggested as the necessary backbone of the emerging agglom-
eration (Lheritier, 1921, p. 343). The ideas of Ebrar
never have taken a complete form. Following a governmental
change, his contract was not renewed and he was forced to
leave the country. His departure meant the abandonment of
his ideas. Calligas, who replaced him, provided with a
mediocre plan that could neither envision the new situation
nor provide an artistic attitude. The only positive aspect
was the, for the first time, systematic documentation of
the existing situation.
The plan, without any vision, insists on the existing
city and suggests only a few, small-scale modifications.
These included the extension of 3rd September Street (a
street leading to the swiftly developing at the time north
neighborhoods), a unified railway station but without all
the boulevards that the two previous plans had proposed
in order to connect it with the center, and the widening
of some streets with a stage-by-stage transposition of the
bordering building lines. The place of a former barrack,
east to the palace, which was suffocated by the surround-
ing urban tissue, was suggested for the development of a
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new administrational center.
While the Calligas Committee was busy in preparing
plans for these modest modifications, other public author-
ities (Ministry of Welfare) and private speculators were
also busy in independently developing the first refugee
quarters in the periphery of the city. It is striking that,
once more and despite Ebrar's recent warnings, the exten-
sion of the city was felt to be outside the responsibili-
ties of the planning authorities. Their role was eliminated
only in the improvement of the already existing settle-
ments, an attitude not so much different from those under-
lying the previous planning efforts.
As for the committee with very little insight for the
'cosmogony' that was going on around it, it continued its
work and in 1924 presented the plan in its final form.
A large part of it was immediately approved by decree and
building permits were processed according to the new regu-
lations. These included the transposition of building
lines of Patission Street, the main artery connecting the
Patissia quarter with the center. The inhabitants were
initially enthusiastic with the perspective of the creation
of a boulevard that would permit the integration of their
neighborhood with the more prestigious areas of the city
and its consequent improvement. When, however they real-
ized that they had to give up parts of their lots for the
widening they began a real revolt; it was conducted by
land speculators with large interests in the area (Preve-
lakis p. 308) but the visible leader was a hero of the
Balkan wars, a local priest (.Mpires p. 284), perhaps to
ensure the opinion that the Athenians were a very tradi-
tional society. Strong attachment to the land was one of
the traditional values and it was used in the rhetoric
employed to oppose the Calligas Plan; the "moralization"
of land speculation begins. The plan was revoked
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immediately despite the fact that, at the time, a dictator-
ship was in control of the state.
The case is extremely interesting, for it reveals the
power balance, beyond the literal political schemes, and
the inefficiencies of a period's public planning, one that
failed to gain support for its plans, although the need
was apparent: cancellation of the street-widening scheme
has tormented the whole area and its inhabitants to the
present day. As for the economic implications, we should
note that the proprietors would have been fully compensated
by the surplus-value that the remainder of their land
would have gained by the creation of the boulevard and the
consequent development of the area. Nevertheless the lack
of an alternate layout for the boulevard led to develop-
ment of Patission Street; surplus value was distributed
anyway. From this point of view, the struggle of the in-
habitants was historically justified. Thus began the in-
cidental distribution of urban land's surplus value that,
ever since has been the most strengthening dream for the
petite-bourgeoisie and the best recipe for the perpetuation
of the existing status. These are the first signs of a
situation which will be studied in the post war period,
when it becomes the main problem for urban land develop-
ment.
The revocation of the Calligas plan marked the end of
any effort for an overall control and physical arrange-
ment of the city fabric. The very personal planning pro-
positions that followed (Leloudas 1929, Belanos 1924)
simply underlined the inability of the state to apply, and
the unwillingness of the people to support, a coherent and
coordinated spatial development of the emerging agglomer-
ation.
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ADHOCISM AND CITY EXPANSION
In the two previous chapters, we have seen the funda-
mental conflict that was underlying urban development in
the capital. The state was explicitely encouraging urban-
ization, largely for political reasons, while, on the other
hand, it was unable to coordinate it in an orderly way;
overwhelmed by both the results of its own activities and
external factors that were out of its control. As a
response to that situation, the state finally chose the
solution to liberate the various interest groups, leaving
them to solve their problems on their own, with respect to
their specific purposes and, consequently, without regard
for the public good.
The classic liberal doctrine--"what is good for the
city is good for its poeple as a whole"--is replaced by
the opposite position: "what is good for individuals may
become good for the city as a whole." While liberal plan-
ning generally holds that improvements in the physical
environment supposedly benefit all of its citizens, in
Athens in the early '20s the situation became one where
the improvement of the individual was expected to benefit
the city; if not, then what could one expect by immigrating
to the capital? In this sense, the Greek model still is
explicitly underlined by the same positivist connotations
that characterize western liberalism. This explains the
references that people used to use when judging their
spatial surroundings and the city.
The term adhocism is used to describe this situation,
and refers to both the uncoordinated, incremental process
of expanding the city and the fragmented urban landscape
that occurs as a result.
Adhocism characterizes two levels of action. While
migration to the capital becomes a national policy, the
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accommodation of the newcomers is disassociated from any so-
cial policy measure and becomes an individual affair. Butwhen
specific conditions make it inevitable for some measures to be
taken, then the actions are, again, perceived as separate from
each other, and altogether detached from the social or physi-
cal environment of the existing city.
Although adhocism of the early 20th century shares with
the late 19th century laissez-faire the same faith in the in-
dividual it represents a decisive turnover in the history of
the city. In the previous period, the authorities were willing
and able to control a large part of the city and consolidate
the structural aspects of the urban fabric, despite specula-
tive activities in the periphery. Now the system is disinte-
grated as a whole and leaves its place to a new system of
spatial relationships. But, further than that, it is now the
state itself that pronounces the password for the new mode of
city expansion. The relocation of the refugees in the capital
is the best illustration of this situation.
The Establishment of the Refugees
Schools, churches, railway stations, factories and ware-
houses, even theatres became the first shelters for the waves
of refugees. Under their enormous pressure the state was com-
pelled, for the first time, to consider urban development and
especially housing as belonging to the field of its own responsibilities.
In 1923 it created the 'Refugees' Relief Fund and, at
the same time, issued a national loan "for the rehabilita-
tion of the refugees." The loan provided 7 million drachmas.
This amount, along with returns from special taxations, was
used to finance the Fund, which, in turn, was used for both
urban and rural rehabilitation. The national government
immediately began delivering tents and rough materials for
the construction of "temporary" huts by the people them-
selves. As could be expected, most of these temporary
settlements remained, until the period after WW II, scarring
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the urban landscape. However, financing was weak and the
Fund, with its rather philanthropic orientation, could not
cope with the situation, especially in the milieu of emerg-
ing dissatisfaction on the part of the newcomers.
The government went to the Society of Nations (SN),
asking it to mediate for loans from the international
market. Soon after, the SN received a considerable loan
from a group with main participants the "Hambros Bank LTD"
of London and the "Speyers & So." of New York. However,
there were, for the Greek government, two conditions to
meet in order to get the loan. First, the management of
the loan should be the responsibility not of the Greek
state but of a "Committee for the Rehabilitation of the
Refugees" (EAP)*. Second, the committee was to be headed
by one representative from the U.S. and one from England,
acting as president and vice-president, respectively.
Without many viable options in hand, the government
was forced to accept an arrangement that gave the EAP
almost absolute independence from Greek institutions. But,
aside from its apparent weakness, the government has another,
good reason for "succumbing" to the claims of the banks: by
declining the management of the loan it was shifting the
target of complaints to a party that was out of reach to
the refugees, a group of people who, from the very begin-
ning, made it clear that they were determined to get a
fair share in national life.
The EAP, formed in 1923, was also determined to secure
the interests of the participating banks and so, from the
beginning, it notified the government that it intended to
invest in productive fields with short-term returns that
would enable the refugees to quickly pay off the loans.
*In the remainder of this chapter EAP will also be
referred to as the "Committee."
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So only rural rehabilitation, which was seen as a means of
ensuring immediate returns, was initially included among
the responsibilities of the EAP. The government undertook
the urban rehabilitation, with major responsibilities going
to the Ministry of Welfare.
Nevertheless, the potential of urban rehabilitation
was disregarded: soon it proved to be more profitable, as
there occurred at the time an industrial take-off that
permitted permanent employment to a large number of the
refugees. As Greek authorities were facing difficulties,
a new arrangement was made: a part of the task of urban
rehabilitation was transferred to the EAP.
In Athens, the Ministry of Welfare transferred to the
Committee the four big land parcels that already had been
expropriated by the Fund: Kaissariani, Ionia, and Vyron
in the periphery of Athens; and Kokkinia, near Pireaus.
A year and a half later the four sites were basically
developed and had already become real small towns (Table
I).
In contrast to its predecessors the EAP had never
lost sight of the fact that its buildings were destined
to have a permanent character. This attitude was reflected
in both the architecture and planning of the new settlements.
Table I
Families Individuals
Vyron 2,368 10,273
Kaissariani 2,341 11,002
Ionia 3,550 14,749
Kokkinia 5,665 23,590
Total 13,424 59,614
Source: EAP, 16th Report, May 1925
Most of the houses were built with masonry or cement
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blocks, and a very few with bricks made from dried earth,
a cheap and messy technique with a long tradition in main-
land Greece's architecture. All of the houses were covered
with a tile roof that secured environmental control and
durability.
Eighty percent of the houses are built in two-
story blocks and the rest in one-story blocks. . .
the houses are clustered in pairs, in a way that per-
mits each family to have one bedroom and a living
room. Besides that a small kitchen and a sanitary
installation are provided.
(EAP, in Prevelakis, p. 262.)
The blocks were built around a central court that consist-
ed of small private yards and access alleys. The EAP
followed this pattern, with slight modifications, in all
four of its developments. The result was "a uniformity
that, in a bird's-eye view gives the neighborhoods the
aspect of a camp." The real problem, however, was the lack
of space. The lots corresponding to the clusters of two
(one-story blocks) or four (two-story blocks) apartments
were very small leaving inadequate space for later addi-
tions.
Such a situation had interesting repercussions, both
in the short and the long run. As the average refugee
family had four members, and as these one-bedroom apart-
ments were frequently occupied by two families (EAP, p. 182)
the people soon began an additive building process that
permitted them not only to acquire the necessary space,
but also to elaborate a small-scale environment with vir-
tues that overshadowed the initial image of a camp. In
the long run, however, this intensive use of the land pro-
hibited the properties from being converted into urban
apartment buildings; and thus was consolidated until very
recently, the basic form--and stigma--of the "refugee
neighborhood." The initial overcrowding of the houses also
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resulted in bad hygienic conditions, a fact that is held
responsible for the rise in mortality and sickness levels
of the capital at the time. (Haidopoulos p. 54-64.)
The EAP, with its concept of productive rehabilitation,
no matter what its motivations were, went much further
than simply providing houses. It also took care of social
equipment and infrastructures. Adequate schools were built
and provided with the necessary mobile equipment, and two
hospitals were erected in Kokkinia and Ionia. The operation
of these services was eventually transferred to the state,
which was also responsible for repaying the loans used to
fund them. Beyond that, the EAP also made provision for
space for public squares, and for future administrative
buildings.
The Committee also carried out all the works necessary
for adequate water supply: reservoirs were erected,
complete distribution networks were established and, final-
ly, local drillings were done to discover water. Abundant
water supplies were found, especially in Ionia.
The ultimate concern of the EAP was, however, to faci-
litate installation of industries that would provide
refugees with permanent jobs and secure the return of
money spent. To this end, it delivered free land to enter-
preneurs who were willing to invest and who had "demonstra-
ble professional credit." Along with the abundance of
cheap labor, this stimulated an unprecedented, by Greek
standards, industrial growth. In the territory of the
four refugee quarters there existed only one small factory
before their development. Five years later the Committee
reports:
Within the four quarters of refugees in Athens
and Pireaus there already exist 36 industrial esta-
blishments. Among them 27 rug manufacturers, 4
cloth mills, a factory of dyes and chemicals, etc.
These factories employ 342 men and 4,532 women
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but one must also take into account those who
work in the 500 small enterprises established
in private houses.
(EAP, p. 192)
The largest part of this emerging industry was concen-
trated in North Ionia, due to its abundance of water.
"Small Manchester" was the nick name given to the area,
a reference to its fast development, and the nature of its
industry. As for the process of industrialization, EAP
again gives us a vivid account:
A modest manufacturer was found accidentally in
proximity with the houses that we began building
in Ionia at the end of 1922. It provided an imme-
diate opportunity for work to those women familiar
with that kind of production. The women, for their
part, were happy to have the opportunity of a fixed
salary immediately after their arrival, even if
it was lower than the ordinary levels of the time.
This coincidence of wills changed the fate of the
industry, which experienced rapid growth and now
employs 1,000 workers, plus 200 more in its private
power plant. Thousands of square meters of new
buildings are added onto the previously primitive
installations, and the small enterprise has turned
into a corporation with a capital of more than
250,000.
(EAP, p. 194)
In parallel with the EAP, but more intensively after
its liquidation in 1929, the Ministry of Welfare was
involved in housing the refugees. The system that was
followed was a combination of :
A. Construction of whole neighborhoods, or smaller
settlements of one- or two-story houses or apart-
ment buildings;
B. Delivery of lots with or without provisions of
loans. In both cases the refugees were personally
responsible for building their respective houses;
and,
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C. The formation of 350 cooperatives, which were given
a total of 5,500 lots and loans averaging 30,000
drachmas per family.
(Aggelis, p. 33)
Again, the land parcels that were used were placed in the
periphery of the two cities, with only a few, small-scale
parcels on their fringe.
Among these planning methods, those that took a self-
help approach proved to be the most successful. They
provided lots adequate for decent houses, a satisfying
street network and open spaces for greenery and social
equipment. The self-help lots were destined for those
refugees who managed to save part of their fortunes and
were consequently able to build their houses with little
or no state support. Most of these settlement areas were
later used to build urban apartment buildings and, today,
the only thing that reminds Athenians that they had once
been refugee neighborhoods is the addition of the word
"new" in front of their names, as in the case of the New
Smyrna Quarter.
The quarters built by the state are characterized by
a large variety of typologies and, usually, are smaller
in scale than those built by EAP. The most interesting,
in retrospect, are the small parcels developed on the
fringe of the city, with the aim of accommodating refugees
displaced during small-scale clearances of the illegal
settlements that had appeared immediately after the disas-
ter.
Their interest lies in the fact that they adopted the
style of an emerging type of urban apartment building,
with more intense land use and a higher floor/area ratio
than in any other refugee project. Generally, they were
conceived as a means of arresting the sprawl of the agglo-
meration. But they also notify the adoption of housing
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commercialization by the state itself. They are interest-
ing for an additional reason: they mark the introduction
of "Modern" Architecture into Greece. They are the only
refugee rehabilitation buildings designed by well-known
architects of the time, most of whom followed the contem-
porary, European avant garde style. The morphological
influence of Bachaus is apparent in their "pure" and "sim-
ple" and, indeed, simplistic facades; and the arrangements
display a functional approach, with emphasis to the hygienic
qualities of the space. But the landscape was overlooked,
and with their minimal dimensions, the new buildings were
soon overwhelmed by the suffocating needs of their inhabi-
tants. Porches enclosed by infills demonstrate that there
was a struggle for vital space in such areas--where the
ownership status and rigid design prohibited the elaboration
of a livable milieu--with the use of the limited means that
these people had at their disposal. This situation may
explain the early bad associations that followed the intro-
duction of modern architecture into the field of housing,
and its limited application in Greece thereafter.
The quarters built by the state were generally of poorer
quality than those of the EAP. This includes their con-
struction, their planning and their management.
With rare exceptions, construction contracts were as-
signed after Dutch Auctions with sealed bids. The major
disadvantage of the system was that it obliged the adminis-
tration to accept contractors with no professional standing
even if their submitted bids were only slightly different
from those of experienced professionals (EAP, p. 175).
On the other hand, in the neighborhoods developed by
the state, the refugees were initially given free housing,
so that they became more or less accustomed to the idea that
they wouldn't have to pay rent for the acquisition of their
houses. As the EAP comments, "This claim is justified by
the refugees as being compensation from the Greek state for
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their fortunes, which were destroyed or largely abandoned
in their native places" (EAP, p. 176).
The Greek state obviously had many more difficulties
in the process of rehabilitation than did the EAP, for it
had not the luxury of being an alien. The successive
governments were under enormous political pressure from
a population that considered the Greek state responsible
for its ill fortune. The fact that the Royalists, whose
actions led to the disaster, were replaced by the Liberals
perhaps meant very little to those refugees taking more
radical positions. The Liberal forces, on the other hand,
badly needed refugee support to secure their weak position
as the ruling party. Under such delicate circumstances,
the state under the Liberals, was always ready to compro-
mise, by sacrificing long-run goals on the altar of every-
day needs. The EAP comment on the Greek state, however,
is at least unfair and, if nothing else, it reveals that
the Committee itself was just as unconscious as the state
was of the future results of its own actions.
Despite their qualitative differences, the settlements
planned and built by the EAP and the state were the best
examples of urban rehabilitation for the refugees. Both
kinds of settlement were provided with social services and
equipment adequate for their internal scale. Their quali-
tative differences seem negligible to us, in light of the
catalytic role they both played in establishing the form
of the extension of the Athenian agglomeration.
It is interesting that, although we have detailed
quantitative data of the entire settlement operation and
its progress, we don't have any explanation for, or even
problematic about, the choice of sites and the perspectives
of their urban integration. Examination of the features of
the newly developed areas (spatial placement, relative size,
transportation networks, etc.) leads us to the conclusion
that their distribution lacked any solid guidelines.
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First, they were not destined to become independent
cities. Most of them didn't have a reasonable, self-
sustaining size and were deprived of those necessary services
that characterize a viable, independent center. Their
boundaries were poorly defined, and, with the exception of
a new settlements, lacked the planning necessary for an
integrated, local employment base. The industrial response
that appeared in many cases was disorganized, and it turned
some of the settlements into industrial camps (Ionia and
Kokkinia), attaching to them all those negative connota-
tions that have followed them ever since, and which prohibit
their integration in the social life of the city.
On the other hand it is equally clear that the new
settlements were not concieved as organic expansions of
the two cities that already existed in the basin. For
they didn't consolidate any visible pattern of growth, and
were not connected with the pre-existing concentrations,
nor with those arteries that would assure a satisfying
access to the existing facilities.
Instead, the new developments were simply conceived
as groups of houses randomly scattered in the periphery of
the two cities, perhaps with a unique criterion: land
availability. The perspective of urban integration was
lost not only under the time pressure but also in a confu-
sion of institutions that were fiercely struggling for their
autonomy. We have already seen the Calligas Committee
working only on the center of the city, and the obstinacy
of the EAP in maintaining its independence from the Greek
institutions as a means of preserving the profitability
of its operations. We have seen also the Ministry of Wel-
fare (refugees' housing) acting independently from the
Ministry of Transportation (streets), and both together
ignoring the municipalities of the basin.
This situation, beyond the apparent confusion and waste
of resources that caused*, ultimately established, or
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rather, it imposed the spatial patterns of urban growth.
The developments we have seen acted as focal points for
that part of city extension conducted by private initia-
tive. Their random placement resulted in a diffused growth
of the agglomeration with a mixing of all those activities
that, like industry, were following the supply of cheap
labor.
"Legal" and "Illegal" Private Developments
The activities of the public authorities and of the
EAP only partially met the refugees' needs. They were ac-
tually intended for those who, while not wealthy enough
to solve the problem on their own, were at least in a situa-
tion that guaranteed their ability to pay off the debts
attributed to them following the distribution of houses.
People with better means were either diffused in the
pre-existing settlements, thus contributing to the urban
tissue intensification, or were seeking a place in the peri-
phery, which was also the eventual destination of the poor-
est and neediest among the refugees--those with no access
to public developments. A simultaneous internal migration
was further intensifying a housing crisis that was severe
even before the refugees' influx.
After the failure to devise a realistic plan and imple-
ment it, and with public authorities busy tackling a job
far exceeding their capabilities, private initiative now
undertook the responsibility of expanding the city. In-
creasing demand was leading to--and the emergency situation
was consolidating--what can, at the very least, be described
*Many of the infrastructures created by the EAP soon
became obsolete, as new organizations had quickly undertaken
to assure the compatibility and improvement of the various
networks (See
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as a peculiar land development process:
These kind of entrepreneurs, either having the
ownership of large parcels of land themselves
or assuring the land's binding after agreements
with the owners, were laying out plans for new
neighborhoods, submitting them in the City Plan
Office and were, usually getting approval. Some-
times their plans were in accordance with regula-
tions, sometimes not.
(Mpires, p. 287)
The growth of these new "neighborhoods" was occurring in
small increments and was nothing more than a parcelization
of land carried out, with few exceptions, by practical
surveyors. There was no provision for open spaces and as
for infrastructures, the problem was left to the state and
to the future inhabitants. Transportation problems were
partially solved, thanks to the neighboring, and more or-
ganized, settlements built by the state and the EAP. And
then: "Seductive advertisements were promoting agricul-
tural land or rocky places as urban lots." (Mpires p. 287)
It is clear that the problem was not one of land devel-
opment so much as it was a problem of commerce taking ad-
vantage of the circumstances and the state being unable to
manipulate or control growth. In most cases these new
settlements were not conceived as entities but, again, as
a number of houses at a certain place defined by land avail-
ability. Neighborhoods and suburbs emerged later from the
coalescence of such increments, which were initially inde-
pendent of each other. Typical is the case of the suburb
of New Psychico.
In its growth, it has engulfed three distinct
clusters: a development close to Kifissias
Avenue, a "village" built for the refugees in the
late '20s and another bordering on Chalandri.
The first cluster, St. Sophias', was developed in
a most typical manner: land was procured by a
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group of shareholders, who then distributed the
plots among themselves. . . the refugee "village",
a roughly rectangular area of 8 acres, was an
independent cluster which grew in the midst of open
land. Homes were leased out to refugee families
who were later allowed to buy them from the state.
Both the "village" and the St. Sophia's clusters
expanded independently until the 1950s, at which
time the pressures of growing Athens caused a
population spill-over into New Psychico. At the
time, whole areas were still left open, with roll-
ing fields and, occasionally, grazing animals.
(Philipides, 1980, p. 74)
This inheritance led to the present spatial form of the
suburb, and explains the incompatibility of its parts.
Even the few settlements with an integrated physical
plan had serious deficiencies. A typical example is found
on the other side of Kifissias Street: Old Psychico. This
settlement was created and developed through the initiative
of Kekrops, a real estate agency, which is a highly unusual
aspect of urban growth in Athens. The plan was provided
by the architect A. Nicolaides, and was influenced by the
contemporary movement of Garden Cities. Old Psychico
itself was advertised as a "Garden City." But the influence
was superficial as it lay only in a visual similarity of
the lay-out and not on the social and organizational con-
cepts that underlay the movement. Although Old Psychico
was developed for upper middle-classes it continues to
suffer from the same chronic problems that plague the rest
of suburban Athens: nonexisting social services and no
infrastructures. The sewage system is inadequate and a
large number of houses depend upon septic tanks; after the
slightest rain certain streets are flooded and become im-
passible.
Just before WW II, Old Psychico was still a suburb
with dirt roads, scattered greenery, and dispersed villas.
Within a decade dozens of similar, or larger, settlements
mushroomed around Athens. Only two, Old Psychico being
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one of them, had physical plans made by architects. To
this day, they stand as peculiar differentiations in an
urban tissue that, when viewed from an airplane, lacks any
organizational principle.
Usually all the "plans" were processed by the City Plan
Service intact. The only care taken was the widening of
some projected streets to provide room for future transpor-
tation arteries (Mpires, p. 287). This concern shows to us
that the authorities were not unconscious of the future
but, rather, unwilling and unable to intervene on a larger
scale than providing for street widening.
In parallel with the legal lot trade another, illegal
one, was taking place in the peripheries of Athens and
Piraeus. Agricultural land was divided by its owners into
small plots, on an individual basis, and without any at-
tention given to the existing or potential street layout
of the neighboring land parcels. The internal streets
themselves were substandard, thus leaving room for more
lots. Under these conditions no attempt was ever made to
legalize these plans. In order to transfer these propert-
ies, the obstacles of the law were overcome with a formula
characterizing the lots as "agricultural land," although
they were barely large enough to accommodate a small house.
Increasing demand for cheap land among poor refugees and
immigrants allowed this system to flourish, especially as
the public authorities were eager to see the people rehab-
ilitated in any possible way, so as to avoid the political
costs of their own inability. However this system of land
occupation played only a minor role. It was only a pre-
cursor to the land sale practices of the post-war period,
when it would become one of the two major forms of city
expansion.
Finally, those people who could not afford to settle
by any of the permitted means squatted on land wherever
possible. But the possibilities were few, as in 1871
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Koumoundouros had sold all the public property surrounding
the city (see p. ). This fact prevented large-scale
squatting but also led the poorest refugees to the worst
sites, which were the only ones available. Ilissos, a
quarter built by refugees in a dry riverbed in 1929, is a
typical example of this process (Philipides, 1974, p. 159-
171). Ilissos with all of its problems (social isolation,
floods) and all of its virtues as a coherent, small-scale
environment, was swept away along with other similar settle-
ments (Tavros, Dourgouti, etc.) during the '60s.
The Congestion of the Center
The Multi-Story Urban Apartment Building
Public and private developments in the periphery of
the city mainly provided housing for the bulk of the refu-
gees and the poorest strata of internal migration. The
social environment was poor with the connotations of a
"camp," rather than of an organic expansion of the city.
Infrastructures were inadequate and fragmented, and poor
communications and transportation networks made access to
the center difficult. Institutional and administrative
buildings, on the other hand, all were in the center,
housed in prestigious architectural quarters mainly erected
in the last quarter of the 19th century.
The center inevitably became the destination of the
wealthiest among refugees and immigrants, and of the strata
of public servants. The latter was undergoing a dramatic
increase following the growth of the administrative sector
caused by the population and territorial doubling of the
country. Most of this increase was, as we have seen, ab-
sorbed by a capital that acquired an absolutely dominant
role in the national urban network.
We have also seen the emergence, in late 19th and early
20th centuries, of a more intensified and commercialized
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use of urban land, as a response to the prevailing changes.
These hybrid forms were characterized by the building of
two- or three-story houses, that were owned by a landlord,
but occupied by tenants, with independent entrances for
each floor. These new houses were occupying a larger per-
centage of the lot with elimination, first, and omission,
later, of the yard, thus introducing both a new lifestyle
and a more intense form of land use. The change was fol-
lowed by the weakening of popular neoclassicism and its
gradual replacement by an eclectisism of third-hand French
origins, better known as the "Wedding-Cake Style." It
was characterized by the over-use of plaster ornaments
produced by impromptu workshops.
It was becoming apparent that all levels of the old
fabric were less and less viable. The shock of the refu-
gees' influx accelerated the city's evolution and caused
the violent emergence of an entirely new development pattern
whose dominant feature was the
The Calligas Committee, with a statement that marked
its departure from both the traditional methods and the
thoughts of its first president (see p. ), adopted and
theoritized the emerging patterns as a solution to the
housing crisis:
In contrast to the efforts taking place abroad,
that intend to dilute the population of cities
for hygienic considerations, in Athens we should
increase densities for the very same reasons.[!]
We can achieve that by arresting any further
spread of the city, and with parallel land use
intensification within the boundaries of the already
approved plan.
(Calligas, 1924)
But it also pointed out the need to control such a develop-
ment:
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In Athens, despite the principles accepted in
all the civilized world, proprietors can build
their houses in any way they desire.
(Calligas, 1924)
Actually, the building regulations of the time were basi-
cally the same as those approved eighty years before. They
were the echoes of the Roman and Byzantine legislative
tradition, and their purpose was to regulate neighboring
relations (vistas, etc.), assuming a standard building
typology accepted by everyone. The new constructions
obviously were out of the building code's scope: the need
for new regulations was apparent.
In 1919 came the first of a new crop of laws. It
ruled building heights as a function of streets' width*.
But, as Athens was a city with narrow streets, the law
roused reaction among proprietors and soon (1922) was
revised to permit a more favorable function and greater
maximum heights.** The next year another law was passed
concerning "functional projections"***. It permitted for
projections of 1.4 meters outside the facade of the build-
ing, regardless of the width of the street. The measure
was theoretically based upon comparable arrangements in the
Mecca of Greek city planning: Berlin. However, it dis-
regarded the differences of the two cities and permitted
a wild speculation until 1937, when it was replaced by a
more moderate arrangement for projections of only .4 meters
But by that time the law had done its damage: it had
transferred many of the narrow streets into real wells,
*Buildings could be no more than 12/10 of the corres-
ponding width of the street. Maximum height: 22 meters;
and in streets with a width less than 8 meters, the permit-
ted height was 10 meters.
**Maximum Height: 26 meters.
***A bay that appears from the second floor upwards.
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with inadequate physical lighting and ventillation.
Another strong impetus for the commercialization of
the space was provided by the resolution of the discre-
pancy between the ownership and use status of the building.
The 1929 formula for "horizontal ownership" (condominium
formula of floor ownership) for the first time permitted
the ownership of a single floor, or even part of it (Art. 1)
within a building whose base (land and foundations) facade
and roof were inseparable, and under communal ownership
(Art. 2). The owner of a floor, or part of it had full
rights to his property "to the extent he doesn't hurt the
residence of the rest of the proprietors" (Art. 3).
During the period between the wars most of the multi-
story buildings were developed and owned by the original
proprietor of the lot. Only upper-class people had the
means to develop these buildings which were destined for
other upper-class or for upper-middle-class tenants. There-
fore, the law was initially used only for the occasional
transfer of a limited number of apartments. Its explosive
potential was realized later, mainly in the post-WW II
period, when it permitted the bulk of proprietors to form
short-term cooperatives with contractors and, by selling
apartments before they were built, to develop their pro-
perty with no, or with very little, initial capital.
The final impulse was given by the "General Building
Code" (1929). In its first form, the code was a moderate
compromise between the old houses and the new multi-story
buildings. It provided for an acceptable floor-to-area
ratio and percentage coverage of the lot in an effort to
preserve, at least, the physical existence of backyards
(these usually comprised about 40 percent of a lot),
that were becoming more and more obsolete with the appear-
ance of minimal light wells. It also had legitimate re-
quirements for natural lighting, ventillation, and views,
along with insulation and fire safety regulations.
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The appearance of the code caused a stormy reaction.
Political rhetoric and "moral" approaches to the problem
tended to relate these reactions only with the interests
of proprietors and land speculators, and disconnect it
from the "people"--who as a whole were the victims of the
regulation's negative environmental impact--and the archi-
tects of the time, who had supposedly warned against these
impacts. Ever since, this rhetoric, which treats as
identical the appearance of the new type and its later evo-
lution, dominates every criticism by using the positive
and negative connotations related with each social group
as a means to condemning or applauding acts very similar
both in their intents and effects.
Ironically enough, main bearer of the reaction became
the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE)* which recommended
that the government suspend the code implementation "in
order to examine the problem." With this "scientific"
support, government "gave in," delayed the implementation,
and commissioned studies. But, as the results of the
studies were delayed, it approved a new code with much
worse regulations. The main change was that lightwells
replaced the backyards, with all of the long-run conse-
quences for both the scale of houses and the broader level
of urban landscape. Withing a "silent consensus" the imple-
mentation of the new code began, and soon resulted in a
situation where housing became the number one marketable
commodity.
With all of the legal conflicts of the previous time
*The TEE has a double foundation. It is, by law,
technical consultant to the state, thus defending "public
good", but, it is also, the corporate union of architects
and engineers, thus defending their professional interests.
The assumption behind such a union of purposes is that the
professional interests coincide with "public good", an
assumption with its roots in the "objective technology" of
the time.
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resolved, and with the importation of the necessary tech-
nology (elevators, higher water pressure), the multi-story
urban apartment building vigorously invaded the capital.
The architects of the time either applauded the "social
necessity" of apartment buildings, or involved themselves
in a polemic that focuses only on aesthetics.
Kyprianos Mpires,* the architect of the first modern
apartment building (1930), was excited with its potential
to effectively solve the transportation problem by assem-
bling more people in the center:
Characteristic was the demand observed during the
lease of the houses: even before the completion of
the construction process, leases had already begun
and all forty apartments were rented within a period
of three months. The occupants were among the
rather exceptional people of the bourgeois class:
scientists, public and bank employees that had found
for their families houses very close to the center
and equipped with all those comforts that contem-
porary civilization asks for and modern technology
can offer.
(K. Mpires 1932)
Costas Kitsikis**, one of the most vigorous practioners
of the new building type--he had already built a hundred
apartment building by the beginning of WW II--was concerned
with the benefits to the less prestigious social classes:
I think that, by equiping man with his house and
with the latest technological innovations, by giving
him the support of the moral world, and by breathing
the warmth of pleasant family life into his home,
I contributed in the raising of opulence and comfort,
*K. Mpires was professor in the Athens Technical Uni-
versity (EMP) and Minister of Public Works in the right-
wing government of "new democracy" (1975-78).
**Professor in EMP and member of the parliament, he was
with the left wing party during the 1950s.
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and in the fulfillment of the courteous needs of
the contemporary urban citizen. All this happened
to such an extent that the private apartment is
now becoming a meaningful goal for many hard-work-
ing people.
(Kitsikis, in Damala et al, 1978, p. 130)
But the potential of the new form does not know class
limits:
For the wealthy who desire city life, we have found
a really satisfying combination: the two upper
floors of the building is accommodated as a single
family house. In this was they can live in the
center, while avoiding excessive noise and dust.
They can also enjoy unobstructed views.
(Kitsikis, op. cit.)
Kitsikis, who was particularly influential among the young
architects of the school, had such a blind confidence in
the new building type to state that, "The only remakable
achievement we have to show to our visitors, after the
antiquities is the apartment building" (Kitsikis, in
Philippides, 1978, p. 104).
Opposition to the apartments was focused on the aesthe-
tic impact, the main concern being the distortion in
perspective views resulting from the wide functional pro-
jections, the "barbaric" pergolas on the top of the build-
ings or the "heavy volumes" of some of the new buildings
(K. Mpires). Among the opposition the social appropriatness
of the building was considered to be indisputable: cohabi-
tation was initially conceived to be promotion of communal
life, and the reluctance of some people to accept it was
interpreted as a consequence of the individualistic attitude
of the Greek (K. Mpires). However, the social heterogeniety
of the inhabitants overwhelmed spatial proximity; shelter
under the same roof had not replaced the social interaction
of the declining yard. A. Karouzos, the only "dissident"
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of the time had pointed out early on:
The first impression, that these modern houses
accommodate people with reduced individuality,
people as similar to each other as their apart-
ments, is false. The uniformity of facades cannot
hide the truth that the need for isolation has
never been so imperative. . . The houses, stripped
of any external passion, have a particular similar-
ity with those faces that, without any interaction,
are almost indifferent to each other; they simply
range in line. These portraits with their wide-
open eyes and undefined expressions remind me of
some other, similar creatures, of the 3rd and
4th century A.D.
(Karouzos, in Damola et al, 1978, p. 127)
"Houses without Fume," the fume always being the Greek
symbol of home, was the name she gave to the new type.
The introduction of the new type was followed by impor-
tant changes in urban life.
With the abolition of the yard the old neighborhood
entered a process of downgrading; no effort has since been
made to replace it with a new form of communal living.
While the family house was a handicraft produced, most
of the time, exactly for its future users, the apartment
building was an "industrial" product, in the sense that it
was produced to satisfy the needs of an unknown "average"
or "typical" user.
The continuous and sudden population increases that
occurred at the time were obviously making changes inevi-
table. But the specific way in which those changes have
taken place marks an intense commercialization of housing
that emerges as a consequence to the state inability to
respond to the new demands and manipulate growth, and to
the eagerness of the people to exploit their land without
regard for the side-effects of their action. As, finally,
architects "theoritize" the new developments, individual
interests increasingly become, in a broader sense, the
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definition of society. For while landowners were receiving
substantially increasing land-revenues, improvements were
also assumed to be received by society: it is the city as
a whole that can expect ameliorations of the transportation
problem, the hygienic conditions and, finally, to arrest
its own threatening sprawl. In a few words, the apartment
building was perceived to be an answer to the real needs
of the whole city more than a profit-making machine for
the individuals that were promoting it.
In such a supportive milieu the new building type
continuously increased its share of the building activity
in the city center.* The trend was particularly reinforced
by the infusion of capital that otherwise was suffering
the hardships of the international economical crisis
(Sarigianis, 1978, p. 108-116).
By the end of the period between the wars, Athens
already had a noteworthy number of apartment buildings,
mainly concentrated in the more affluent quarters (Kolonaki,
Patissia, Kypseli). These buildings, with a height of six
to eight floors, were dominating the center and imposing
a random intensification of the urban tissue, thus distrub-
ing the coherence of the pre-existing fabric.
The centripetal and static space of neoclassicism is
gradually replaced by a new space that vigorously spreads
to all directions (Kalogeras, 1980, p. 64-70), perhaps to
express the glutonous attitudes of the people and the ex-
plosive potential of the city.
Ironically enough, the message of modern architecture
*
YEAR ONE-STORY TWO-STORY THREE-STORY MULTI-STORY
1933 880 259 79 38
1934 893 294 78 66
1935 878 289 71 80
1936 892 210 129 115
Source: Damalas, et. al., 1978, p. 128
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finally found a fertile ground in the requirements of the
multi-story apartment building: the morphological weaponry
of bauhaus was intensively applied in most of the between-
the-wars multi-story buildings and created the illusion
(or alibi) that Athens was developing according to the pre-
scriptions of the European avant garde.
But even then, the small size of the lots permitted
a superficial imitation rather than an integrated applica-
tion of the vocabulary.
The Capital on the Eve of WW II
Settlements for the refugees, legal and illegal develop-
ments in the periphery, and the multi-story urban apartment
building in the center, all were results of the same condi-
tions; namely, the inability of the state to coordinate
the urban growth, for which it had been responsible, and
the disastrous events that deeply marked the first steps
of Liberalism in Greece.
In the end, the extended application of the above forms
of spatial occupation resulted in the formation of a macro-
environment that was decisively differentiated from its
predecessor, in terms of both spatial and social organiza-
tion.
A quick look at the map of the basin on the eve of WW II
reveals the fundamental changes that the capital had under-
gone. First, the bi-polar system was replaced by an agglo-
meration diffused in the largest part of the basin. Never-
theless the two previously independent cities still repre-
sented points of intense concentration, while the recently
developed periphery continually occupied new spaces, but
with very low densities.
This was not because of the existense of adequate social
equipment and open public spaces; on the contrary, the
predictions for these spaces was minimal, if not totally
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lacking. But densities were still low because of the adhoc,
incremental growth where houses were scattered on the
lotified areas randomly, just following the instant needs
of the proprietors. Most of the lots in these areas were
still empty (but already owned by various individuals),
while the already built houses were occupying the largest
parts of their lots. The spatial distribution of these
new 'neighborhoods' was incidental (land availability),
and their provision with social services and infrastructures
was difficult to attain (as it was coming to repair an
already set condition), if not impossible to attain, be-
cause of the low densities. Besides that, the 1925 law
concerning 'cities' extensions' had not made clear who,
and under what conditions, was in charge of these infra-
structures.
In such a framework, the fact that most of the new,
illegal neighborhoods were legalized, after intense politi-
cal pressures, in 1936 (Mpires, p. 322-324), contributed
little to their amelioration, beyond the fact that the move
legitimized and implicitly encouraged participation in the
worst forms of land speculation, by both the speculators
and their clientele.
With its generally poor status, the periphery became
the destination of the poor, the main exceptions being Old
Psychico (upper bourgeoisie) and New Smyrna (relatively
wealthy refugees). On the other hand, as none of the peri-
pheral developments (the ones created by EAP and the state
included) were satisfying the requirements for the spon-
taneous creation of viable local centers, it is not strange
to find that the basic streets' network converged with the
networks of the two pre-existing cities, and mainly with
the Athens network. This was the consolidation and rein-
forcement of an old pattern; really Athens, and to a lesser
extent Pireaus, had already developed all the bureaucratic
and financial activities as well as the commerce that co-
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existed with urban life. As the newly developed areas
were deprived from these functions the pre-existing centers
inevitably attracted the population of the whole basin. As
a result, linear extensions of the commercial center began
to be formulated, mainly along Patission and Kifissias
Streets, while the housing stock was enriched with the
erection of multi-story urban apartment buildings, a devel-
opment that, for the time being, was enough to keep most
of the bourgeois population within the boundaries of the
old city. Upper bourgeois classes lived in an advantageous
site at the foot of Lycabeyus Hill, right next to the
parliament and the palace, while middle bourgeoisie were
mainly concentrated in Patissia and Kypseli. While private
initiative was involved in developing the center there were
no public improvements to support it. Beyond the land-
scaping of the area in front of the parliament (1929) and
the creation of a park at the intersection of Alexandras
and Patission streets (1934), no other improvements appeared.
The street network remained identical to that of the late
19th century and the center became more congested.
Briefly, the basic form of the capital consisted of a
disorganized and vague periphery, and an already congested
center, that complemented each other. The evolution of
the relationship between center and periphery will matter
from now on in all changes in city form.
Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to characterize
all of the periphery as homogeneous. Although there exist-
ed some shared basic characteristics (scattered houses,
lack of infrastructures), interesting differences also
exist. Patterns established in previous periods continue
to play a role.
Industry, already developed to the north-west of
Pireaus, and along the Athens-Pireaus axis, attracted most
of the new establishments around it, while new developments
appeared in the refugees' settlements and mainly in New
-165-
Ionia, north-west of Athens. So industry increasingly
occupied the west part of the basin; as a response, most
of the superior activities began to concentrate on the east:
most of the hospitals (along Kifisias Street), terrains for
the expansion of the university as well as the prestigious
quarters of Old Psychico and the neighborhood for the
wealthiest among the refugees, New Smyrna, are on the east
side of the basin. The east-west separation of the city
that appeared from the very beginning was now reinforced.
However it was not the strict separation seen in the North
American ghettoes. Spatial and social mobility was pre-
served for the very reasons that stimulated urban growth.
Even beyond that, we can find working class refugees'
neighborhoods (Kaissariani, Byron, and Hymmetus) on the
east side of the city. They were obviously exceptions to
the rule, but they also confirm the looseness of spatial
segregation in Athens, that existed at the time, and still
exists today.
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INFRASTRUCTURES AND CHANGES IN POWER STRUCTURE
The explosion that transformed the "sleepy provincial
town" of Athens into a crowded agglomeration laid out over
a vast territory, also rendered many of its organizational
structures and physical infrastructures obsolete. We have
seen that the municipalities of Athens and Pireaus were
the two administrative entities in charge of the whole
space of the basin. With limited resources, and a constant
deficit, but also with some generous infusions of money from
the Hellenic diaspora, they had adopted an approach of com-
promise between the needs of the capital and their fiscal
ability; the municipalities were hardly able to satisfy
the former. Most of the resources were allocated in water-
supply improvements and in covering the central streets
of the cities. Infrastructures were actually lagging be-
hind the development of the city unable not only to in-
fluence and rationalize it, but even to accommidate it.
The only sectors that had seen substantial ameliorations
were those transferred to the hands of private enterprises,
and especially those concerning transportation.
In the decade that followed the installation of the
refugees, we observe more radical solutions to the problems
but, also, a decisive transfer of power that offends the
role of municipalities as agents for urban development.
In 1925 the government signed a contract with the Union
of Greek Banks and the English group, Power and Traction,
that had done business in Greece before. The contract as-
signed them with the production and exploitation of electri-
city and of electrified public transportation in an area
that covered the entire Attica basin. The three existing
transportation companies also participated with Power and
Traction. The above groups initially formulated two com-
panies, one for the generation of and one for the distribu-
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tion of electricity. These two were later merged into
the Athens and Piraeus Electric Company, which acquired
all the small, local enterprises of the basin and provided
the whole capital with uniform current of low price. That
was achieved with the expansion of the already existing
station in Phalere and the creation of a new one in Kerat-
sini, which soon became the pole of local industrial devel-
opment. The contract, however, absolutely ignored the
municipality of Athens, which already owned a complete
lighting network. This network had fallen out of use,
because of changes in the type of current used. The
municipality finally found itself a plain customer of the
new company without any privilege or right on the new
network (Mpires p. 301).
As for public transportation, the three companies that
initially participated in the Power and Traction group were
later merged into two new companies. The first took up
the exploitation of the existing electrified line connect-
ing Athens with Piraeus, with the obligation to build an
underground extension of it towards Concord Square. The
second company was given the exploitation of tramway lines
with the possibility of adding another 15 km to the existing
network, the exploitation and development of bus lines and,
finally, the construction and exploitation of a railway
line from Concord Square to the northern suburb of Kifissia.
The following year Athenas Street and Concord Square were
excavated for the creation of the subway. Sometime later
the excavation continued, from the other side of the square
to Attica Square, but it stopped there and the line towards
the north was not completed until after WW II. The com-
pleted line became the only one, and, under the direction
of the Athens Metropolitan remains so to the present. As
noted, at the time of its construction the line corresponded
to the only clear direction of the city expansion (north-
south). The fact that it was not followed by the construc-
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tion of other lines can be explained from the lack of any
other clear direction of development that would ensure
the profitability of the new line (Prevelakis, p. 309).
Even more characteristic of the dynamism of the private
enterprises, and the parallel fade-away of the municipality,
is the case of water-supply. The local authorities had
always been trying to solve it with successive ameliora-
tions of the Adrianian Aqueduct and its continuous enrich-
ment with waters from all over the basin. It was realized,
however, that these resources were limited, and that the
city had to look outside its strict geographical boundaries
for a permanent solution to its problem. In 1892, a French
engineer had already suggested the erection of a dam and
the creation of an artificial pond in the dry riverbed of
Haradros in the north of the city. The work was continually
postponed until 1925, when the national government, ignoring
the municipality, signed an agreement with the bank of
Athens and the English company ULEN, making them responsible
for erection of the dam, creation of a tunnel bringing the
water to the capital, and construction of additions to the
existing aqueduct and distribution network. The two later
were transferred to the company that, once more, "found
itself a plain customer of the company obliged to pay for
the water that coming from its own installations that were
built with expenses and efforts of more than a whole cen-
tury" (Mpires, p. 304).
Another problem, which became apparent with the instal-
lation of the refugees, was the lack of an adequate sewage
system. Liquid disposals were conducted to the open river-
beds; water stagnating in these beds was the source of foul
odors and epidemic diseases that led to sickness levels
higher than before 1922. On the other hand, the central
sewer led up into the vegetable gardens, very close to the
city center, thus also contributing to the appearance of
endemic diseases. Other areas of the central city that
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were not served by the sewer had nonhermetic cesspools
that were infiltrating their content into the aqueduct,
especially after rain storms. But as the natural flow of
water in the basin was disrupted by the new construction,
rain storms produced yet another effect, floods, especially
in the south of the city near the seashore. A final problem
that was worsening the hygienic conditions was that garbage
collection was still operated with horse carts that were
becoming less and less efficient.
Confronting these acute problems that had such immediate
and visible effects, the municipality concentrated all of
its forces in an effort to improve hygienic conditions.
That made some improvements possible: automobiles were
introduced to replace carts, some arrangements were made
in torrent beds and the central collector sewer was extended
to the sea. However, a complete solution to the problem
was out of reach for the municipality. The story was
repeated once more: the state assigned the private sector
to implement an overall, long-term solution with the esta-
blishment of the 'Sewers' Construction Corporation in 1932.
With all of this intense activity, the infrastructures
of the basin were substantially ameliorated. Within a
decade water-supply increased by a factor of three, elec-
tricity by ten and telephone installations by twelve. The
immediate problems of sewage were solved and all the new
quarters in the periphery had some kind of public transpor-
tation connecting them to the center.
The problems, however, were solved in favor of the
Greek financial capital and of the foreign, industrial
groups. At the same time, the municipality was deprived
of the largest part of its revenues and was restricted
within a narrow scope of responsibilities.
Caught between the political conflicts and the some-
what aristocratic attitude and the interests of its own
mayors, the local authorities proved to be unable to
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benefit from the fast development of the city. But we can
also hypothesize that the governments, in a milieu of a
continuous crisis, were becoming more afraid of a rivalry
with strong, local authorities. In the case of Athens and
Piraeus, such a contender would represent nothing less
than the most vital forces of the whole nation. The trans-
fer of the infrastructures to the private initiative was
not only a response to the piling problems of the city, it
was also the first in a series of political movements that
had finally brought the role of the local authorities to
negligible levels.
Until 1932, the territorial responsibility of Athens
and Piraeus was expanding through the whole basin. At
that time, it was limited to an area roughly corresponding
to the boundaries of the cities before 1922. The rest of
the basin was divided into 50 small municipalities and com-
munities. But these were communities only in name, as
they consisted of an heterogeneous population that had
settled there only a few years before, and under externally
imposed conditions. This administrative division of the
space was an artificial one, without regard for any social,
economic or spatial characteristics. As the urban fabric
was expanding on its own in a continuous and diffused way,
the division meant that these new, local authorities were
actually deprived of any intervention in the general urban
plan. Decentralization at the time was indispensable and
positive in principle but it was carried out without the
creation of a second-degree local administration that would
guarantee parallel coordination. Instead, the changes
reinforced the central will, which now gained absolute
control in the whole basin. The new situation found its
institutional form in the creation, in 1936,* of the
Ministry of Administration of the Capital and of the
Superior Council of Urbanism, whose chairman was the prime
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minister himself. Athens had now exceeded the limits of
a plain capital and was treated as a sector in national
life, exactly as agriculture, industry, or finance.
With the abolition of the intermediate scales of ad-
ministrative organization, a strange duet now governed
the fortunes of the capital: individuals, on the one hand,
looking for the opportunities and the social position that
only the capital could offer them; and, on the other hand,
the government, or rather sequential governments with little
self-confidence, determined to assure their national power
base. In such a scheme, the idea of the Liberal State is
either simply ignored, or exploited by short-term govern-
ments that tend to confuse their role with that of the
state, and also to confuse the publid good with the speci-
fic interests of their political clientele. Actually,
the belief in a common, public good is totally dismissed.
For the people struggle to get their share on an individual-
istic basis (apartment buildings, illegal developments) and
the state is restricted to those minimal actions that are
necessary to keep the system going (housing for a part of
the refugees, basic infrastructures). The lack of any
intermediate scale transfers the power question only to
the formal shape of government and confuses social justice
with personal benefit.
On the eve of WW II, the whole system that underlies
the present structure of the capital, both in socio-econo-
mic and spatial terms, was already set, at least in its
basic guidelines.
*It is characteristic that this final coup de grace for
the local authorities was imposed by the authoritarian and
highly centralized administration of the Metaxas dictator-
ship.
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INTRODUCTION
After its liberation in 1944, the city of Athens looked
wretched. Deterioration resulted not only from the abandon-
ment during the years of the German-Italian occupation and
from the Nazi-Resistance skirmishes, but also from the
Battle of Athens, which occurred after the departure of
the German conquerors in December 1944. During this battle
British and Royalist army forces, which landed in Athens
from the Middle East, fought against the leftist National
Liberation Front (E.A.M.). E.A.M. was "the main prop of
the entire resistance movement against the axis forces"*
and received strong support from a majority of the Greek
population.**
The swift occupation of the city's central triangle by
the British and Royalist forces determined the course of
the battle. By loosing Athens, E.A.M. lost its best oppor-
tunity to govern the country. The Varkiza Treaty (February
12, 1945) obliged E.A.M. soldiers to relinquish their arms,
after which a wild persecution of its members was organ-
ized by unofficial right wing terrorist organizations and
Nazi collaborators, and was supported by the Greek police.
The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was a last desperate
effort by the remaining members of the left movement to re-
gain their power. They established their own government
in the mountains, where they had left strong organizations
and bonds since the years of the resistance against
Hitler's occupation. E.A.M. had implemented there its
*Quoted from a German Report entitled: "Political Situa-
tion in Greece from June 4th to July 3rd 1943" (July 6,
1943).
**E.A.M. was an alliance between Communist and Socialist
political powers, actually guided by the Communist Party
of Greece (K.K.E.).
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social and economic model, which was very close to the
Yugoslavian one, based on decentralized rural production
and autonomous communities. But official state forces
were controlling the capital and the large urban centers,
utilizing successfully the substantial, American financial
and military aid, which came after the Truman Doctrine
to replace the British one. A large part of Greek popula-
tion, tired and confused by the civil war, moved to the
urban centers to seek for safety and jobs since the country
was being destroyed.
At the same time the capital was experiencing its re-
organization along the economic guidelines established in
the prewar period. The destruction of the city during
WW II gave the opportunity to some planners to propose a
state controlled expansion and improvements in the central
area. The 1945 Plan for the Reconstruction of Athens pro-
posed the establishment of a satellite administrative city
in Megara, a town located southwest of Athens, street im-
provements and financial strategies for funding the imple-
mentation. Planning for this development was given over
to the new Ministry of Reconstruction. K.A. Doxiadis was
in charge of the organization.
While political power centers such as Palace, Police
and Army were applying tight political control over the
citizens, the economic controls, as outlined by the suc-
cessive liberal puppet governments of the period, selected
the laissez-faire framework, to move the economy of the
cities they controlled. The planning proposals were never
implemented, and Doxiadis finally resigned.
The final defeat of the "Democratic Army" (1949), --
which, having been left to its fate by the other Balkan
socialist countries and the U.S.S.R., was gradually loosing
its position -- marked the elimination of any other model
of development and the return to the prewar trends under
different labels and rhythms. The basic official ideological
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slogan was anticommunism, which resulted in widespread
persecution of leftists, with numerous trials, executions
and political prison camps. No one could work in public
services, or find a job easily in the private sector with-
out being certified as "nationalist" and "anticommunist".
Ideological terrorism, exercised by the police, became the
means of ideological control since national unity had
been destroyed. Right wing governments' prevalence (since
1951) was largely based on this terrorism, as well as on
falsification of election results. Unofficial organiza-
tions, comprised of officers from the army, police, the
palace, and foreign secret services, had much of the real
power. These organizations, together with the unstable
political climate of the mid-1960's finally led to the
colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974).
If the political slogan was anticommunism, the economic
one was rapid development. From 1951 to the present,
Greece has experienced an impressive, accelerated growth.*
Since the generous Greek capital from abroad had largely
ceased after the Asia Minor infusions of disaster, this
growth was mainly based on the intensive exploitation of the
country's own resources (including labor) and the foreign
capital investments. Greater emphasis was given to the
industrial growth.** Athens became the central promoter
of this growth, accompanied by Thessalonika after the
'50s. In addition, since the previous, natural relation-
*G.N.P. per capita increase:
Pre WW II 1951 1956 1964
$80 $112 $270 $500
(Source: N. Svoronos, 1976, p. 146)
**Participation in the Groww National Income (op. cit.):
Pre-WW II 1952 1962
Agriculture 50% 33.5% 27.6%
Industry 21.4 26.6
Services 43.9 42.5
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ships with the Balkan countries were destroyed during the
Civil War and the ensuring Cold War, Athens became the
main entrance to the country.
The bases of the conglomeration had been installed in
the previous periods. But between 1950 and 1970, a
continually increasing intensification occurred. Athens
was developing and absorbing the wealth of the provincial
cities and the rural population of the country. By 1971
it contained 30 percent of the country's population,
(showing an average annual increase rate of 3 percent),
47 percent of the total employment in industry, 70-80 per-
cent of the chemical and metallurgy industries, and 46
percent of the wholesale commerce.* It contained all the
headquarters for the banks and the great Greek and foreign
corporations. In addition, it represented 65% of the tax-
able income (1960-1970), it concentrated 65 percent of
students, 50 percent of the hospitals, 55 percent of the
graduates of the universities of the country, 90 percent
of the political newspapers, all of the periodicals, 83
percent of the insurance companies, 95 percent of the ad-
vertising enterprises, and 95 percent of the computers
(1970).* These statistics not only show the obvious super-
iority of the capital over the rest of the country, which
had been established since the end of the 19th century,
but they also represent aspects of an extremely complex
pyramid system. In such a system the capital is not merely
the imperialistic center, which expands by exploiting the
rest of the nation, but also the center of redistribution
of resources, the most efficient productive machine, and
the real moving power of Greece in both socioeconomic and
ideological terms. The developments represented by these
statistics certainly have their roots in previous establish-
ments (1880s, 1920s), but during 1950-1970 they reached
*See G. Haidopoulos, 1976, pp. 13-14.
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their zeniths aided by the political and economic impera-
tives of the time.
Such an intensification of social and economic phen-
omena are met also in the spatial form of the urban area.
Actually we don't have the appearance of any new pattern.
The Athens area is divided into two segments -- the center
and the periphery -- and the periphery is again divided in
to the lower income northwest and the higher income north-
east. The whole gives the impression of an amorphous mass
which is flowing towards every direction, as happened in
the '20s. Building types are the same as in the previous
period: urban apartment building, working class housing
built by the public sector, low-rise for middle-income
people,'houses, suburbian villas for upper classes, and
illegal settlements for the bulk of immigrants who over-
flowed the city after 1950. But the intensification in the
use of these forms (especially the urban apartment building
and unauthorized houses) together with the expansion of in-
dustry and the creation of two new national roads (Athens-
Corinth, Athens-Thessalonika) transformed the quantitative
crowding to a qualitative change. The Athens urban area,
expanding towards the rest of the county, and even further
along the national roads, became a spread-out metropolitan
area.
In this sprawl urban land policy again played a deci-
sive role. Conservative governments not only acted along
the 'successful' grounds of their preceding Liberal ones,
but tried to 'improve' the profitability of the land as
much as possible. Public construction was minimized to
3 percent of the total housing, while the various decrees
and regulations liberated the urban apartment building from
the boundaries of the central areas and allowed the private
sector to almost rebuild the Town Map* portion of the city.
*The "Town Map" included only the legally authorized city
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In Athens demolitions are almost equal to the
new construction. The life-span of a building
owes itself less to the technical requirements
than to the regulations which permit more height
and to the speculative activity that is encour-
aged by the economic development and the needs
of social rising. This has as its result the
development of an economic activity that is
equally intensive in the central quarters and the
periphery of the city...
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 13)
Through this encouraged growth, private speculative
building becomes an indispensable, and at the same time
almost autonomous, part of the activities of the city,
which finally escapes any boundaries and determines its
form.
As Athens does not express the internal dynamics
of the country, so it does not respect the
boundaries of its space or even the rules of
urban growth... It demolishes its center in order
to reconstruct it as higher and denser; it is
eating little by little its periphery in order to
settle people on the mountains around; it is
expanding along the highway in order to incorpor-
ate their space; it builds the beaches in order
to possess them and enjoy them.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 45)
The urban apartment building became the symbol of
Athenian "success", a symbol and an envelope for everyone.
It not only housed the higher and the middle ranks of
Athenian bourgeoisie, but was also the dream of the work-
ing class. Despite the strong political depression of the
period this building type became the container of the var-
ious private and public services. Behind its neutral
facades the different contents are not conceivable. Thus,
no one can recognize the central headquarters of the sec-
urity police, which "sheltered" many students during the
dictatorship, among the surrounding middle-class apartment
buildings, except perhaps by seeing policemen standing at
the main door.
areas, approved by the Ministry of Public Works.
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ATHENS: A BUILDING CONSTRUCTION FACTORY
...Building construction represents an integral
part of the Athenian's everyday experience. The
building site, which in the cities of west Europe
is either an exception or is hidden behind the
surrounding buildings, here finds itself first in
the heart of the capital, in the center of traffic
and circulation, in the center of economic life
and office buildings, among the groups of tourists,
inactives and buyers. It seems to mark dramati-
cally the city with the seal of temporarity...
Seen from a deeper point of view, the building
construction coincide with the development of the
Athenian economy, marking the impulses and under-
lying its fragility.
(G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 385-86)
In the post-war period Athens was almost transformed to a
permanent construction site. Building construction became
the number one activity of the city, a major source of
employment for its citizens, and the most efficient means
for the circulation of money. In 1961, 8.7 percent of the
economically active population of the city was occupied
in the construction sector (4.5 percent of the total of the
country); in 1971 this share increased to 10.4 percent
(7.7 percent of the total of the country).* In 1970 this
sector attracted 43.8 percent of private investments in
the entire Attica County (industry 23.6 percent, transpor-
tation 11 percent).* Greece today leads the world in the
number of new buildings constructed each year (14.7new
buildings per annum per 1000 inhabitants),*** and building
construction represents 10 percent of the G.N.P.
In Athens, the most intensive construction activity
*G. Burgel, 1976, p. 386.
**M. Kamches, et. al., 1978, p. 12.
***Sweden: 13.7; Japan: 11.9 Switzerland: 10.1.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 396.)
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appeared after 1960. It was undertaken almost totally by
small building enterprises; and was oriented towards the
rebuilding of the Town Map areas (central areas in the
'60s; northern, northeastern and southeastern suburbs in
the '70s). This intensification coincided with the expan-
sion of industrial activity in Athens area. Before that
time there was an expansion of the western residential
areas, which were mostly filled out with low-rise houses
for low-income population, or by "unauthorized" settle-
ments. Meanwhile, the central areas displayed a slow
growth.
The great construction boom came to absorb the savings
of middle-class people after WW II, and at the same time,
it provided jobs to the waves of incoming migrants. It
influenced not only the building sector itself, but also a
series of sectors and professions such as building materi-
als industries, architectural and real estate offices,
lawyers, and notaries. Apartment construction became the
symbol of economic and social success.
State governments tried to facilitate private building
enterprises as much as possible, influencing either the
supply or the demand by decrees and regulations, or even
by reducing construction done by the public sector. The
legal framework had been laid down by the floor ownership
law and the general building regulations of 1929. But the
decisive incentives for the proliferation of urban apart-
ment types came after 1955. New building regulations,
passed in 1955, reduced the minimum distances for sunlight,
ventilation and view while the 1968 Compulsory Decree
395/68 increased the floor-to-area ratio from 20 percent
to 40 percent.
In the meantime, various decrees gradually increased
the building heights. Public construction activity, under-
taken mainly by the ministries of Social Welfare and
Labor -- following the previously described patterns of
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the 1920s, and housing remaining refugees, and low-income
workers -- gradually diminished. Since 1968, the policy
for low-income people has been oriented towards granting
housing loans.*
Many building enterprises were born during this period,
to take advantage of the favorable measure. They were
characterized by their small size and the low organic
structure of their capital. The origins of these entre-
preneurs varied widely. Some were familiar with the
building sector (contractors, civil engineers, small-scale
producers and sellers of building materials, prior special-
ized artisans), while others were not. They all had capital
or access to credit organizations. The building entrepren-
eur, most of the time, was the contractor or the develop-
er. He started with low capital-and continued to keep it
at low levels.** The obstacle presented by the high cost
of purchasing the land was overcome by the legislative
formulae of "antiparochi", according to which the entre-
preneur and the owner of the lot sign a contract.
In an Antiparochi contract -- which is still used to-
day -- the landowner appears as partner, contributing only
his land, transferring his ownership rights to the future
buyers, and receiving at the end a percentage of floor
area equal to the land's value. In the central areas this
percentage has become very high (80-100 percent). In
these cases, the land owner actually doesn't transfer own-
ership rights, but only allows the contractor to exploit
a part of the building for a specified time (i.e. 10
years). Clearly the landowner gains profit without taking
any risk; if his contractor fails he can continue the
building with another one. However this case is rather
rare.
*In 1972, $203 million (American) in loans were granted.
**G. Yannopoulos et. al., 1974, p. 29.
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Building proved to be a very beneficial undertaking.
Profits in the '60s were around 100 percent.* The con-
tractor could sell apartments before proceeding with the
erection of the building, merely showing buyers the plans,
and thus he could obtain the capital necessary for com-
pletion of the construction.
Finally, the central factor in this building process
was the urban land. The device of 'antiparochi' matched
perfectly both the needs of the Greek building enterprise
and the financial conditions, since the entrepreneur rarely
intended to increase his capital and the banking credit was
not enough to purchase the lot. As a result of this policy,
land values were increasing continually (20 percent per
year), coming to a total value, in 1972, 2.5 times higher
than the gross national product.**
Despite the high land values and the consequent high
apartment prices, this residential type showed under "nor-
mal" conditions, a continuously increasing demand. The
factors defining this demand go beyond the state's inten-
tions: For the period 1970-74 public investments in houses
were only 3.29 percent of the total, while banking finance
was only 17.8 percent.*** Thus the major load of housing
expenses went to the individuals. The buyers could be
found in every social stratum. For the upper incomes an
apartment purchase was a secure investment. For the lower
ones a "respectable" residential environment, or a dowry
*A. Tzakou, 1978, p. 131.
**From 1964 to 1972 the average land value increased 162
percent (1050 drachmas/m 2 to 2,750 dr./m 2 ). See M. Kamches,
et al, 1978, p. 15-16. Total land value in 1972: 699.6
billion drachmas. The center alone, which occupies only
220 hectares, had, in 1972, a value equal to the GNP
(312.4 billion drachmas).
***M. Kamches, et al., 1978, p. 25.
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of the yet unmarried women.*
The differences between Peristeri and the other
areas show that the dowry system is more strongly
conserved in the low-income neighborhoods...
If we had to classify the situation, we would
say that the case of the day-laborer -- a young
modiste -- who buys, after years of exhaustive
work, a two room apartment -- her dowry -- in
a middle-income neighborhood, or the case of
the petit bourgeois, mature woman, who obtained
the same kind of apartment after a beneficial
antiparochi, is much more representative of the
real estate speculation in Athens and its gener-
alization than the case of the building enter-
prise, which sells a luxury apartment to a doc-
tor or lawyer, and even here it would be a
dangerous simplification to characterize the
real estate speculation as a profitable game of
some wealthy landowners. The massive interven-
tion of building activity as a motivating force
for development, and as responsible for the
transformation of the urban space, is located
exactly on the level of individual personal
aspirations, which are channelled to become an
element of exploitation by the economic mech-
anisms of profit.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 395-6)
Just as the economic mechanisms of profit had distri-
buted the Athenian land to small ownerships since the end
of the 19th century, so in the post-war period similar,
but more complex mechanisms distributed the Athenian built
space to small owners. Again, modern Athenian speculation
is connected with the influx of capital from other parts
of the country and from Greeks living abroad (Africa) or
coming from abroad (West Germany). In Athens and Kawithea,
fully one fifth of the new apartment owners don't live in
the urban area.**
In the most recent years housing demand was strength-
*The percentage of unmarried women among the owners of
apartments in Athens is extremely high (1/4 to 1/3). See
G. Burgel, 1976, p. 394.
**See G. Burgel, 1976, p. 393.
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ened, in a large part, by speculators and those wishing
to avoid inflation by investing in real estate.* Thus
the increase of the apartments' prices sometimes are higher
than the increase in prices of other goods and services.**
As a result, housing expenses have absorbed a large propor-
tion of the family budget (15-35 percent).***
So, although the building enterprises proved success-
ful at the beginning, to accommodate a large portion of
Athenian population, the continuous, disportionate and
many times speculative increase in prices, has recently
made it inaccessible to the lower incomes. Furthermore,
from its very beginning it was addressed more towards the
high-middle income population than the lower one, which had
mostly followed the "illegal" settlement alternative.
In addition, after a large part of the city was built,
people discovered the low quality of their environments:
the low-quality standards of their apartments -- cheap ma-
terials, small spaces -- and of their neighborhoods. Ab-
sence of social facilities (greenery, kindergardens, free
spaces, health centers, educational facilities), problems
of circulation and transportation, proximity to inappropri-
ate installations (industries, workshops), absence of
social interaction, congestion, etc.
However, the building enterprise is still strongly
connected with the political and economic conditions in the
city. G. Burgel points out the strong effect that building
crisis had in compounding the political and economic crisis
that threatened the colonel's dictatorship in 1973.
For the first three months of 1973, we notice
a 91 percent increase of building in the Attica
County in comparison with the first three
*OCDE, 1978, p. 13.
**M. Kamches et. al., 1978, p.- 25.
***Op. cit., p. 24.
-188-
months of the previous year...
This speculative gleam incited the political
authorites to try to stop the housing loans,
that banks generously offered. This measure
was to accelerate their fall: disappointment
of the great financial capital, sudden ceasing
of any construction, thousands of building
workers unemployed. These unemployed workers
were, together with the students, the prota-
gonist of the National Technical University
turmoil in 1973.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 389)
Having become a source for employment and being con-
nected to the economic UFE of the city, the building en-
terprise was also connected with speculation and low en-
vironmental quality. Although insufficient to meet the
lower-income residents' needs, the building enterprise has
become an important factor that cannot be ignored in any
decision affecting the future of the city.
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THE "UNAUTHORIZED" BELT AND ITS INCORPORATION INTO THE
CITY PLAN
While the urban apartment building was spreading from
the center to the closer periphery, a new residential belt
started surrounding the city. This belt had two distinc-
tive characteristics: "illegal" houses and rapid growth.
In 1964 its area comprised 17.94 percent of the Town Map
one (35 and 195 square meters respectively).
The new neighborhoods occupied mainly the northwestern,
northern and southeastern side of the periphery of the
capital and the west of Piraeus. Isolated examples appeared
also in the industrial area between Athens and Piraeus, or
in the eastern periphery, as well as in infills among the
quarters of the two cities.
The new housing areas, together with the industrial
expansion and the widespread appearance of vacation settle-
ments, towards the sea-shores, pulled further the already
vague boundaries of the Athens' area, giving at the same
time a new dimension to it. The establishment of the metro-
politan area was already a fact in the '60s. The urban
sprawl flew out of the basin and began to cover the rest of
Attica County, following the directions of the national
roads (Athens-Thessalonika, Athens-Patras, Athens-Halkis,
Athens-Messogeia).
The residents of the "illegal" settlements were immi-
grants who were coming from rural areas in order to make
"a better living". These people overran the basin from
the mid-sixties to the late '60s. Between 1945 and 1966
320,000 to 350,000 people were housed in "unauthorized
settlements", representing 45 percent of the total popula-
tion increase (1945-1966).* In 1951 the number of 'illegal'
*A Romanos, 1969, p. 141.
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houses was 8 percent of the total of new houses; during
the following decade the number increased at a rate of
13.7 percent per year.*
This phenomenon was neither new, nor exclusively
Athenian. It has marked the development of the great cities
in Latin America, Africa and Asia in the postwar period
and has been given several different names, (i.e. 'barria-
das', 'barrios' or 'campamentos'). However, the Athenian
case includes some quantitative and qualitative character-
istics that differentiate it from the third world capitals.
'Unauthorized' housing, although it was critical to
the city's expansion, did not take such extreme dimensions
in Athens as in Bogota, Caracas or New Delphi. It involved
11.2 percent of the total population,** which is relatively
low in comparison to the other cities (25-30 percent,
usually). In addition it is a phenomenon which mushrooms
during the decades of the '50s and '60s but which became
extremely limited by the end of seventies.
There were also qualitative differential characteris-
tics -- in the social status of the migrants, the process
of land acquisition, and the initial and final forms of the
settlements. Regarding the socioeconomic status, Athens
has had almost the same percentage of economically active
population among the migrants as among the natives.*** Also
the percentage of unemployment or underemployment has been
very low in comparison with some third world cities (2 per-
cent). Regarding housing accommodation, the majority of
*A. Kotsi et. al., 1973, p. 244.
**The population increase between 1951 and 1961 was
500,000 inhabitants. If 45 percent of this increase repre-
sented migrants housed in unauthorized settlements (225,000
inhabitants) then their percentage in the total population
(2,000,000 in 1961) is 11.25 percent.
***N. Kalogerou, 1975, p. 20.
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migrants were settled in bought rural land, while the
phenomenon of 'squatter settlements' remained limited.
In addition, the process of shaping the 'unauthorized'
settlement was more of an accumulation of many individual
actions than the well-organized group action characteris-
tic of third world cases.*
The most striking peculiarity of the unauthorized
settlements was their quick incorporation into the town
map. This process of legalization, besides satisfying the
"illegal" inhabitants' desire for legitimacy, also received
support from public authorities, who by this policy secured
two goals: the absorption of "urban villagers" into city
life; and the expansion of the building sector from the
already rebuilt center into the peripheral areas.
Some years ago, Greek progressive architects used to
think of the 'unauthorized' settlements of Athens and
Thessalonika as 'spontaneous, autonomous' environments, or
as reflections of Latin America's analogous examples.**
However, a more careful examination of their creation and
their resulting form would reveal that, in terms of mech-
anisms and land subdivision, they more closely resemble
the speculative settlements of the late 19th century than
any traditional or innovative spatial model. Interesting
differences lie in the social characteristics and the rela-
tionships among the inhabitants, which still indicate rural
*K. Axarli, P. Kosmaki, 1979, p. 176.
**See M. Papadolampakis, 1975, pp. 22-27 and 1973, p. 33-
45; E. Volikas et. al., The Festival, E.M.P. thesis, 1974;
and Sf. Papadakis, L'Autoconstruction Arbitraire dans la
Marge Du Systeme de la Production Du Logement En Grece --
Le Cas De la Ville de Salonique, Maitrise En Urbanisme,
Paris VIII-, November 1976.
D.A. Fatouros and K. Hatzemihalis, who first used the
term 'self-generated'in their research study for 'Meteora'
of Thessalonika, were first to dispute its appropriateness.
See L. Papadopoulos, D.A. Fatouros, K. Hatzemihalis; 1979,
p. 289.
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patterns. But these pecularities were mostly limited to
the household level and tended to dissappear with time.
Four principal actors were cast in the drama of the
settlement's formation: the migrants, the builders, the
land speculators and the public authorities. But, in the
first act of the play, landowners or land speculators were
the protagonists.* Former shepherds or peasants of Attica
-County -- mostly Albanians -- had owned the areas. Their
lands, usually empty and sloping, or along riversides,
were located near the official refugees' settlements es-
tablished in the previous period. Rarely did these land-
owners hold legal titles for their ownerships, a fact that
would later cause problems for the future settlers. In
most of the cases the landowners had expropriated public
lands:**
In the mid-1960s a climax in land speculation
was reached. Articles and reports telling of
scandals and nearly mythical profits made from
public-owned lands by acute speculators are
*Here we should add the minor case of squatter settlements,
which had appeared sporadically since 19th century and
continued in this rhythm, perhaps because of the scarcity
of public lands. Such a case, in the post-war period,
appeared in Perama in an industrial area out of Piraeus,
around a previous refugees' settlement. There, the settlers
gradually occupied the land, which belonged to the Greek
church. The state came to solve the problem by buying
a large part of land and asking from the squatters a small
symbolic amount for their lots. The church, also, did the
same for the rest. Despite the different processes, this
example is much closer to the bought land settlements, in
terms of form. (see I. Danou, Th. Pantopoulos, 1975, pp.
55-56)..
**We referred to the process of expropriation of public
lands since 19th century in Part 2, under the headline:
"Ownership Patterns and Building Processes" (pp.
Burgel writes of a funny case in the Peristeri neigh-
borhood where the landowner insisted in order to explain
the 'unclear' limits of his land that, "His grandfather...
had defined the boundaries (of his area), together with
those of his neighbors, by throwing a stone from the center
of the plot" (G. Burgel, 1976, p. 392).
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abundant in the national press of the time. The
public exposition of one such spate of reports cul-
minated in a House debate in October 1966, in
which the Minister of Agriculture and his prede-
cessor accused one another of having allowed
land speculators to make huge profits out of
buying and selling state-owned land leased to
shepherds for grazing.
(A. Romanos, 1969, p. 142)
Sometimes the areas had already been subdivided to small-
landowners, as in the case of the Brahami Settlement,
but this made no difference for the buyers in terms of
land prices and neighborhood quality.
The last Turkish feudal lord governing the area
was Braham-Bev, after whom the area was called
Brahami. In 1840, the people who had served as
workers or shepherds on the farms became big
landowners (tsiflikades), with fields stretching
south past the present airport. Most of them
were Greeks or Albanian origin (the so-called
Arvanites) who were known as hardworking farmers...
...Many of the employed farm-workers started
to take second jobs and by the second World War
most of them had bought land with their savings.
This meant that, in addition to a few big owners
there were now many small landowners, often with
scattered properties. In the early fifties a
great influx of new settlers started to come into
the area. The landowners began to find the sale
of land a profitable business, so they sub-
divided plots for sale on a rather large scale --
thereby completely destroying all rational
farming possibilities.
(B. Roe, 1979, p. 86)
After the climbing and prices, and the influx of migrants,
rural landowners found that urban land revenues were in-
comparably higher than the rural land ones. Thus, around
the early '50s, they began to sell their areas either to
land speculators or immediately to the newcomers, who were
unable to dispute any 'unclear' titles. In the second case
the settlers usually defined the boundaries of their
properties themselves, according to the number of square
meters they had bought.*
*D.A. Fatouros, K. Hatzemihalis, 1979, p. 263.
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The speculators subdivided the land into 'rural' plots,
sometimes with the help of engineers, who were paid on a
per-plot basis.* The picture of such areas was that of a
distorted or regular grid, with streets from 3 to 10 meters
wide, and almost rectangular lots with areas ranging from
120 to 200 square meters.** The layout was trying to con-
form to the 1953 lot standards waiting to be added to the city
map.
This form of land subdivision had nothing to do with
any 'spontaneous' or 'autonomous' process springing from
the settlers thPemselves, but it conformed to merely specula-
tive intentions. It was nothing more than a clear exploita-
tion of the meager savings of the migrant, which took place
under the apathetic gaze of public authorities, and gave
extremely high profits to land speculators (as much as
280 percent per plot').***
The majority of the inhabitants had come from the
poorest rural areas (highlands and islands) or from small
provincial towns, seeking a better life. It is difficult
to isolate the reasons of its movement or attribute it only
to the destruction of the productive relationships in the
country or to the dynamic development and the lights of the
capital.
The phenomenon cannot be explained by the
assignment of people's conglomeration into
Athens to general reasons (rural exodus, attrac-
tiveness of the great city) or to the coinci-
dence of personal aspirations of millions of
individuals. The real explanation should be
found in the point of their interface in the
*Consequently, engineers attempted to break up the land
into as many lots as possible, diminishing any public or
communal space. For the working out of such a map see
B. Roe, 1979, p. 86.
**Op. cit., p. 91; also see A. Romanos, 1970, p. 18.
***See A. Romanos, 1969, p. 142.
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individual wills into collective dynamisms......
The willingness of the capitalistic class
to develop the economic activity of Athens,
where the revenues were safer, quicker and higher
than anywhere else, coincides with the aspira-
tions of increasingly numerous masses to obtain
a regular and well-paid job. This coincidence
explains why, despite the swiftness of the in-
flux of migrants into Athens, this migration
never became an urbanization of misery, as in
the cities of the underdeveloped countries. For
the same ages, the percentages of economic acti-
vities are more significant among the migrants
than the native inhabitants of the capital; and
in every research study, economic initiatives are
particularly projected as an explanation for the
settlement in Athens. Capitalism not only suc-
ceeded in attracting the necessary masses for its
expansion of producers and consumers into Athens,
but also to persuade them that their settlement
was due to their own will and for the securing
of their happiness.
(G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 378-380)
Actually, the majority of the newcomers, although fully
employed, was distributed to economic sectors different
from those of the natives. In industry, the percentages
are about the same; the differences are obvious in the
sectors of commerce, building construction, transportation
and services. Migrants turned more to the teritiary and
building sectors than did the natives and less to commerce
and transportation.* Apparently, in the beginning, the
migrants constituted the less privileged part of the
*Occupation of Migrants and Natives in Athens (%)
Migrants Non Migrants
-Agriculture 1.1 1.0
-Industry 30.9 30.8
-Building construction 11.7 7.9
-Commerce 10.5 17.9
-Transportation 5.8 9.5
-Other services 31.0 23.3
-Other occupations 9.0 7.6
Source: E.S.Y.E. (National Statistical Service of Greece),
1963, Issue V.
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Athenian population; and this status is seen in their
distribution in space, the quality of the construction
of their houses, and the attitude of the public authorities
towards them. Their weak purchasing power -- which der-
ived from a dowry, a sale of a small rural parcel, or
savings from their job -- pushes them in to the margins
of both the city and the law. The legal framework theo-
retically prohibited building in such areas but it also
encouraged the 'illegal' process, since it was an inex-
pensive means of housing the new-comers necessary for the
development of the city's labor potential. This attitude
dated back to the previous period and it is expressed in
the 1923 and 1926 decrees.
The City Plan Service or local police proceeded to
demolish such buildings "if no permanent habitation of
people occurred during day and night."* The more restric-
tive laws or 1952, 1955, and 1956 were never enforced,
while the compulsory decree of 1968 went further to define the
"habitable structure" as that which has "a completed
structural frame of reinforced concrete or masonry."
Owners of such units were obliged to pay a tax equal to
3 percent of the value of the built unit. Under the above
legal restrictions a unique scenario developed: the new
settler hired a specialist builder in unauthorized con-
struction , who built a room with dimensions of 4 x 4 x
2.5 meters, all 'in one night', so as not to be noticed
by the police. This construction cost the owner much more
than a similar legal building, because of the risk, and
it had all of the inadequacies of a cheap, impromptu erec-
tion. But the builders usually were experts in public
relations, especially with the police, so even if the owner
was himself working in the building sector, he didn't dare
undertake the construction of the first stage. Of course,
*Presidential Decree, 3/18/1926. (F.E.K. 101A/3/20/26).
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for all these services the owner was exploited by the
specialist builder, who provided a line of credit to his
clients at extremely high rates of interest (50%).
Many of these 'first nuclei' were erected during na-
tional celebrations, or during parliamentary elections,
a frequent case in the '60s. An entire illegal settlement
was born during the 1964 elections, and took the name of
the new prime minister (Papandreika, in Kypseli quarter)
while previous ones were enriched by new houses:
A man said that one part of this house was
named after "old" Papandreou and the other part
after Karamanlis, relating to who had won the
elections at the time it was built' Election
time was selected for two reasons. The police
were usually occupied elsewhere and the politi-
cians sometimes promised to ask the authorities
to "help" the unauthorized settlers, so they
left them in peace at least for the time being.
(B. Roe, 1979, p. 92)
Political parties, trying to increase the number of their
voters in the capital, the area most crucial to their vic-
tory or survival, supported as much as possible "illegal"
housing, as a whole. Politicians on the other hand showed
personal interest to those individuals who had important
acquaintances.
The family tried to bribe the policeman, who
was from the same village as one of the family
members, but he did not accept the bribe. Then
the father-in-law asked another former minister
(also an acquaintance) to help them. He
reacted immediately and called the Chief of
Police in the municipality, who ordered his men
not to patrol the area for some time. The
building site was afterwards left alone.
(B. Roe, 1979, p. 95)
The political beliefs of the settler were an import-
ant factor in determining the attitude of the police toward
'illegal' housing. Communists were usually the black sheep
for the conservative patrolman.*
*Such a case is described by B. Roe, 1979, p. 95.
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The confusion of responsibilities among the state
organizations, is made apparent when widespread demolitions
by the police or the Town Map Service, had been opposed by
other ministries. Such was the case of Perama in 1974.
The illegal nuclei, whose safety had been guaranteed by
parliamentary members belonging to the governing party,
were pulled down by the police, while the Minister of
Social Welfare only days before had referred to the sus-
pension of the demolitions until the accommodation of the
settlers inside its own lots.*
Inside the above institutional framework the residents
of the 'unauthorized' settlements were acting under multiple
pressures and influences. State authorities viewed them as
a field on which to project their political aspirations,
while capitalists saw them as labor potential, to accom-
plish their economic goals. Therefore, their attitude was
to manipulate and absorb the new-comers. The housing as-
pect became a means to achieve this political and economic
incorporation. Through an equivocal institutional frame-
work that kept the migrants bound to the good will of each
successive government, the rulers could control the politi-
cal loyalty of the lower classes; at the same time they
could free themselves of any costly social care while de-
voting any available capital to the quick economic develop-
ment of Athens. Illegal settlements initially lacked
public facilities and infrastructures (schools, health
centers, water supply, sewage system, garbage collection).
Aside from the general framework of rules and formal-
ities already outlined, the illegal settler had also to
face the exploitive intentions of the local land specula-
tors and builders. If for the ruling class 'illegal
*See I. Danou, Th. Pantopoulos, 1975, p. 59, 58. The
politician who appeared as the patron of the new settlers
spoke about "dark forces" which demolished the unauthorized
houses.
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housing' was an inexpensive solution to the housing problem
of working class and lower strata in general. For the
local entrepreneur, it was a chance for accumulation of
wealth. Thus, a large part of the settler's small budget
was absorbed by others for speculative profit purposes.
So far, we have seen how 'illegal' settlements in
Athens were not born spontaneously, but followed a path of
restrictions and limitations that others had posed. From
the moment the new settler bought a piece of land until
at least the time he built his first residential nucleus,
he was obliged to conform to a certain number of behavioral
patterns. First he "chose" to live in the 'rural' areas
surrounding the city, because no alternative place is
economically accessible. Second, the size and the position
of his lot was in the settlement a function of the amount
of his savings; nevertheless the more or less standard
small sizes and the poor qualities of the neighborhood
could not offer many alternatives. Third, the building of
the first portion of his house was not result of the col-
lective communal action as we have seen in previous per-
iods (Anafiotica, illegal refugees' settlements); it was
rather an individualistic procedure, whose success depended
on his acquaintances and accesses to public authorities,
his local builder, his political record, or the lucky mom-
ent when public authorities seemed lax toward the control
of 'unauthorized' buildings (celebrations, elections).
Finally, the form of his first structure was almost a
given: 4 x 4 x 2.5 meters. A habitation of this size was
acceptable to the authorities although the size actually
derives from the standard materials used: it is a multiple
of the size of cement blocks used for quick building, or
of the standard wooden planks used for slab shuttering
(4 meters).* In addition, the quality of the construction
*See P.A. Fatouros, K. Hatzemixales; 1979, p. 243.
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was also a given, since it took place under risky conditions
and with cheap material. In the end, the first structure
denotes nothing more than the establishment of the exist-
ence of the migrant inside the city, and his strong anxi-
ety and will to secure a private base for himself and his
family, in order to continue his adventurous journey to-
wards a 'respectable' urban life.
Until the completion of the four steps described above
the process of formation of the 'illegal' settlements does
not differ markedly from that of the 'authorized'specula-
tive lower-middle class settlements established in Athens
at the end of 19th century. Again, land speculators define
the urban form, which also lacks social facilities, com-
munal places, and basic utilities. The first unit is built
according to certain standards too. The differences be-
tween authorized and unauthorized settlements are expressed
in quantitative rather than qualitative terms: smaller
lots and streets; poorer transportation facilities, as the
settlements precede expansion or communication networks;
longer distance from the center; more frequent proximity
to quarries or industrial plants; less decoration and room
for the original structures. The only qualitative differ-
ences lie in the label of "illegal" and the social back-
grounds of the inhabitants who are rural-origin, unedu-
cated workers or lower rank employees.
The most interesting differences lay in the later phases,
from the time the 'illegal settlement' was established to
the moment it became 'legalized'. A neighborhood social
relationships network was formed, while each house devel-
oped through stages, taking a form far different from the
other urban or rural precedents. These last and signifi-
cant characteristics emerged inside an already defined
fabric, and can be explained only by the social quality of
the 'illegal' neighborhoods which hardly can be found in
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the rest of the Athenian urban milieu.
The social organizations that developed kept the com-
munity coherent and they provided it with the opportunity
to express itself through the collective amelioration of
the neighborhood. These organizations were either informal
structures (based on family and friendship relationships)
or formal bodies constituted for specific purposes (pres-
sure the authorities for utilities and social ser-vices, or
to build communal facilities -- playgrounds, churches,
small bridges).
The informal relationships can be explained by a number
of common social characteristics found among the residents.*
First, there were relatives or compatriots who migrated to
the same neighborhood, together or gradually; second, was
the social homogeneity (rural origin, similar cultural
background, similar incomes and occupations); and third,
the trend to transfer the village life pattern and strength-
en new friendships with new family relationships (marriages;
sponsorships). These patterns were mostly developed along
a single street but also could be found on the whole settle-
ment level.
Also, acute common problems unified a part or all of
the inhabitants. Formal organizations gave them the oppor-
tunity to undertake active roles.** Committees or neighbor-
hood councils were formed to address specific environmental
problems*** or to confront sudden threats such as expropri-
ations or demolitions. By the end of the '60s most of
these organizations were devoted to seeking the adoption of
their respective settlements to the Town Map.
*For an analysis of the above social organizations see
Axarli, P. Kosmaki, 1979, pp. 188-199.
**Op. cit., pp. 202-207.
***See B. Rde, 1979, p. 98.
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Despite the residents' efforts the poor character of
the whole of the area rarely changed during the "illegal
phase". On the contrary, a significant change can be
noticed in the houses themselves.
The main impression of Kipoupous is of visual
disorder and misery. If one tries to pinpoint
the disorder in space, one will come to the
conclusion that disorder and ugliness are liter-
ally limited to the public areas... So the dust
that covers the area comes from neighboring
stone-quarries and from the wind blowing on the
unsurfaced roads, the heaps of junk or rubbish
are only in the unused plots, etc. on the con-
trary within the domain of the individual house
one finds the expression of a feeling towards
plants and flowers and order and cleanliness
and pure decorative disposition and artistic
creation -- sometimes even ingenuity... And
you...begin to see that Kipoupolis, far from
being a slum, far from being an ugly, poor
settlement, is a collection of individual suc-
cessful attempts. It is a creation by dynamic
people of a viable physical environment, the
virtues of which spring from their efforts and
faults and disadvantages from restrictive state
measures.
(A. Romanos, 1970, pp. 19, 20)
Residents were developing their houses in stages, ac-
cording to their economic possibilities. Additional
building was taking place during the night or during spec-
ific national events, done by builders or by residents
themselves, helped sometimes by friends or relatives.
Rooms were arranged around a courtyard, which became the
center of communication and family life. Many times, two
or even three households appeared on the same plot accom-
modating two or three generations. Sometimes shops or
residential units for rent were also added. This typology
succeeded in incorporating the villages' patterns and,
also, in meeting the current needs of the settlers. Con-
struction quality was low, but when the house came to a
more or less completed stage many visual quantities pre-
vailed. The resulting vivid, polychromic mixture of rural
-205-
and urban decorative elements cannot be compared to either
the "vernacular wisdom" of the traditional villages, or to
the typical, post-war "villas" popular among the petit-
bourgeoisie. This mixture expressed the inner dynamism
of the inhabitants who succeeded in creating,despite the
multiple restrictions, a new, urbanized environment without
forgetting until that moment their local habitual life.
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THE COURSE TOWARD 'LEGALIZATION'
The illegal settlements, as samples of an architec-
tural creation and social organization different from the
dominant patterns, did not last for long. The proximity
to a city like Athens, which has shown in the past its
tremendous ability to absorb and transform any different
trend, appeared in its domain. Along with changes in the
character of migration, such proximity became critical for
the evolution of the "unauthorized" settlements.
At the end of the '60s conditions changed. First, the
continuous stream of rural-origin migrants to Athens
slowed down. The proportion of the 'unauthorized' houses
fell to 2.3 percent of the new housing activity by 1966.*
A series of factors, such as the premature decrepitude of
the rural population,** the outlet for emigration to
Europe, the development of regional centers*** as well as
the quick rising of land prices in the 'illegal' areas of
Athens,**** affected the quantity and the quality of people
migrating to the capital. The rate of migration from the
rural areas to the large urban centers (Athens and
Thessalonika) diminished,***** while another category of
migrants appeared on center stage -- middle-class people
who were moving from provincial towns to Athens and
*K. Axarli, P. Kosmaki, 1975, p. 6.
**G. Burgel, 1976, p. 382.
***As Patras, Volos, Larissa, Erakleio, (op. cit., p. 377).
****In Kipoupolis in the period 1952-1957 the plots were
sold for 6000 drs each. In 1964 the same plots were sold
for 30.000 drs, which means 500% increase (see A. Romanos,
1970, p. 18).
*****D. Tsaoussis, 1971, p. 223.
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Thessalonika.* Having saved a considerable amount of
money, the middle-class immigrants were looking at their
residence in the capital more as a safe investment than as
an urgent need. As a result, the social status and the
attitude of the migrant changed.
On the other hand, a change also occurred in the social
and cultural characteristics of the already settled migrants.
Although the nature and degree of their employment still
differed from that of the rest of the city, most of them had
raised their social status.
In Mesonisi, 66 percent of the population in-
terviewed worked in tertiary occupations, the
rest in secondary. A high proportion were
self-employed (restaurant owner, furniture
producer, truck owner/driver, building material
wholesale dealer, shopkeeper). Other members
of the families worked as shopkeepers, taxi
owners/drivers, salesmen, etc. Several had
changed occupation one or more times, but most
seemed to have stabilized... The inhabitants
obviously had "drive" and ability. All had a
job very often by their own initiative, and if
the income from the regular job was not suffi-
cient to keep up their standard of living they
took a second job.
(B. Roe, 1979, p. 88)
This change first was expressed in their houses: plas-
tic materials, aluminum frames, decorative elements offer-
ed in quantities by the market, large rooms closed and
used only for display of social status, appeared,**
drawing many of the 'unauthorized' houses nearer to the
models of the middle-class, authorized structures. Now,
these people were looking forward either to moving towards
more 'respectable' neighborhoods or to changing the status
of their own neighborhood, through inclusion in the Town
Map.
*G. Arachovitis, Mp. Phameliadou, 1979, p. 243.
**N. Kalogerou, 1979, p. 55.
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The private housing market, combined with state govern-
ment policy, came to fulfill both aspirations. The housing
boom of 1969, together with a number of favorable building
regulations and the increase of housing loans towards lower
incomes, had two impacts on the 'illegal' settlements. On
the one hand, the intensive rebuilding of the eastern
parts of the city attracted a number of middle-class people,
thus freeing the older areas, which the lower-income popula-
tion from illegal settlements could now reside. On the
other hand, the new opportunity for the illegal settlers
to exploit their land, by building multi-story apartment
buildings, helped to intensify efforts for adoption into
the town map. From 1968 to 1971, a great number of city
map expansions occurred, including older and more recent
illegal areas.*
Social and spatial mobility, and individual efforts
for legalization not only loosened the previous social or-
ganization but also brought together conflicts, discrepan-
cies and deadlocks in the unauthorized neighborhoods.
Political limitations posed by the dictatorship, regarding
the constitution of associations or councils, came to con-
tribute to the above process. But the basic attitude did
not change when these limitations were withdrawn after the
political reform of 1974. Most of the proposals for the
adoption into the town map were characterized by individual
desires to favor some lots over others:
Members of the group claim that the Melissa
Council is trying to influence the authorities
to save their personal properties and not to
make the best possible plan for the area as
a whole.
(B. R~e, 1979, p. 98)
The conflicts revealed that, due to the spatial arrange-
ment of the town plans and to the imposed regulations,
*D. Emmanuel, 1975, p. 12.
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which favored the few large lots (300 square meters and
up), the small ones were left to slowly decline.
For the smallest unbuilt-on plots, the only
solution is for two neighbors to combine their
plots or no building will be permitted on
either, as has been the case in several in-
stances. The result is that (six years later)
four-story houses are popping up on several of
the bigger plots while a lot of smaller plots
remain undeveloped. The houses that already
existed on small plots have remained unchanged,
sometimes deteriorating. These houses have not
been "legalized" according to law 720/77 be-
cause, after paying for the legalization, their
owners could not be permitted to do anything
about their houses.
(.B. Roe, 1979, pp. 98-99)
All inhabitants, without exception, wanted the Town Plan
in their area, despite its injustices. Legalization
could offer to them two immediate benefits, and the hope
for a third one: the label of legal, important for their
social restoration; the opportunity to sell or exploit
their property; and, besides that, the increased possibil-
ity for better infrastructures.
But this solution did not automatically promise better
social services or facilities. Only rarely did such "com-
mon goods" appear in a legalized settlement; public spaces
remained as unorganized as before. On the contrary, all
the positive elements that these settlements had displayed
in the past -- the more or less creative social interaction
and the skillful adaptability of their residential struc-
tures -- with legalization deteriorated. The picture of an
authorized "illegal" settlement is that of confusion: a
few apartment buildings here and there, and unfinished; low
houses, left to decay. It could not approach the dense,
continuous structure of the middle-class housing areas, nor
was it allowed to develop gradually, according to the
previous mode.
Taking into account the type of Athenian demographic
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growth then prevailing, and the internal mobility towards
more prestigious settlements, it becomes obvious that only
a few people could gain from this specific mode of legal-
ization -- contractors and landowners. While for the
majority of the inhabitants there remained only their
nomination as regular residents of Athens and the illusion
of a possible future development of their land.
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FORMS, TRENDS AND ASPIRATIONS
A 1978 report, the Technical Chamber of Greece (T.E.E.)
and the Centre of Social Studies (EKKG), defines the
main elements of contemporary Athens' structure:
1. A central north-south axis, including the central busi-
ness district and the areas around Patession and
Syggrou Streets, which contain the most important
administrative functions (public and private) and com-
merce, together with high- and middle-income residential
areas;
2. An eastern area, including high- and middle-class resi-
dential areas, several green spaces, most of the pri-
vate high schools, hospitals and clinics, the new
university campus, several public services and organi-
zations, as well as offices of Greek and foreign cor-
porations; and,
3. A western area, including wholesale commerce, industrial
districts, the national roads and railway lines, as
well as residential areas for middle- and lower-incomes.*
Beyond these general abstraction, one can also mention
some additional, important characteristics: low-come
housing and industries have penetrated the central and east
areas as well, being concentrated mainly along the artery
leading to Messageia Plain (Messogeion Street) and the
artery leading to the airport (Vouliagmenis Street). In
addition, each one of the three areas has been overrun by
retail commerce. Furthermore, the overall visual impression
that a visitor would have -- looking down on the city from
a height -- is not marked by an awareness of such func-
tional or income segregations; rather, the most vivid
*T.E.E., TKKE, 1978, p. 480.
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impression is of a central, built mass overflowing into a
lower peripheral one, which spreads over the entire country-
side. Natural boarders (hills, mountains) are almost
surpassed by built volumes. Limits between areas are
ambiguous. Central areas can be recognized by their higher
densities and the intersection of the major arteries.
Lower density peripheries include high-income suburbs,
middle- and lower-income neighborhoods, and the belts of
unauthorized housing. Large or small, and popping up "in-
cidentally", the lot-based building mass is finally the
sovereign element throughout the Urban scene. The whole
aggregation of such building volumes looks like a mass that
has no end, ready to swallow up the adjacent countryside
in every direction. Inside this mass, the Acropolis
stands alone, a strange metaphysical element.
..All the elements that constitute urban
structure, increase or improve or get more
complex as one investigates the cross-section
of the town from the periphery to the center
at a specific point in time. Volume and height
of building,...incomes, utility networks, the
quality of housing, the quality of services, the
quality of road network, and, of course, land
values, can all be represented by curves, whose
highest points occur over the centre, and low-
est on the periphery of the city. Athens is
like an onion.
But the onion is not static. The layers
(boundaries) multiply continuously. Each wave
of newcomers to the area builds another belt
of unauthorized settlements pushing the peri-
phery outward all the time. The'immediately
receding belt gets a higher land value and, with
incomes going up, its inhabitants now press
for 'recognition' from the state and the supply
of basic utilities and amenities. These are,
little by little provided and by then physical
changes start to occur in the area in the in-
tensity of the building density and building
heights, with the result that the area is now
'authorized' and upgraded. It is then the turn
of the new peripheral belt -- and so the process
goes on and on.
(A. Romanos, 1969, p. 140)
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But beyond the sphere of the immediate connurbation,
three directions seem to attract urban development: the
north, along the national roads leading to Thessalonika
and Halkis, a dynamically developed industrial pole; the
southwest, along the national road leading from Athens to
the developing city of Corinth; and the east, towards the
mixed industrial and agricultural area of Mesogeia.
The increase in density of the inner neigh-
borhoods and the expansion of the urban network
along the motorways have replaced the two terms
of the Athenian urban equation, the renewal of
the center and the displacement of the boundaries
of the urban area...
...The immediate impact of the capital on the
landscape and on the people's life becomes more
and more clear: there never existed any Athenian
economic area, because Athens's space was always
spreading to the entire country; but an Athenian
metropolitan area begins to be formed... Roads
and cars succeeded in giving, in a few years, a
new dimension to the capital, where more than a
century of political and economic concentration
had failed.
(G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 40-42)
This spontaneously spreading urban space contains an
extraordinary, dynamic life which is expressed throughout
its streets. The lights of the city, which in "a glorious
red gleam light up the Aegean sky" and "are visible from
Syros Island when the weather is clear"* underlie the in-
ternational radiation of the city, its dominance over the
rest of the country and its inner dynamism.
Athens of the post-war period became not only the show-
case of Greek development, but a significant international
center as well. The mutual infiltration between the great
Greek** and foreign capital*** strengthened by the important
*G. Burgel, 1976, p. 52.
**Mainly capital coming from shipowners, banks and great
construction companies.
***Foreign capital, many times in collaboration with Greek
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position of Athens in the network of international rela-
tionships, transformed the Balkan urban center into an in-
termediate station crucial for the continuous movement of
international capital. The city is neither an imperi-
alistic metropolis nor a colonial city; rather, Athens is
pulled by the chariot of world capitalistic streams. The
securing the continuity of their course. It is the last
advanced station of Europe on routes to the middle east
and Africa.
Urban space became an active component in the interna-
tional role: Hellenikon airport, an important interrediate station
in the long international flights; Piraeus Port and the
national roads completed during the '60s, which connected
the capital with Europe -- to the north through
Yugoslavia and to the west through the shipping line
Patras-Italy -- have contributed to the quick opening of
Athens to the outside world; at the same time strengthening
its focal role inside the country. The triangular center
of the city and the axis starting from it (Kifissias,
Syggrou, Mesogelon), as well as Pireus's center became the
main territories, for the headquarters of large companies
with activities in the country or in the third world.
The several high-rise buildings that sprang up at the
beginning of the '70s, housing mainly international cor-
porations or grand hotels, and pointing out the interna-
tional significance of the city, became the new symbols of
capital, has been channelled to productive investments in
Greece; from 1960 to 1974 the total capital flowing into
the country was $6.6 billion (American) while the amount
flowing out was $2.2 billion. This contrasts to the de-
pendent third world countries, where multinational capital
is concentrated mostly in the exploitation of the raw
materials of the countries and most of the profits are
exported to the metropolises. For the intermediate position
of Greece among the countries of the center and periphery,
see G. Burgel, 1976, pp. 135-136, 351 and 356; and also
G.D. Melios, 1979, p. 37-41.
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post-war Athens.
But other parts of the city too, have gotten a taste
of the money surplus brought by international business
and tourism. Thus, wealth from abroad, to be invested or
spent in the capital, has led to the appearance of numerous
commercial and entertainment enterprises of small or medium
size, that swarmed into the urban space. The Athenian build-
ing sector was strongly favored by this capital injection,
as well as by the influx. of money from sailors and from
Greek emigrants in the West European countries and the
United States. Numerous office and urban apartment build-
ings, as well as hotels were built during the '60s and the
early '70s in order to meet the increased demand and util-
ize this money influx.
Athens's international economic role also has been
accompanied by a secondary cultural one, and, recently, by
new demographic movements. Athenian universities and
professional schools attract a large number of foreign
students coming from the Middle East and from African
countries, while a number of foreign migrants lately have
come to work in the shipping companies, industries or in
other manual jobs.
However, all of these new demanding tasks that post-
war Athens has undertaken further bind its fate to inter-
national developments, and add new parameters to its
already saturated, complicated, and shallow urban space.
Such cosmopolitanism also further increases the wide dis-
tance between the capital and the rest of the country. This
distance was the natural result of the continuous increase
in concentration of the private and public administrative
services, capital and people.
The development of the Greek capital, moderate
in comparison with the metropolises of the under-
developed countries, and equal to that of the
other Mediterranean capitals, becomes outrageous,
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when considered inside the national demographic
framework. Athens is a heavy head on a weak body;
the rapidity of its expansion can be explained
neither by the size of the country nor by the
dynamism of its demography.
(G. Burgel, 1976, p. 23)
During the post-war years, Athens concentrated further in-
side its territory the administrative, industrial and
commercial activities of the entire country, and increased
its control over the other centers. Regarding administra-
tion, it has gathered the majority of public servants (55
percent in 1956) and banking employees (60 percent in 1958);*
and it contains almost all of the higher ranking officers
and executives, while provincial services remain staffed by
minimal personnel, who play only a secondary executive role.
At the same time that the capital was developing as the
top industrial center of the country -- half of the industri-
al potential in 1969 -- including number of enterprises,
unit size, and industries with the greatest productivity,**
the more dynamic Athenian corporations gradually absorbed
the peripheral ones. Those that survived transfered their
offices in the capital to be nearer to the decision-making
center. The result of this Athenian growth was that a
number of industrial centers that showed promise during the
pre-WW II period, such as Kavala, Volos, and Kalamata,
showed a continuous decline after the war.
However, by the end of '60s some new trends had appeared.
Having their headquarters in the capital, heavy industries
moved their plants into the periphery, to follow the cheap
labor and to take advantage of the new legislative incentives
*Most of the Athenian banks had come gradually under
state control.
**Athens had 2,643 individual corporations, while
Thessalonika, the second-largest industrial center, had
only 364, and Patras, the third-largest, only 102 (G. Burgel,
1976, pp. 67-68).
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passed by the government to encourage decentralization.*
But, even in these cases, the new plants were not far re-
moved from Athen's radius, concentrating mainly inside the
broader Attica county (Megara, Eleusis), or the adjacent
counties of Viotia, Euvoia, and Corinth, along the national
roads. Simultaneously, Athens area showed a remarkable
increase in high-technology, medical and consumer-goods
industries. These were mostly medium-scale units with few
personnel, and were scattered in the basin or in its out-
skirts. This removal of large-scale industries, together
with the expansion of the Athenian circle of influence into
the adjacent centers, changed the image of the entrance to
the capital. Instead of having boundaries of the building
mass appearing suddenly at the ends of the basin, now a
series of facilities, industrial plants, and settlements
prepare the visitor, before reaching Attica County, to
arrive in the megalopolis. Despite the fact that a complex
network, consisting of denser urban relationsionships, has
started to develop inside the broader space, the pyramid
organization of the urban agglomeration still exists, imply-
ing inflexibility in mechanisms and systems.
Operating inside a single square kilometer of the
center, a small oligarchy is in control of every decision
involving the fate of national development:
The district enclosed by the 'walls' is a central
zone of Athens. The reason that urged me to write
about these walls is that, inside their area, all
of Greece is judged and directed. When we consider
that the Palace, the Parliament, the Ministries,
the houses of previous and present primeministers,
the theater, the airway companies, the tourist
offices, etc. are located inside the walls it is
not odd to say that the heart of the heart, the
state of the state, the life of the life, are con-
trolled by the walls...the walls, at the first
view are not closed to anybody. People are coming
* G. Burgel, 1976, p. 84.
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and going from their entries all the day. Never-
theless, under the surface, the walls are entirely
closed, the gates are impassable, as with the
museum doors when the time comes. The 'inside'
people live the life of their own, where nobody
from 'outside' can penetrate...the walls are not
the forwarding office of various private affairs;
they are not the waiting room; the walls are a
big matter; they are the surgery room.
(V. Vassilikos, 1960, p.9).
Outside of the walls, the rest of the population lives in
almost uniform apartment buildings or in low-income houses.
In 1971, the capital numbered 2,530,207 inhabitants.*
Athens is a city of workers, employees, professionals, and
tradesmen.** Occupations in the city recently have tended
more towards the tertiary than the secondary sector. Rapid
economic progress brought about a remarkable increase in
the proportion of middle strata in the city. Full of
ambition this strata contributed to the enormous increase
of consumation and apartment building construction. Retail
commerce and entertainment enterprises took advantage of
this potential and overran the urban fabric. Although
rich in production activities, Athens is, first of all, a
consumption city. Although it receives 75 percent of the
country's imports, it produces only 40 percent of its ex-
ports. Being encased in their three-room apartments, the
major portion of the middle-class descend into the streets
of the city during the evening hours, searching for
recreation, or move in waves towards Saronicos or Euvolkos
Beaches during summer, pulling the city towards the sea.
*The population was 1,378,586 in 1951, and 1,872,709 in
1961. That means that, inside 20 years, the population
doubled.
**From 1971 census: Craftsmen/Laborers 45,57%
Professionals 10,27%
Administrative/Executives 1,47%
Clerks 16,25%
Tradesmen 11,51%
Service Workers 12,22%
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Vacation housing again takes the form of an apartment
building while, for the working class, the same "unauthor-
ized" settlements, or cheap "mobile" houses, are the
solution. As a result extensive urban sprawl covered the
seashores in Saronicos and Euvolkos Bays.
Although they are educated, the majority of Athens'
middle-class come from country areas; they are still
caught between provincial manners and modes and the
cultural patterns provided by mass media. Connected both
to public and private services, they are divided between
the clientele-system course of personal social ladder
climbing, and that of the hard, individual effort. Carry-
ing no common urban tradition, facing a city that developed
by eating* away at itself, dizzy and occupied in the
delirium of post-war growth, they filled out the small,
neutral apartment spaces the market offered. After years
of residence in the capital, they could develop no alterna-
tive preference except that of "suburban" apartment building,
which looked less congested, and more luxurious, and had
covered the still-unpolluted northeastern peripheral zone.
Architects and civil engineers, who first designed the
new building typology, following the suggestions of their
clients -- building contractors -- were seized by mixed
intentions. However, for just about all of them, Athens
promised social success. Offering many opportunities, the
city gathered 70 percent of Greece's engineers**(1970).
The majority of these people worked as professionals,
opening many small offices, while the rest were absorbed
by public organizations or medium offices.***
*Most of the neoclassical buildings, and even a part
of the traditional Plaka, were demolished to be replaced
by new multi-story structures.
**See G. Chaidopoulos, 1976, p. 3.
***See D.S.A., 1976, p. 25, Tables 1 and 2.
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For those participating in the leftist movement during
the '40s, private, professional practice was the only alter-
native, since any other channel (public works and services,
large construction companies) was actually prohibited.
But besides that, the design and construction of a new
structure appealed to many leftist architects, who were
eager to contribute their personal creations. Leftists'
return from isolation through a personal, constructive
work has been perfectly described by A. Frangias in his
book E.Kageloporta (The Iron Gate). Here the hero a civil
engineer who was for years an outlaw in hiding, decides to
return and participate in the city life by designing an
urban apartment building, an assignment offered him by a
friend:
As soon as the first sunbeam had penetrated the
small room,..., Aggelos woke up immediately and
started the work. Never before had he imagined
himself starting so important a project, a build-
ing with seven stories... The noon passed, night had
come and still he did not get up. He had remem-
bered everything, nothing was lost and his hands,
which he had considered useless, were drawing the
lines straight, the design precisely. The
anatomy of the structure is a magic play, an exer-
cise that has much to teach. And maybe a piece of
music. Construction of any element is the most
beautiful, the most needed function...And a build-
ing lives when it provides its balance to house a
life. And if the designer dies, or is imprisoned
or executed, the building remains, because concrete,
iron and stones are mutually bound, to be con-
served for one hundred, two hundreds, one thousand
years.
(A. Fragias, 1976, pp. 413-4)
The sum of the individual building efforts, deriving
either from a Fragias-like humanism or simply from profit-
making motives, composed finally a city that could not
afford any other logic than that of profit and exploitation.
Attempts such as these of Pikionis,* to elaborate an
*D. Pikionis had been professor in the School of
Architecture of E.M.P. from the 1930s to the mid 1960s.
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alternative typology springing out of traditional cultural
roots (landscape design of the walk in the Acropolis and
Philopapou, planning and design of the Aixoni settlement
in the periphery of the city), had few followers. Many
admired them, butno one was willing to implement them.
Also, the blossoming aspirations of young, leftist archi-
tects who, during the dictatorship, attempted to solve the
problems of the illegal settlements, were destroyed by the
process of so-called legalization.
...The unauthorized settlements belong to history...
they were the last example of a mixed housing pro-
duction exercised by a group of people whose economi-
cal situation and their lack of skills, led them to
this method of meeting their need for shelter.
... Unfortunately, we became interested in the un-
authorized settlements very late.
(G. Arachovitis, 1975, p.17)
Athens, center and periphery, had already bound its
development to the concept of rapid growth and continuous
and unplanned urban speculation. But this mode was carry-
ing with it a number of problems and conflicts: the city
was expanding quickly towards more remote areas; buildings
mushroomed in a capricious fashion; all of this occurred
inside a legal framework, established in the 1920s under
emergency situations, and with land subdivision patterns
inherited from the 1870s. The cumulative multiplication
of small, artificially divided, communities, which were
not allowed to control their own development resulted in a
mere aggregation of scattered, individual attempts, which
were in sharp contrast to the austere pyramid and bureau-
cratic institutes in control.
Finally, there continues to be no body to connect the
head with the legs. The absence of any substantial utili-
ties (such as sewage and water supply) and services, the
absence of any communal environmental quality, perhaps was
affordable in the small pyramid city at the end of 19th
century, or necessary amid urgency of the post-WW I
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agglomeration; but how long an extensive urban sprawl,
without infrastructures, be viable?
Absence of any immediate or intermediate form of citi-
zens' participation in the affairs of their environments
had been overcome in the past, through the individual
privileges of the 'clientele' system; but how long can it
be affordable in the anonymity of a megalopolis?
These conflicts were hardly explicit. Almost everyone
seemed very happy about post-war Athens: conservative
governments occupied in securing their political control
and the incentives for a rapid industrial growth, favored
this kind of Athenian development, since it relieved them
from disposing of additional capital and energy; small- and
medium-sized landowners, speculators and builders were free
to develop the city in the fashion most profitable to them;
engineers were overrun by the euphoria of personal creation
and their significant earnings; citizens were satisfied
with a piece of land or an apartment in the city -- a pro-
perty with ever-increasing value and a secure investment as
well -- and being with near a cosmopolitan consumption-
center promising them a short road to social success.
All of their goals and desires were based on the assump-
tion that the energetic, vital 'onion' would unceasingly
produce as many new layers as it did the year before.
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INTRODUCTION
In this last part we trace the history, still in its
initial stages of major new developments that could greatly
influence the evolution of the Greek capital. The presen-
tation of the new developments is made in terms of the
various issues we have been examining throughout our study,
and also in terms of the problems that arise in connection
with them.
We are concerned with current events that simultaneously
involve not only politicians, bureaucrats, and administra-
tors, but also architects and engineers as well as people
who are actively preoccupied with the spatial shaping of the
city. Personal contradictions arise as many, who claim
allegiances with various parties, find themselves in the
difficult position of supporting actions or propositions
that seemingly contradict their fundamental beliefs. At
the same time, the most peculiar alliances occur between
parties with supposedly deeply split philosophies, along
with bitter confrontations between former allies or friends.
As a result, political rhetoric is more obscure than ever
before and one can hardly conclude what exactly different
parties stand for.
The politics of the urban environment in Greece follow
the chaotic patterns just outlined more closely than any
other issue requiring political discussion. Since, in
addition, new developments are continually evolving, any
conclusions about the impact of contemporary urban planning
politics on the city form would be, at the very least,
dangerous. Instead, we focus on an effort to analyze pro-
visionally the new developments in light of the historical
trends that led up to them -- trends in the way people
think and act (or react), and trends in the course of the
city's evolution. In this sense, we try to outline the
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impact that history is likely to have on the evolution of
the city and the limits and possibilities that it pre-
scribes. With such an approach the last chapter of this
part contains the conclusions of our whole work.
The 1974 political change, when the Colonels' junta
resigned in favor of a political government under Karamanus,
marked a turning point for both the political and socio-
economic status of the country. A number of changes
occurred, following that point in time, that seem to be
strongly interrelated within a consistent framework of
changing policies. These changes run through the whole
spectrum, from the constitution, to the everyday economic
reality, and thus underline a new threshhold in the life
of the country.
Greece's Constitution of 1952 lays down general rules
and principles of conduct; the laws regulate action and
behavior on this basis between individuals, the public and
the state. Traditionally, physical planning - other than
building controls - has not been generally accepted and
has not been supported by the constitution. Thus, property
rights have been manipulated for profit with little control.
The present Constitution of June 1975 generally reflects
more democratic aspirations, and has several implications
for planning. The relevant articles and their potential
impact on the situation are:
Article 17 -- protects property, but not its use, in a
manner detrimental to the public interest. However,
the state can regulate and coordinate the development
of the country and take part in private enterprises
in order to fulfill its goals.
Article 18 -- requires legislation to be enacted
regarding exploitation of resources such as land,
archeological sites, etc.
Article 21 -- housing for those who are homeless or
live in inadequate housing conditions is made the
subject of special care by the state.
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Article 24 -- places the whole responsibility on the
state to play, protect and develop "the physical and
cultural environment". This article also provides
measures for the exchange, expropriation and trans-
fer of land for public purposes. Regional policy.
The democratic aspirations that underline the new con-
stitution are more palpably expressed in the prevailing
attitudes of political life. The political system is finally
becoming stabilized as a parliamentary republic, with paral-
lel rejection of all those para-political institutions
(royal court, army intrigues and unofficial or right-wing
terrost parapolitical organizations) that, from the introduc-
tion of liberalism in Greece, and mainly throughout the
post-war period, were always threatening -- overtly or
covertly -- to undertake an active role and substitute the
elected governments. The change is ultimately expressed by
the legalization of the two Communist parties, which had
been continuously outlawed since the civil war. In a
broader sense, the change reveals tolerance of, and respect
for, the opposition, which, in turn, demonstrates a desire
for more explicit discussions about the country's problems.
The intensity and broadness of the ensuing discussion about
the capital's future could never had existed without these
new developments, which may open the door to a new inter-
ventionist role for planners. For the time-being, however,
one-party governments, which dominate the Parliament, conduct
this intervention through the indirect paths of political
rhetoric, and prevent the introduction of explicit compro-
mises that characterize planning processes in other South
European countries like Italy and Spain. Nevertheless when
referring to the previous situation, the changes are
apparent: the "Athens 2000" Master Plan has attracted
broad public attention, the controversial Act 947/79 enjoys
wide concern, and the public discussion of issues concerning
the capital has reached an unprecedent peak.
Another change in political life, with important impli-
cations for planning, is that the post-junta governments
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are persistently oriented to Greece's incorporation into
the European communities as a means of safeguarding democracy
and of surpassing the difficulties that abberant capitalis-
tic growth has piled up. The reforms that, necessarily
will follow this incorporation, pose the question of the
role of the capital city in the economic system of the
country: the struggle for a new Master Plan, the policy of
'competitor cities', and, ultimately, the Act 947/79 must
be seen in the framework of such problems as the hypercon-
centration of various activities in the basin and the
staggering productive efficiency of the metropolitan environ-
ment. Problems like pollution, congestion, delays in trans-
portation, bad settlement conditions, and skyrocketing land
prices not only torment the inhabitants, but also restrain
productivity, endanger the entire economic system, and
mark the end of a course of city evolution that has been
followed throughout the post-war period.
Economic problems, however, have been exacerbated re-
cently by the current international crisis; these repercus-
sions have a strong effect on Greece's inherently weak
economy. Recession and inflation brought increases in GNP
down to zero, creating a new situation for a building
industry that traditionally had been a basic stimulator,
(and also the ultimate beneficiary), of the post-war econo-
mic growth. Decline in the building sector, under the
historically established circumstances, would diminish the
prosperity of the capital and bring bitter conflicts on
the scene; but also, if controlled, could offer an oppor-
tunity for the infusion of fresh ideas and the reorganiza-
tion of the city on a new basis, as in Rome during '60s
(King p. 195).
The present, heated discussion about the future of the
city marks a popular understanding of the changing situa-
tions and poses, once again, all the problems that had been
ignored during the years of fast development.
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In the following pages we trace this discussion and the
motives that underline it, in order to understand the con-
flicts that have emerged and their possible impact on the
evolution of the Greek capital.
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"ATHENS 2000"*
The governmental concern about the future of the capital
is marked by an effort to overcome the traditional rela-
tionship, or rather the lack of any relationship, between
"official" planning and actual city expansion that has
characterized the urban affairs of the city since, at
least, the period between the wars.
This effort is made clear on two levels. First, in the
general policy guidelines that surpass the consideration of
the capital as an isolated city, and treat it as a part of
the national urban network. And second, on the level of
the specific implementation measures that are suggested or
have already been taken, in order to support the policy
guidelines.
The new effort tries to get to the roots of the
problem -- hyperconcentration of population and economic
activities in the capital to a degree that simultaneously
causes stagnation of large areas in the rest of the country,
and congestion and malfunction in Athens. Although
general declarations speak about improvements in the
"quality of life", a more careful examination of the ori-
ginal edition of the Master Plan proposal reveals its main
concern to be the "improvement of the efficiency of the
productive mechanism in the capital", a declaration also
repeated in the introductory texts to the many new laws
that intend to regulate city expansion. On the other hand,
we have to note that the obstacle to a balanced develop-
ment was not so much in the lack of the necessary legislation,
*"Athens 2000" is the name given to a discussion about
the new Master Plan, organized by the TEE last fall. Ever
since, it has become fashionable to attach the name to any
related discussion, or even to the Master Plan proposal,
itself.
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but rather in the lack of political will for programming and
organization. The proof is that those few laws
assuming long-run responsibilities for the government had
been rarely used, while the bulk of the laws that deal
with 'city extensions' had been overused. From this point
of view, the new legislation not only aims at providing
the necessary tools for implementation, but also declares
a will for a new course of development.
Professionals, through their organizations (TEE and
SADAS*) had always been asking for the broad approach that
is now promoted, but, at the same time, feverishly involved
in expanding the city in the adhoc manner we have seen in
the two previous parts. For the time being, they don't
oppose the principles of the new policies but absolutely
refuse to desist from their established "rights". The
discrepancy that occurs between theory and everyday reality
is then pushed back to even more fundamental issues, touch-
ing on the very nature of the system itself. This position
offers the safe shelter of a reality that can't be reversed
and thus postpones solution of the problems to some remote
ressurection of the city and its society.
In our analysis, we followthe opposite path. We try
to reduce the issues to their basic ingredients, and thus
reveal the fundamental conflicts that underline the polemic
about the new envirnomental policies. Following the broad
outlines of the discussion, we examine three issues:
Decentralization, the relation of the capital to the
rest of the country;
Reorganization. The intention to manipulate relation-
ships within the capital as expressed in the 1979
Master Plan proposal; and,
Interventionist Planning. The increase of planning
power as a response to the structural problems that
*SADAS is the Greek Architectural Association.
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scarred the face of the capital.
DecentraZlization
Decentralization policy intends to funnel the largest
part of an imminent wave of migration* to proposed 'com-
petitor cities', instead of to the capital and Thessalonika
the traditional destinations of migrants. Although the
policy intends to favor the periphery, which is generally
considered to be neglected by the state, it is character-
istic that it includes strong considerations about the
capital. Only two among the five goals of the regional
policy** explicitly address the problems of the capital:
1. To check the population growth of Athens and Thessa-
lonika.
2. To provide with acceptable living condition the popula-
tion remaining in the two major cities. Institutional
and administrative reforms are necessary, as well as
the completion of the urban infrastructures, works of
urban renewal and environmental improvement.
The remaining three goals, which directly consider the
periphery, suggest:
3. The economic development of the periphery through the
intense use of incentives and the suitable adoption of
the program of public investments;
4. The gradual betterment of the settlement environment
in the whole country, with specific initial emphasis on
some regional centers (competitor cities) that because
*This is expected to occur as a result of industrial in-
tensification and agricultural improvements, both promoted
by ECM. It is said that the government has accepted an
ECM goal to reduce the agricultural population from the
present 28 percent to 12 percent, within the next ten years.
This is not officially confirmed, but attributed to off-
the-record remarks by ministers, and is persistently re-
peated by the press, and the opposition parties.
**As declared in the document: "Regional Policy Guide-
lines," National Council of Regional and Environmental
Planning, Ministry of Coordination, Athens, March 23, 1979.
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of their size, place and existing trends can be devel-
oped into peripheral poles of attraction for economic
activities and population; and,
5. The regional distribution of those administrative ser-
vices that deal with local problems.
However, all fundamental decisions are still reserved
for the capital and a new ministry of Regional and Envir-
onmental Affairs has been created in order to coordinate
the whole operation; it is expected to allocate resources
in a more 'equal' way but without any cost for the ideologies
of the basic distributive function. Thus, decentralization
is attempted through further centralization of the funda-
mental decision-making mechanism and this is expressed by
the fact that the government has initially chosen to develop
'competitor cities' and not regions. This leaves intact
the basic relationship between cities and government and
does not introduce any intermediary level of government
with essential authority. Actually the public agencies
that deal with urban affairs are expected to operate local
offices which will be coordinated by headquarters in the
capital. Keeping in mind the bureaucratic stiffness of the
existing mechanisms, one could expect further complications
in the flow of information, which is very likely to be
absorbed by the capital in the form of new increases in
the already hypertrophic administrative sector.
Such a policy actually supports the pattern of corpor-
ate activities that has developed in recent years (head-
quarters in Athens and new plants in the periphery), tends
to concentrate all 'superior' activities in the capital,
and thus further strengthens its appeal at least to skilled
migrants.
However, it is not only that the government is too
hesitant in following a consistent decentralization policy,
but also that the opposition is too tepid in its criticism.
That is, while the measures that deal directly with the
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capital have attracted, in the last two years, hot discus-
sions. The debate about decentralization seems to be
buried within a general consensus.
In our opinion this is a good illustration of the role
that politics play in urban affairs in Greece. To clarify
this point, as well as aspects of the discussion about the
new plan proposal and the Act 947, a brief look into the
elective system could be particularly insightfull.
The central government is elected in a general vote by
the system of "reinforced proportional representation,"
according to which a party with as little as 35 percent of
the vote can achieve an absolute majority in the distribu-
tion of seats in the parliament. In this way, an electoral
minority is capable of establishing a parliamentary major-
ity and so collaboration cabinets are unknown as yet. The
other levels of administration are relatively insignifi-
cant; prefects are directly appointed by the government
and have limited control over small counties, while the
local governments are directly elected by the people, but
are deprived of any essential power, as we have seen with
the Athens municipality. With such a system, whoever gains
the support of more than 35 percent of the constituency is
theoretically capable of forming a government with full
control over the country. This system not only consolidates
the successive ruling right-wing (ND) governments, but it
also warms the hopes of the Socialist opposition (PASOK)
for an undisturbed administration after an electroal win
that now seems imminent. A complex system of directly
elected regional governments could present obstacles to
whomever is in control of the central one, and it seems
this fear is shared by both the ruling party and its prin-
ciple contender.
In this framework none is really willing to suggest
and seriously support the establishment of regional govern-
ments that might have authority to challenge the centrally
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made decisions. The ruling ND relies on the present sys-
tem, which has always sustained it. PASOK and other oppo-
sition parties, on the other hand, emphasize the role of
municipalities they have historically controlled municipali-
ties are good conductors of party politics and, besides
that, weak enough to ever seriously challenge the central
government. In a broader sense, politics overshadows
policy. This will become even more clear in the presenta-
tion of the discussion about the future of the capital.
Reorganization -- the "Athens 2000" Master Plan Proposal
The "Athens 2000" Master Plan proposal, or more precisely
"Proposal of a Framework for the Regulation of Space in
Athens until the Year 2000," has some interesting differ-
ences in comparison with previous plans produced in the
post-war period. The most essential one is that it comes
as a response to explicit policy guidelines set by the
state, a situation unusual in Greek politics, where plan-
ners -- either public agencies or individuals -- were usually
assigned to work out plans with limited specification about
the related governmental intentions. The usual request
made to the planners was to devise means to arrest ad-hoc
growth, replace it with an organized development, and
other such vague generalities that left wide margins of
interpretation and, actually, transferred responsibility
for establishing policy principles to the planners them-
selves. Planners responded by projecting their individual
values, a reality that explains both the 'utopian' charac-
ter of Greek town planning and the striking discrepancies
among the various plans of the recent decades: Doxiades,
influenced by his own professional involvement in the United
States, conceived of the capital as a megalopolis, while
Kokkoliades suggested the removal of most industrial acti-
vities from the city and its gradual transformation into
a cultural center similar to the one it used to be in
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classical antiquity. In this way, planning became a field
for professionals to exercise their personal abilities, and
lost its public role. In order to reintroduce this public
role, the new effort promotes the distinction between policy
guidelines and physical planning to accommodate them. The
latter is still reserved for the professionals, but the
former is increasingly becoming the responsibility of the
public interest, as expressed through the various existing
institutions.
The results of this new reality are expressed in the
declaration of a set of goals that represent official policy
guidelines at this time. The basic aspects of the policy
are:
1. To arrest the population growth in the capital: a
target of 4.3 million was set for the year 2000 (pre-
sent population, 3.6 million). All those activities of
the public and private sectors that can attract further
migration will be restricted to their present level.
Industry is permitted, from now on, only to reorganize
its functions on the assumption it does not create more
jobs. Regional development efforts are the complement
to this policy.
2. To arrest the spatial expansion of the city and, in-
stead, focus on an effort to redistribute population
within the already developed territory, in order to
achieve a polycentric function that will eliminate
unecessary movements and wasted time. In other words,
to develop cities within the city, with their own
independent activities and centers.
3. To assure the channels of the basic transportation net-
work. To develop public transportation and especially
the long-discussed Athens subway, the Metropolitan.
4. To preserve the environment, with development of the
spaces in the periphery of the city and with rehabilita-
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tion of heavily polluted industrial areas. Also to
preserve the adjacent rural land through the introduc-
tion of intense cultivations that will increase its
productivity.
5. The Master Plan is considered as a continuous process
in which municipalities must participate with essential
authority and about which the public must be continu-
ally informed.
The above guidelines were agreed upon in a meeting
organized by the Ministry of Coordination, with participa-
tion of the cabinet and delegations from the TEE, the EMP,
the municipal authorities of the basin and from organiza-
tions that are involved with the problems of the capital.
Although the rationale behind these guidelines seems ob-
vious and vague, the process that led to their adoption was
innovative, considering the Greek reality. First, that
the government has taken on some commitments; and second,
the institutions largely controlled by the Socialist oppo-
sition (TEE and municipalities) have cosigned a public
document that commits them as well. In a sense, none
disputes the need for planning; real problems occur, how-
ever, when we move closer to the reality.
The plan, following the guidelines, suggests that the
capital be separated into a compartment with an average
population of 500,000 (this size is considered as adequate
to decentralize the system but not diffuse it). The com-
partments will be assisted by centers that have already
begun developing and will be reinforced by the establish-
ment of all those administrative functions that are under
the direction of a prefect and satisfy the usual everyday
needs of the inhabitants. As for the road network, the
plan, again, relies upon improving the efficiency of exist-
ing arteries with the single addition of an east-west highway
that improves communications within the basin and connects
it with the two adjacent plains that are already flooded
-241-
with industry (Eleusis) and urban sprawl (Mesogea).
Besides these two fundamental arrangements, the plan
specifies the area of wholesale commerce, the areas of
study for industrial rehabilitation, the rural land to be
preserved and, finally, the desirable standards for the
accommodation of various activities in the basin. Further
details are left to be studied by the nine compart-
nents, for small-scale actions are suggested to be taken
either by municipalities, where they are willing to do so,
or by the new Ministry of Regional and Environmental
Affairs. Thus the plan, along with new legislation, tries
to set up a framework for a process, rather than produce
yet another colorful document, which has been the case up
to the present.
By the spring of 1979 the proposal had been presented
to the public, and a number of discussions were held with
wide participation, including both institutions and people.
It was also at this point that there appeared the first
strong reactions to the whole case of regulation of space
in the capital. Besides a few technical disagreements the
reaction was focused on three main issues.
First, is the number of the compartments, criticized by
the municipal authorities on two grounds: the number of
compartments is too small, they say, to carry out 'real'
decentralization and in some cases they cut-off parts from
the territory of the 'historically' established municipali-
ties, that should be preserved. The implicit alternative
is that compartments should be based on the existing
municipalities or groups of them. Such a criticism for-
gets that the metropolitan area includes 'cities' as large
as 1.1 million (Athens) side by side with 'villages' with
a population of no more than 450 inhabitants (Kamatero).
It also forgets the role that the staggering peripheral
communities has played, since before WW II, in establishing
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the concentric pattern we know today. Besides that, the
suggested centers already 'ignore' municipal territories
and develop along arteries that intersect neighboring
'cities'. Again, none suggests a new administrational
structure, and all seem to prefer the existing one which
is characterized by a large gap between the centralized
government and the weak and numerous local ones. (By now
there are 102 such municipal governments in the whole met-
ropolitan area).
The second point is that local authorities, along with
TEE and SADAS, claim that they had been ignored in the
stage of plan preparation and, instead, they were invited
only to ratify it after it had been completed. It is true
that in a state with structures as centralized as Greece's
national governments have always been mistrustful of local
authorities, especially as the latter had always backed
the successive opposition parties -- in a sense, it is con-
sidered natural that municipalities are almost de facto
anti-government. The origins of this mutual mistrust can
be traced to the manner in which the state stripped local
governments from any essential power during the period
between the wars. It seems to us, however, that the cur-
rent problem is different, and we will be looking at it
later in this text, in relation with the Act 947/79.
The third point, and perhaps the most interesting one,
is that, finally, all institutions politically affiliated
with the parliamentary opposition come to dispute any
possibility for regulation of the space to occur within
the limits of the existing socioeconomic system of the
country. Despite their continued references to the well-
organized western European cities, a number of mayors and
a TEE delegation have cosigned a text flatly stating that
"a Master Plan cannot achieve anything positive if based on
free-market mechanisms." This dramatic statement totally
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obscurs the discussion, especially if it is kept in mind
that several among the cosigners are affiliated with parties
that, though in the opposition, do not dispute at all the
fundamental aspects of the Greek socioeconomic system.
Clearly, the discussion about the Master Plan proposal
gives us limited insight into the actual problems of the
city, the possible alternatives to overcoming them, or
their associated costs. On the opposite it seems rather
strange that a plan proposal could cause such a violent
reaction in a city where previous plans had been considered
to be simply bright colors on peculiar maps, and opportun-
ities for philogical discussion. The motives underlying
this reaction will be clarified only when we focus on the
specific processes that are suggested by the plan proposal
for the implementation of its guidelines. The processes
refer to a number of laws that have been promoted by the
parliamentary majority of the right-wing government during
the last few years. This new crop of laws has come to ac-
tually replace the whole corpus of legislation that had been
elaborated in the '20s and early '30s. Its most interesting
parts are:
e The act for building ratios (Act 880/79). This deals
with two subjects. On the one hand it eliminates the
floor-to-area ratio, in order to prevent excessive den-
sities (in this way it also makes it very difficult for
proprietors and engineers to develop small lots with
the system of antiparochi). On the other hand the law
modifies the status of eminent domain: instead of pay-
ing for state-expropriated land, the government can now
replace a parcel with another parcel of estimated equi-
valent value in another area of the city.
e The decree for provision of parking spaces in new build-
ings (.697/79), according to which all new buildings must
be equipped with parking spaces or, alternatively, the
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owners must contribute to a city wide money pool that
will fund the public provision of such spaces.
e The act for "settlement areas" (947/79) that provides
the framework for rehabilitation of existing settlements.
. The act for the creation of a Public Real Estate Cor-
poration (957/79), whose purpose will be to exploit the
property of the state and intervene in the land market.
. The act which establishes the Public Corporation of
Urbanism and Settlement (DEPOS), whose purpose will be
to actively undertake works of construction in the
"competitor cities," and urban rehabilitation in the
capital and Thessalonika.
The new legislation radically changes the frame of ref-
erence in which city expansion and planning is to occur
from now on, and deeply affects the role of all involved in
urban affairs. The first efforts to implement it (1979-
1980) caused strong reactions that will help us understand
the actual problems of the Greek capital. The case of the
act for "settlement areas" is perhaps the most illustrative
one.
Interventionist Planning: Act 947/79
Act 947 is a response to the structural problems which
are scarring the face of the Greek capital. Its major
purposes are: to establish and legislate the redistribu-
tion of urban land, and eliminate the restrictions that are
imposed by extensive parcelization and land ownership by
individuals; to help in the provision of those public spaces
necessary for social and physical infrastructures, thus
widening the meaning of "public good;" to offer the insti-
tutional framework for reorganization and betterment of
degradated areas, assuming the 'rehabilitation' of these
areas' inhabitants; and finally, to offer a method for the
segregation of incompatible uses. The land necessary for
the provision of these measures will be obtained by contri-
-245-
butions from all the proprietors of the area that will be
characterized as a "Settlement Area;" the contributions can
amount to as much as 40 percent of their lots. Funding of
the works will be assured by special local taxation that
will amount to 10 percent of the value of the remaining
part of the lots. This process of reorganization of the
urban fabric can be initiated by the Ministry of Regional
and Environmental Affairs, by municipalities, or by the in-
habitants of an area themselves; and the study and construc-
tion can be undertaken either by private groups, public
institutions (such as DEPOS) or by mixed-economy corpora-
tions.
The process that, in a few words, aims to provide the
settlement areas with an acceptable street network, greenery,
and space for social equipment, can be applied both in
areas that are included in the city map and in illegal
settlements where the intensity of the problems is more
acute. In the latter case the contribution in money roughly
equals the fee that is now paid for the legalization of
these areas, according to 1923 law for city expansion.
It is obvious that Act 947 promotes for the capital a
new concept of city function, the recycling of the existing
fabric on a communal basis, rather than the expansion on
an individualistic basis that is the established pattern
since the period between the wars. Along with other new
decrees and acts, Act 947 substantially decreases the mar-
gins for the small-scale land speculation that has been the
strong support for both city expansion and for economic
vitality throughout the same period. The Act also tries
to bridge the gap between official planning and the every-
day reality. It is on the foundations of Act 947 that the
Master Plan relies for the realization of its guidelines
and specific proposals.
In a sense, we see in Act 947 a compromise that tries
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to adopt Big Actions, that are felt as necessary to match
the Big Problems of city actions that address the esta-
blished scale of city fabric, and thus take advantage of
its qualities, rather than attempting to implement quali-
ties that are alien to the existing situation. To this
end, the Act strives to radically change both the scope of
production of urban space and the ideologies that underline
the activities of all those who are the subjects of urban
affairs. Exactly for this reason the case gives an excel-
lent opportunity to approach the actual probilities of the
capital on many levels.
Actually, the idea of rehabilitation of degraded areas
through an organic incorporation into the city fabric with
parallel redistribution of land ownership accepting more ra-
tional patterns, is an old one. It first appears in a 1966
Conference of SADAS,* in later proposals about the fate of
illegal settlements,** -- a most recent example -- in an
actual effort to organically include an illegal stetlement
area into a city plan,*** an effort that covers very close
to the terms of Act 947. The latter is especially inter-
esting, not only because it tested the idea of rehabilitation
in reality, but also because it separated the role of the
state from the problems inherent in the urban communities
of the capital as the initiative was taken by the local
municipality, and the project was based on a close personal
*Diamantopoulos study for Kaissariani.
**Explicit similarities with proposals by Turner, assuming
a city that is still under the process of expansion.
***The presentation of the case is based totally on the
paper, "Coal Mines at Nea Ionia, Athens: Procedural Steps
for Master Plan Inclusion -- The Role of the Architect,"
produced by the architects who were involved in the re-
planning of the area, however, we use the information in-
cluded in the above paper to reach conclusions quite dif-
ferent from the ones suggested by the authors themselves.
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relationship between the planners and the cities of the
area, rather than on the usual impersonal bureaucratic
processes.
The case refers to the area of illegal settlements
around the coal mines at Nea Ionia, which were developed
in the '50s and early '60s, and which gave the same major
chronic problems as most illegal settlements in the basin.
The problems of the area cropped up recently when a major
circulation axis was planned to run through the area of
illegal settlements, around the coal mines at Nea Ionia.
The future development of the area is therefore directly
related to the construction of the project, which would
transform a street running through the middle of the illegal
settlement, Kymis Street, into a 60-meter wide avenue, thus
splitting the settlement in two. The local authorities,
after several attempts to arrive at an agreement with the
Ministry of Public Works about the area's future plan, com-
missioned in 1977, a group of architects and planners to
draw up a plan on their behalf. The group adhered to the
prescribed 60-meter width of Kymis Street, and also to the
position that the spatial qualities of the settlement
should be preserved as much as possible. The proposed
solution aimed at the smallest possible number of land
expropriations, converted most secondary roads into pedes-
trian ways, and suggested the redistribution of large plots,
to be used for green areas, a school, a shopping center and
building sites alloted to the landowners suffering damages
from the widening of Kymis Street. Besides that, a zoning
ordinate was presented, which anticipated land coverage of
50-60 percent, two- to three-story heights, and also, stand-
ard types of house layouts; the latter to facilitate the
people who built their own homes. The basic idea of the
new plan meant to assure a uniform level of satisfaction in
meeting the needs of the inhabitants, and also to prevent
-248-
the possibility for speculation that usually marks the tran-
sitional period of illegal settlements and deeply hurts the
virtues of the initial environment.
The proposal was presented to the inhabitants and local
authorities, giving rise to heated controversy stemming
from conflicting interests. Following the presentation,
various pressure groups first tried to win the planners to
their side:
a. Some inhabitants suggested to the planners that they
provide them with more advantageous zoning for specific
lots, in exchange for commissioning the planners them-
selves to draw plans for the houses to be erected there.
b. "Big" landowners wanted to cancel the redistribution of
land or the plan itself; and,
c. Pressures arose from municipal councilors, involved in
building conservation, who had interests in the area
(building permits with the old status under process,
promises for contracts under antiparoch, etc.)
After a period of inactivity the planners were ignored al-
together, and the local authorities produced and submitted
to the Ministry of Public Works an alternative plan with an
unimaginative orthogonal layout, with Kymis Avenue re-
taining its present width of 27 meters. No comment on or
replay to the plan was ever received from the Ministry.
Instead, in January 1979, the Ministry of Public Works
announced that the construction of the 60-meter-wide Kymis
Avenue was a top priority project, to be started immedi-
ately.
The experience of replanning the coal mine settlements
of Nea Ionia reveals the fundamental difficulties that
will follow any intention to overcome the present concept
of city growth. The case is especially vivid as it is
absolved from the odious aspects that the Act 947 suggests
in order to rehabilitate urban areas: no monetary contri-
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bution from inhabitants is required, and only insignificant
contributions in land, as the planners assume that the
neighboring public land will be delivered in compensation
for the expropriated land used to widen Kymis Avenue. Es-
sentially, the obstacle lies in the fact that the plan in-
tends to arrest the use of the land as a speculative means,
and thus disrupt the spiral of inflated expectations on the
part of the inhabitants, which in the specific case, is
inflamed by the fact that the area is adjacent to such
highly developed neighobrhoods as Phlothei and Galatsi. The
case gives insights into the limits to the role of the
municipalities, which, despite any declarations, have to
recycle the existing concept of city growth as a means to
consolidate its electorate base. Whoever makes the highest
bid in this auction of expectations will gain the politi-
cal support of the people, and local authorities are in an
advantageous position, as they can disassociate local prob-
lems from the fate of the basin as a whole. In addition,
the fact that elected councilors of municipalities are
often professionally involved with building construction
further tightens their bonds and their interests with the
many individual citizens who want to develop their proper-
ties, and puts in doubt their ability and will to positively
intervene in urban affairs.
After the reaction we have seen in the Nea Ionia case,
it can hardly seem strange that a storm was caused by the
Public Works Ministry's efforts to implement Act 947. And
it no longer seems paradoxical that municipalities were
reluctant to take their own initiative in planning, even
though they finally had the chance to fulfill their old
and persistent requests for an active role in urban affairs.
Recent plans drawn for the rehabilitation of two urban
neighborhoods and of an extended area of summer houses,
along with the implementation of Act 947, have caused, up
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to the pay we write these lines, 20,000 grievances from
the inhabitants, refusal by the municipality of Nea
Heraklion (initially a participant in Act 947) to be
actively involved in the process, and finally, the replace-
ment of the minister who conceived and tried to implement
the act by a new one, who promised to "study" the case and
modify the law to a more lucid one. Thus, the government
temporarily removes its policy in order to avoid the poli-
tical consequences. The opposition, on the other hand,
attempts to take advantage of the situation by violently
deploring the law, and by making vague criticisms similar
to the ones we have seen earlier in the chapter.
We have seen thus far conflicts and divisions on three
levels: People split between their identity as inhabitants
and proprietors; local politics; and split between desires
and present reality; and national politicians split be-
tween their understanding of the need for planning policy
and their very political survival. In this game, the roles
of government and opposition can be seen as temporary and
interchangeable, as the problems do not make ethical dis-
tinctions between who is in control, and interested in
consolidating their status, and who is the opposition, and
thus interested in overturning the situation. Sooner or
later the opposition will have to face the same puzzling
questions; and rhetoric against planning will only bind
them, should they come to power, hampering their ability
to implement a policy.
In this mileu, the position of the professionals brings
onto the scene other aspects of the problem, which com-
pletes the picture of present dead ends. While the profes-
sionals do not dispute directly the necessity of the
improvements that the Act 947 intends to bring to the city,
they react strongly to its supporting legislation and to
the process that are suggested for its implementation.
Actually, the act for building ratios and the decree for
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provision of parking spaces have substantially decreased
the margins for small-scale speculation that has been the
motivating force for expanding the city in the post-war
period. Along with the economic recession, an inflation
rate that, in the case of building industry, moves 2-3
percent higher than the general index, and a new burden of
taxes that discourages potential buyers, the above laws
reduced building activity in the last 9 months to levels
25-57 percent lower than in the previous year. The threat
to the 200,000 people involved in the building industry
seems to be very serious and Act 947, with its regulations
that intend to drastically cut the margin for small specu-
lation, is considered to be the potential coup de grace for
the building industry. In a broader sense, however, Act 947
threatens the whole institution of small- to medium-scale
private building enterprise, which has been the cornerstone
of the building industry in Greece since the state had quit,
its role in housing provision during the '50s. Besides
limiting margins for speculation, Act 947, indeed the en-
tire spectrum of new government policy, introduced bigger
scales in city growth that, if applied, will inevitably
leave the existing small enterprises behind, rendering them
obsolete. Under the hard truths, professionals persistently
complain that Act 947 opens the door to "big capital" which
will transform independent, small entrepreneurs into em-
ployees in the big enterprises. Paralyzed by a similar
fear, the professionals have ignored altogether the possi-
bility of creating cooperatives from public corporations
and the municipalities, as it implies the same strains of
large-scale planning. It is inevitable that socialization
of production will lead to more efficient forces of city
expansion and, under this reality, it is also inevitable
that the professionals will lose their advantageous posi-
tion, a face that will be especially true if they don't
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adopt to the new situation with mergers that will make
possible their survival. Persistent recourse to vague,
anti-monopolistic rhetoric will fail as soon as more effi-
cient forms of production appear, and thus persuade the
people that they can provide less costly solutions to their
problems.
In such a confusion between public and local or private
interests, no one is surprised by the fact that professional
bodies such as TEE and SADAS are split by their double na-
ture, as scientific organizations on the one hand, and
corporate bodies of the engineers on the other: The TEE
is organizing discussion and criticism of the plan but, at
the same time, it promotes strikes to protest decline of
the building sector. In this context, it is not difficult
to understand the professionals' vague criticism of the
scale of the plan nor to understand the coincidence of opin-
ion between supliers and buyers of the market.
The struggle to promote an acceptable Master Plan and
new legislation represents, in spatial terms, a conflict
between two concepts of city growth: a continuation of
urban sprawl, or a change to a pattern of localized growth
that would lead to a decentralization of the city itself.
In a broader sense, however the new policies intend to
drastically intervene in the mechanisms that produce the
urban fabric, and introduce governmental intervention and
land use regulation instead of the adhoc activity that
dominated the scene for the last half-century. In this
sense, more decisions that, up to the present, were in the
hands of the private sector, will be transferred to the
hands of the state, these decisions will also be made in
light of the state's intentions.
Regulation -- although all agree that it's necessary --
is not supported, through action, by anyone for whom it
would mean restriction of potential income from land. Since
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the regulations in effect in the early '50s were minimal,
if followed at all, any increase in regulation or the
enforcement of regulation would mean effective downtoning
of many areas and, thus, loss of income for both the entre-
preneurs and their clients. As the motivations for regula-
tion express, in our opinion, a response to such fundamental
issues as recession and inflation and improvement in the
productivity of the city's mechanism, one could expect that
planning will increasingly become the vehicle of political
struggle, and thus acquire a central role in city expan-
sion. The role of planning becomes more and more crucial
as adhoc city expansion threatens the very foundations of
the system on which such expansion was based.
-254-
CONCLUSION: CHANGE OR INERTIA?
So far the "Athens 2000" framework and Act 947 by them-
selves cannot give us specific insights into the course of
city making in Athens. They only express the present govern-
ment's intention to establish control tools over the urban
environment and interfere in the status quo of urban shaping.
Their general pronouncements, which aim at the city's better-
ment, and at stimulation of the local municipalities' par-
ticipation in the solution of present environmental problems,
are not enough to answer questions about how they will be
implemented, or whom they will benefit.
However, the debate, that the new proposals have stimu-
lated, can bring new insights into the trends developing
among the groups of people involved. But, again, as the
trends have come out only through the present response to
the governmental policy, they cannot reveal their actual
dynamics. Here history intervenes to shed light on the
character of the contemporary situation, revealing the time
dimensions of its phenomena.
As shown from our analysis, present attitudes towards
the future of the city revolve around two main contradictory
components: one promoting planning as a means for struc-
tural changes in the stale city fabric, and one defending
or accepting the continuation of the unplanned course of
urban shaping. The significance of this counteraction is
that, for the first time, events are unfolding in the re-
verse order: it is planning that comes to dispute the
feasibility of laissez-faire to cope with the present-day
environmental problems. In contrast, throughout the four
examined historical cases of city formation, planning was
successfully overwhelmed by the ad hoc city expansion, to
be overtly reduced, in the post-war period, to a mere means
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of stimulating architectural fantasy. Small lot exploitation
was increasingly becoming the essential unit of urban develop-
ment. This mode of city making was always the result of
three components: the politicians' will to promote urbani-
zation as a means to accommodate their constituency; the
stimulative role of Athens regarding money investments from
abroad, or from other peripheral cities; and the high rate
of social mobility and the specific ideologies developed
inside the social unit of Greek society. These elements
have deeply infiltrated the Athenian urban structure, and
motivated, overtly or covertly, its development. Despite
the conflicts and sometimes violent contradictions that
appeared--in both the relationships of labor (working class
struggles in the period between the wars, and in the Sixties),
or on the national level (the split between Royalists and
Liberals occurring in World War I; the civil war of 1947-
49)--these three components of Athenian life worked quietly
to converge on one single aspect: individual housing.
Politicians used it as a means of providing individual
privileges for their voters, and created the corresponding
legislative framework; influx of money into the city found
it to be a secure channel for investment; and an expanding
middle class chose it as a symbol of social success and as
a channel for their surplus earnings. An emphasis on indi-
vidual habitation, and the institution of the dowry system,
was expressed throughout the social ranks of people migrating
or living in the capital.
These forces behind individual housing fed an economic
circuit that followed its own course, independent of the
specific political changes. Land and building speculation
became the vehicle for converging aspirations for private
housing, absorbing a substantial portion of Greece's en-
gineers and architects. Being disconnected from national
discords, but always linked to the petty or broader politics,
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housing in Athens expressed a silent consensus among the suc-
ceeding generations of politicians, people involved in the
real estate markets, and citizens. This consensus created
the conditions for a quick, quantitative solution to the
housing problem, at the same time depriving such a solution
of any broader social meaning. Ad hoc, lot-based building
aggregation in Athens best illustrates the individualist
basis of this consensus. In the remainder of our conclu-
sion we will outline the large role this consensus played
throughout the four historical cases, according to these
three components: the political will, the speculative cir-
cuit, and the individualistic aspirations.
Political will founded the capital of the New Greek
state in 1833, and determined its specific location and form.
However, it alone was not enough to secure the regeneration
of its initial concept. Another political mechanism came to
facilitate the continuity of urbanization. Through the
channel of the clientele system, politicians promoted the
continuous concentration of rural population in the capital.
Transformation from the rural to the urban status represented
a special privilege given by the political aristocracy to
these people connected to it through a network of family
relationships or acquaintances. This system ensured poli-
ticians two things: a broad constituency in the counties,
and the creation of a new network of relationships in the
seat of government. Thus, a smooth transition to urbaniza-
tion was achieved through the above political channel linking
the country and the city. But the specific form of this
urbanization had three impacts on the city institutions and
form: the reduction of the housing problem to a matter of
individual privileges; the resultant abandonment of urban
planning, which is inherently too broadly socially based to
accommodate individuals; and the subordination of bureau-
cratic urban affairs directly to public organizations, whose
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role was the better distribution of privileges among indi-
viduals. Expansion came to maximize the private territorial
space. Subdivision of the land into small-sized lots and
elimination of public spaces facilitated urban land distri-
bution among the citizens. Landowners and speculators bene-
fitted most from this practice of urban space production.
Thus, the concept of "citizen" was split into two person-
alities: one half was concerned with politics, and the other
half was an individual aiming at the promotion of his private
benefits. Thus, urbanization in Athens represented an aggre-
gation of personal privileges. Distribution of these privi-
leges was not considered a social issue, but as connected to
the political will.
This characteristicy resulting from the preindustrial and
rural structure of the country, was going to mark the next
periods of the Athenian development. The establishment of
Asia Minor refugees in Athens ensured for the liberals a
strong electoral base. However, for the first time the
housing problem was placed on a social-political--and not
individualistic--political basis. But also, for the first
time the pre-established institutions displayed their fascin-
ating capability to adapt to the new conditions and absorb
the foreign bodies. The Calligas Committee proposal failed
to give any social dimension to the entire form of the city,
the scattered establishment of refugees' settlements around
Athens--separated from the previous city context but being
also very close to it--was rather a sum of independent site
planning attempts. Both represent the inability or care-
lessness of the government to place Athens' development on a
holistic social basis. Soon the unplanned expansions of the
city approached the camps of the "Praetorians," surrounding
them with their own fabric. The 1923 and 1928 laws covering
"unauthorized" housing expanded, again on an individual basis,
the privilege of private ownership to the lower income
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migrants of the city, thus continuing the institutional
framework established in the second half of the nineteenth
century, in an urban agglomeration that was now facing rapid
industrialization. The laws framing the appearance of the
condominium apartment building developed further benefits
for the small landowners, providing them with the right to
exploit their property while giving the opportunity to a larger
number of architects and engineers to follow a successful pro-
fessional career.
In the post-war period, the rightist government inten-
sified, expanded, and diffused further the system of privi-
leges, facilitating the growth of the city and trying to
avoid any urban crisis connected to social questions in a
time when the memories of a divisive and hard-fought Civil
War were still fresh. The continuous expansion of urban
apartment buildings, the continuous increase in heights, the
growing number of "unauthorized" settlements, the housing
loan policy, all facilitated the numerous small landowners,
building enterprises, and professionals; while they
provided a private shelter to the increasing numbers of new
residents of the city.
In addition to the above official attitudes, opposition
parties were trapped in a competition of promising the most
to everyone, if they would win in the elections. It is
characteristic here that election periods were the times
when "unauthorized" building flourished, since both govern-
ment and opposition were trying to gain as many votes as
possible in the most decisive electoral precinct of the
country. As a result of this situation, it was always poli-
tics that replaced policy in the Athenian urban space. The
fact that both are expressed by the same word--"politiki"--
is the best evidence of this attitude.
The Speculative Circuit: At the same time Kleanthes
and Schaumbert were elaborating the first master plan of
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Athens, wealthy Greeks from abroad and some foreigners were
buying more than the half of Attica county land, expecting
the increase of their property value, after the city was
chosen to be Greece's capital. Their predictions were not
unwarranted. Land value in Athens, from the very beginning
of its modern history, showed an incredible rate of increase,
and proved to be the most profitable investment in a city
that had not yet developed advanced modes of capitalistic
production and exploitation. But this way of profit making
was not only stimulated by the mere fact that Athens, as the
capital of Greece, was expected to grow, but also by the
intention of Greek bourgeoisie of diaspora to invest a part
of their money surplus on their country.
As the future of the Greek communities abroad seemed
rather uncertain, due to the nationalist movements in the
countries in which they were established, Greek bourgeois
were seeking a safer place to transfer their capital. Ath-
enian space was promising both security and profitability.
Channelling capital into a city that, in the beginning,
looked cut off from any regional area, stimulated the de-
velopment of large numbers of tertiary activities, promoting
consumption and services. On the other hand, being the
first to consider land as an investment, the bourgeois be-
came the catalysts for the specific course of Athenian
expansion. Soon a circuit of land speculators was generated,
which also included people who, in one way or another, had
obtained rights on the rest of Attica's lands. It was this
circuit that produced the speculative expansion of the city
at the end of the nineteenth century. Scarcity of land for
sale never existed in the Athens area. Even though the
supply always outweighed demand, profits were always high.
As soon as an area began to be inhabited, land values were
increased before the area was filled up. A new area next
to that started to be developed, pulling the expansion of
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the city further, and so on. This process facilitated two
things: adequate Athenian space, to provide a piece of land
to its increasing population, and the investment of the
substantial money surplus stimulated overtly or covertly by
the influx of money from Greek communities from abroad. Soon
this circuit developed its own independent logic and went
beyond the conditions that created it. Illegal settlements,
first appearing in the period between the wars, were the
alternative that land speculation provided for low-income people.
Again, we have very similar processes. Rural land is parcelled
and sold as soon as the first houses are built in the settle-
ment, and another one begins its parcelization. After divid-
ing the land of the basin into small lots, the circuit is
transferred to the rest of Attic basin, providing vacation
settlements for the Athenian population, aiming at the easi-
est and most profitable method of exploitation, and increasing
the size of private land while diminishing that of public or
communal spaces. Their remedy was the subdivision into small
blocks and lots as well as narrow streets. Thus, by defini-
tion, the speculators were against the standards of planning.
As influx of money from abroad stimulated land speculation,
it also stimulated the commercialized building circuit. The
first commercialized housing for sale appeared after the
transfer of capital from the Greeks living in Egypt who
feared expulsion because of the appearance of a strong
nationalist movement in this country. In post-war Athens,
the urban apartment building also was revived by the invest-
ments of Greeks living in African countries as well as those
of the Greek immigrants working in the Western European
countries or in the USA. By filling the central areas with
condominium apartment structures, as well as most of the
suburbs and the close-lying, lower-income periphery and
expanding along the seashore, the building sector proved
its efficiency and independence of the causes that generated
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it. This efficiency is also strengthened by the number of
professions developed around it. Not only architects and
engineers but also lawyers and notaries have based their
success on the numerous sales and contracts that came with
urban apartment building expansion. Depending for its
efficiency on small lots and continuously larger floor-to-
area ratios, building circuit and the relevant professions
that follow it were always against any planning framework
proposing down-zoning regulations.
The Individual Aspirations: So far we have seen how
political and speculative mechanisms facilitated and pro-
moted private housing in Athens on an individual base. Here
we are coming to outline these social and cultural charac-
teristics of the Athenian population that supported this
base. Middle-income people, employed by public and private
services, were the first "clients" of both circuits. They
had come from rural areas or provincial towns with their only
means being an education provided by the public schooling
mechanism. Athens represented for them the promise of
climbing the social ladder. Their earnings were not great
enough to assure their habitation, in a space of their own.
A traditional custom incorporated inside the family law
framework intervened here to facilitate the new middle class
aspirations: dowry. Although the social characteristics
of the Athenian population changed dramatically in the
period between the wars, the dowry institution continued to
survive inside the working class families of privately
organized settlements. In the post-war period the institu-
tion of the dowry stimulated another trend. Families with
a daughter, or single women living in other cities of Greece,
bought an apartment in Athens with the hopes of marrying
and either living in it or at least having a standard income
from it. But a change seems to have appeared in recent
years. Apartment dowries are a declining trend. Broader
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participation of women in the production system will reduce
further the application of this institution.
Apartment buildings followed the same course that specu-
lative settlements established. They were first built for
the increasing numbers of middle-class people, they expanded
later to lower-income neighborhoods and, more recently, to
facilitate the internal movements of the middle class from
the center to the suburbs. Increased social mobility, and
the resulting ability of working class people to rise above
their status into the middle class, combined with the trend
among members of this class for owned housing, implies that
apartment-house construction in Athens would have at least a
more or less standard clientele. But this is not enough for
the building entrepreneurs who have based their economic
success on the continuous growth of the Athenian population.
In general, the people living in the city were motivated by
the strong tendency for individual housing, which was rep-
resentative of the power of family programming in Greece
and the success of real estate investments. This tendency
also symbolized the stabilization of a better social status.
The increasing rate of growth and building contributed to
the isolation of private dwelling from the surroundings. But
the previously happy apartment owners, after the filling
out of their neighborhood with multi-story building masses,
are realizing the problems of this kind of urban habitat.
They are becoming very much worried about the lack of serv-
ices and qualities that resulted from this building con-
gestion. They discover that there are not any spaces for
their children to play, no space for parking their cars,
no other view than the facade of the opposite multi-story
building.
Environmental pollution (bad air, loud noises), con-
gestion of children in schools, inefficiency of the trans-
portation system, slowness of social services, all have
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become the major issues today. Decline of environmental
quality in the already built neighborhood has resulted, in
many cases, in a decline in the property value in these
areas. Suddenly the apartment owners have discovered that
their real estate investments were not as secure as they
thought. When buying an apartment, residents of Athens
had satisfied their urgent desire for private housing through
the speculative circuit. But this has become the weakest
link of the system. The environmental problems by their
nature cannot be solved through any "clientele," specula-
tive or family-based institution. Since the problems
affect a broad range of social strata, they can be approached,
rather, through citizens' actions than the usual political
channels.
The reaction to the challenges put by the government
has shown, up to the present day, that the speculative
circuits, as well as traditional politics in general,
continue to hold the power and the influence over urban
affairs. The public response to the government planning
proposals ("Athens 2000," Act 947) was totally negative.
By this response, landowners, architects, engineers, and
builders showed their strong will to conserve the framework
that shaped Athens. But this framework was based on the
assumption of continuous growth. Some conditions that
generated this growth now seem to be changing. Change in the
trends in industry, development of other centers on the
regional and national levels, bad environmental conditions,
high cost of living, staleness in productive investments,
all imply that Athens may not be as attractive to people
from the rest of the country as it once was.
And certainly this new reality would have an impact on
people's attitudes and mechanisms. So far, political will,
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which had created modern Athens, showed a certain commit-
ment to proceed with fundamental changes in the city-making
process, but a viable change needs another base of consensus
than the present one.
-26:5-
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